POLITICAL INPUT FUNCTIONS IN THE
FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter describes the focus and general purpose of this study, outlines the theoretical tools selected for use in accomplishing the tasks proposed, and summarizes the procedure followed.

Focus and General Purpose

On September 16, 1963, four previously distinct political entities[1] were joined to form an independent political system--the Federation of Malaysia. This newborn Asian polity is the focus of this study.

Malaysia[2] has received scant systematic attention by social scientists, only in part because of its so recent creation. Even when they were separate political entities, the

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[1] The peninsular Federation of Malaya in its sixth year of independence (1957); the semi-independent and internally self-governing island State of Singapore; and the two British Borneo Crown Colonies of Sarawak and Sabah (formerly known as North Borneo).

[2] Following general usage, throughout this study terminology will be used as follows: Malaysia or Federation of Malaysia is used to refer to the thirteen state Federation comprised of peninsula Malaya plus Sarawak and Sabah. Singapore Island was a part of Malaysia from its inauguration until Singapore's expulsion in August 1965. The Federation of Malaysia's inhabitants are called Malaysians, regardless of their ethnic origins. Malaya or Federation of Malaya is used to refer to the Malay peninsula, excluding Singapore; its inhabitants are called Malayans, with the term Malays reserved to designate that portion of the population of Malay ethnic stock. The term Borneo States refers to the states of Sarawak and Sabah, as does the increasingly used phrase, East Malaysia.

components of Malaysia were largely neglected by systematic
political analysts. While a large body of literature does
exist, it is with but few exceptions dated and/or impressionis-
tic.

One need not deeply explore the reasons for this scholarly
neglect to conclude that it is regrettable. The Malaysian
nation's status as an independent state of international politi-
cal, economic and strategic significance is alone sufficient
argument for intensified scholarly analysis. The need is ampli-
fied when viewed in the framework of political science's yet
inchoate quest for universally applicable generalities about
political systems everywhere, and about polities in developmen-
tal situations in particular; by its mere existence as a unit
in the universe of political systems, the Federation of
Malaysia case demands consideration as a prerequisite to
attempts to generalize about the nations of the entire world.
The Malaysian polity is moreover of great intrinsic political
science appeal as a dramatic case study of a democratic experi-
ment in a polyethnic, developing, Southeast Asian setting.

This study scrutinizes politics in Malaysia from a general
level; it focuses macroscopically upon five of the political
system's most salient functions: political socialization,
political recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggrega-
tion, and political communication. Stated in the broadest
terms, the goal of this dissertation is to produce a systematic
descriptive and analytic study of the political input functions
of the Federation of Malaysia.

Theoretical Orientation

The theoretical dissensus that exists in comparative politics is evident from the increasingly imposing array of admittedly inchoate but quite different theoretical schemes current in the literature. Granting the desirability of an explicit statement of one's theoretical orientation, the researcher who elects to leave theory building to others faces a very difficult preliminary task in the selection of an approach; it is unlikely that study of extant theory will end in an immediately obvious choice. While some choice-criteria can be found in the literature,[3] in the last analysis the subjective aspect of approach choice is probably predominant; the student can only select on the basis of what objective criteria do exist and make explicit, so far as is possible, the subjective appeal of one's choice.

Gabriel Almond's structural functional approach, as developed in The Politics of the Developing Areas,[4] has been selected as the most promising theoretical orientation for the type of task undertaken in this study.

Without detail, the salient features of Almond's theoretical framework can be outlined briefly. In essence he posits a

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[3]Karl W. Deutsch names four: relevance, predictive performance, economy of representation, and originality. See his The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 18.

[4]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

means of comparing political systems by relating the elements
of three sets: structures, functions, and the styles of per-
formance of function by structure. The key concepts, political
system, structure, function, and style are defined as follows.
A political system is:

> "...that system of interactions to be found in all in-
> dependent societies which performs the functions of
> integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-
> vis other societies) by means of the employment, or
> threat of employment, of more or less legitimate phy-
> sical compulsion. The political system is the legiti-
> mate, order-maintaining or transforming system in the
> society."[5]

A common feature of all political systems is political
structure, defined by Almond as "legitimate patterns of inter-
action." Political systems universally perform seven (four
political input and three governmental output) common func-
tions: political socialization, political recruitment, inter-
est articulation, interest aggregation, political communica-
tion, rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication.
"Comparisons may be made according to the frequency of the per-
formance of the functions, the kinds of structures performing
them, and the style of their performance."[6]

To characterize the manner or style by which structures
perform functions, Almond relies upon the stylistic pattern
variables developed by Talcott Parsons.[7] Almond argues that

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[5]Ibid., p. 27.

[6]Ibid., p. 11.

[7]See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Toward a
General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p.
77 ff.

polities can be compared according to the way in which mani-
fest, latent, specific, diffuse, particularistic, universalis-
tic, affective and instrumental styles combine.

In sum, Almond's systemization of descriptive categories
is a conscious effort to explicate the essentially statistical
nature of his propositions about structures, functions and
styles of the polity; it is proposed as a contribution to
efforts which may ultimately lead to a probabilistic theory of
the polity.

The Almond scheme stands up quite well to the choice-
criteria of relevance, organizing power, and economy of repre-
sentation proposed by Deutsch. It directs attention to pheno-
mena presently accepted as salient and central to the concerns
of political science. Organizing power accrues from the sys-
tematization of categories presented in a comparative framework
applicable to the universe of political systems. It meets the
criterion of economy of representation in that it is "simpler"
than the situation to which it applies--directing attention
only to features of the polity hypothesized as central to
understanding.

The Almond approach has certain sensitization merits that
recommend it highly. As a systems approach it sensitizes the
student to the interdependency of polity elements, and the
links between the polity and other systems. As Eckstein notes,
it:

"directs the analytical attention, more perhaps than
any other approach to the whole web of relationships
of which politics is a part: the social phenomena on
which politics impinges and those phenomena which im-
pinge upon politics. Structural-functional analysis

is the preeminent approach to the study of social interconnections."[8]

In addition, the Almond scheme sensitizes the student to the possibility of functional equivalence, i.e., the performance of functions by unexpected structures. The approach has the additional merit of facilitating the analysis of the process of change, a fact of key importance for the study of a transitional polity. A final advantage of the Almond framework is that it is significantly operational.

The Almond approach has nowhere been exulted as the well-established best way of studying political life; it is one of many highly tentative approaches to polity study. That it is not dogmatically rigid is in fact a bonus advantage; as Eckstein notes: "It...offers the possibility of something more than crude, unsystematic description and induction, without committing the theorist to a premature, perhaps vain, search for social 'laws' or for 'grand theories' in the historicist manner."[9]

Procedure

This study of Malaysia's political input functions is divided into ten chapters. The first three chapters set the stage, providing perspective and background for the core of inquiry which follows. Chapter I presents the focus, general

[8]Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," Harry Eckstein and David Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) p. 28.

[9]Loc. cit.

purpose, theory and procedure to be followed. Chapter II overviews the environment of the Malaysian polity, with attention to the physical, social, and economic setting. The third chapter outlines the main features of Malaysian political history using a five period breakdown extending from the pre-Western period to the formation of Malaysia and the expulsion of Singapore.

Chapters IV and V are devoted to the analysis of the empirically interrelated by analytically separable input functions of political socialization and political recruitment. Chapter VI presents a quantitative analysis of the background characteristics of a sample of major Malaysian political leaders, and serves to illustrate the Malaysian socialization and recruitment processes.

Chapters VII, VIII, and IX deal respectively with the functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication. In each chapter the nature, personnel, setting and character of the major formal and informal Malaysian social and political structures crucial to the performance of these input functions are identified and described. The processes in which these structures perform are next described, and the style of their performance is characterized.

Chapter X is the final chapter in the study; it summarizes findings and presents the general conclusions of the inquiry.

CHAPTER II
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE MALAYSIAN POLITY

For purposes of perspective, this introductory chapter surveys the environmental setting or ecology[1] of the Malaysian political system. Focus is upon factors essential to understanding the current political scene.

The Physical Setting

Malaysia is the only Southeast Asian country that is concomitantly part of mainland and archipelagic Asia. The mainland sector is the country's heartland. Like an irregular stalactite, the narrow, thousand-mile-long Malay Peninsula hangs from the southeast corner of the Asian continent into the sea, with the island droplet of Singapore just off its tip at the Strait of Malacca. Mainland Malaysia occupies the 50,690 square mile south half of the Malay or Kra Peninsula-- roughly that four hundred and fifty mile portion between six and a half and one degree north latitude. Roughly conical in shape,[2] measuring two hundred miles at its central wide point and narrowing to a mere sixty miles across its southern tip,

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[1] What constitutes the environment of the Malaysian polity follows from the analytical framework discussed in Chapter I, especially Almond's definition of a political system.

[2] The asymmetric cone simile applies in a three dimensional as well as a single plane sense; in wider north Malaya, elevation is generally high and highest in the center, tapering to sea level at the southern tip.

peninsula Malaysia juts into archipelagic Indonesia; it is in land area approximately the size of England (minus Wales), or Greece, or the State of New York. Artificially joined to the peninsula by the three-quarter mile Johore Causeway is the two hundred and twenty-five square mile isle of Singapore, located a latitudinal degree and a half north of the equator.

Approximately four hundred miles by direct route across the South China Sea is Eastern Malaysia, consisting of the large coastal states of Sarawak and Sabah, measuring 48,250 and 29,388 square miles respectively. Territorially larger than all eleven of the states of western peninsula Malaysia put together, Sarawak and Sabah occupy the non-Indonesian, northwestern third of the huge island of Borneo, that stretches east into the Sulu Sea between seven and one degree north latitude.

Together these two widely separated parts of Malaysia total approximately 129,000 square miles, making Malaysia one of the largest states of Southeast Asia, exceeded in size only by Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand.

The geopolitical position of Malaysia has significantly shaped her history. Physical proximity has meant long exposure to the polar pull of the colossi to the north, India and China.[3] For centuries, the Malay promontory has served as a peninsula bridge between mainland and insular Southeast Asia;

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[3]Indian and Chinese influence--cultural, political, economic and social--has been a permanent feature of Malaysian history, especially in nodally positioned peninsula Malaysia; today Malaysia's position between the giants places her in a crucial cold war theater.

early southern migrants travelled down the peninsula into
archipelagic Australasia. Concomitantly, Malaysia's peninsula
has formed a great natural barrier on the sea route from India
and points west to the Far East--it lengthens the India-China
maritime route by several hundred miles. Because rugged moun-
tains repress overland travel between India and China, the
shortest maritime route has for thousands of years[4] been a
treasured threshhold of immense strategic importance; today
Malaysia's heartland commands this natural highway. The
funnel-shaped Strait of Malacca, formed by the Indonesian
island of Sumatra and Malaysia's west coast, is the great gate-
way between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This key shipping
lane narrows to a mere 23 miles wide, about the width of the
English Channel. Located approximately in Southeast Asia's
center, Western Malaysia straddles the strategic hub of the
region, constituting a major world meeting ground and cross-
road. The Borneo states of Eastern Malaysia are not so propi-
tiously located; they are remote from the key shipping lanes,
in the backwaters of the South China Sea, isolated from the
intense economic, social and cultural activity of the penin-
sula by 400 miles of sea.

Geologically, Malaysia is mature. The Malay Peninsula
and Borneo are elevated portions of the mostly submerged Sunda

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[4]The Straits of Malacca was a major maritime route at the
time of the birth of Christ.

Platform[5] which extends from mainland into insular Southeast
Asia. Orographically, the peninsula is marked in its northern
half by parallel series of short, geologically senile, mostly
rounded and forest-covered mountain ranges. The peninsula's
longest and highest is the Main or Central Range which extends
south from the Thai border to Malacca. With lesser parallel
ridges, this rugged range forms a backbone barrier to east-
west movement and northern interior development of Western
Malaysia even today. Moving southward, peninsula elevations
diminish, with ranges first becoming hilly ridges and finally
flattening in the deep south into the Johore Lowlands. Three-
quarters of the peninsula consists of low (under 1,000 feet
above sea level), generally hilly terrain; the coasts are
indented from 5-40 miles by low, flat, often swampy[6] alluvial
plains.

The topography of the Borneo states in Eastern Malaysia
is very similar, with an alluvial, swampy coastal indentation
that changes as one moves inland to hilly terrain and rises in
the interior to mature mountain ranges. Mount Kinabalu
(13,455 feet) in Sabah is Malaysia's highest peak; Sarawak's
highest is Mount Murud (7,910 feet).

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[5]This continental shelf gives Malaysia a uniformly shal-
low sea--surrounding (mean sea depth: 120 feet), thus creat-
ing fish breeding grounds which support a major occupation.
Geographers think that the Malay peninsula and the islands of
Sumatra, Java, and Borneo were in a previous age joined to the
mainland of Asia.

[6]Mangrove swamps are found on the western littoral, while
the peninsula's east coast is typically sandy.

These notes on elevation extremes in Malaysia should not obscure the fact that most of the country is low and typically hilly. Actually flora forms a greater topographic obstacle to human activity than does Malaysia's relief; 75-80 per cent of the area remains covered with a dank, nearly impenetrable tropical rain forest or jungle.

Hydrography has immensely influenced the life of man in Malaysia; the population has always been markedly maritime and riverine. Malaysia has nearly 3,000 miles of coastline, and the seas have long provided the means and sometimes the menace of external world contact. Most of Malaysia's people live in clusters near her waters. This has long been so; from the earliest times the Malaysian peoples have "...lived in settlements strung along the coasts and rivers where transport by small boat, drinking water, and irrigation water were available."[7] The earliest Malaysian political units were "...shaped round estuaries, where rice growing was easy and the coastal and riberine [sic] string of villages met. The interfluve was a forested frontier zone to political units undefined by boundaries..."[8] Movement and communication throughout the jungles of Malaysia have for centuries been practical only by river

[7] E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (6th ed.; London: London University Press, Ltd., 1958), p. 128.

[8] Loc. cit.

travel.[9]

Peninsula Malaysia's rivers[10] are short and run, like the mountains, in a general north-south direction; this fact has repressed interior travel and hindered east-west movement.

Rivers in the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah flow down from the interior mountains north-east and west to the Sulu and South China Seas. Over a third of the 350 mile long Rejang River in Sarawak is navigable; Sabah's Kinabatangan River is her most important interior waterway. The seas and rivers of the Borneo states are even more important than the peninsula's for travel and communication as a consequence of their remoteness and underdevelopment.

The soils of Malaysia are in general quite low in inherent fertility, the exceptions being in coastal alluvial areas. Rubber growing success is due to the fact that with proper climate and drainage it can thrive on poor soils; likewise pineapples thrive on peat--mostly wood and water on the jungle floor.

Mineralogically, Malaysia is moderately well endowed.[11]

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[9] Hodder writes in his recent book, "...the river is still almost everywhere the vital focus of human interests and activities...in many rural areas [rivers] still provide the principal means of communication." B. W. Hodder, Man in Malaya (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1959), p. 17.

[10] Each of the peninsula's three chief rivers--the Kelantan River, flowing north, the Pahang River flowing south-southeast, and the Perak River on the west coast--begin in the Main or Central Range.

[11] Natural wealth is inaccurately known, as only about a fourth of the country has been explored by modern methods.

Tin is the chief mineral; while found in nearly every state, Perak's Kinta Valley alone supplies a third of the total world tin supply. High grade iron found mostly in eastern states of the peninsula makes Malaysia the largest iron ore producer in the Far East. Some coal and bauxite are also present, but other mineral reserves are small and/or of poor quality. Sarawak has over 150 petroleum wells at Miri, but annual yield is decreasing.

The climate of Malaysia is typically tropical with average measures of temperature, relative humidity, and rainfall all being high and monotonously uniform--80°F.; 80-90%; 100" respectively. Hardly enough fluctuation in rainfall and wind direction exists to achieve seasonality.[12] While the enervating effects of an equatorial climate on man in Malaysia have often been overstated, competent research in physiological climatology has confirmed that Malaysia's climate is not conducive to optimum physical and mental energy. Hodder's recent summary of this type of medical research notes that nearly all writers agree that "...tropical fatigue certainly constitutes a serious obstacle to the social, economic and political development of Malaya."[13]

In summary, sea-divided Malaysia is a small country

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[12] There are four only mildly different seasons in Malaysia: the Northeast Monsoon season (October-March), the Southwest Monsoon season (May-September), and the two periods in between.

[13] "Climate and Man in Malaya," Hodder, op. cit., pp. 91-99.

situated between two giant nations and two great oceans, in a position of immense strategic importance, but with a physical setting generally inhospitable to man. Characteristically hilly, with moderate natural wealth, the country has mostly infertile soil and a physiologically oppressive climate. Eighty per cent of the area is covered with swamps, mountains and jungle; these factors have combined to encourage a maritime and fluvial focus for human activity. The Malaysian polity has been fundamentally conditioned by these geopolitical facts of Malaysian life.

The Social Setting

The polyethnic, polyglot population of the Federation of Malaysia, by 1966 estimate, totaled over eight million people. It is a prime example of conglomerate ethnic and cultural confluence.

. On the basis of conspicuous phenotypical physical features (skin color, facial form, stature, etc.) Malaysia's population can be classified into the communal categories shown in Table 1.

All but two per cent[14] of Malaysia's population can be classified into four rough communal categories. Ethnic diversity clearly is Malaysia's dominant demographic characteristic; its ramifications are difficult to exaggerate. Religious

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[14] This group of about 175,000 people, classified as "non-indigenous" is composed of Europeans, Eurasians, Siamese, Arabs, and others. The Europeans, Eurasians and Arabs are urban and of great importance to the Malaysian economy. Siamese are rural concentrated in the mainland north near the Thai border.

Table 1

Population of Malaysia by Ethnic Groups*

	Malays	Sarawak	Sabah	Total	% of Total
Malay	3,616,000	137,000	1,700	3,754,700	44
Chinese	2,670,000	243,000	110,000	3,023,000	36
Indian	813,000	2,400	3,200	818,600	9.5
Pakistani	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	------	
Ceylonese	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	------	
Indigenous				716,000	8.5
Sea Dayak	------	246,000	------	246,000	
Land Dayak	------	61,000	------	61,000	
Melanau	------	46,000	------	46,000	
Dusun	------	------	152,000	152,000	
Bajan	------	------	63,000	63,000	
Murut	------	------	22,000	22,000	
Other	4,000	39,000	83,000	126,000	
Non-indigenous	129,000	5,600	40,100	174,700	2
Totals	7,232,000	780,000	475,000	8,487,000	100

*Note: No Pan-Malaysian Census has yet been taken and ethnic figures and categories are contentious. The above are colated census and population estimate figures. Peninsula Malaysia's last census was in 1957; The 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 1957). More recent estimates are taken from Malaysia: Official Year Book, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1964). The last census taken of Sarawak and Sabah was in 1960.

differences, linguistic divisions, social affinities, politi-
cal allegiances, and economic specializations all roughly coin-
cide with ethnic legs of Malaysia's social foundation as Table
2 suggests:

Table 2

Race, Religion and Language in Malaysia

Race	Religion	Language or Dialect
Malays (44%)	Moslem	Malay, Indonesian, Boyanese
Chinese (36%)	Confucian-Taoist, Buddhist	Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese
Indian (9.5%)	Hindu, Muslim, Sikh	Tamil, Malayalam, Punjabi
Indigenous (8.5%)	Moslem, Animist, Christian	Malay, many tribal dialects
Non-indigenous (2%)	Christian, Jews, other	English, European, Siamese, Sinhalese, Arabic, etc.

Malaysia forms an extreme example of the "plural society"
--one in which "...the division of labor as well as the divi-
sion of wealth does not so much coincide with class lines but
rather with racial, ethnic lines."[15] Bobby prefers the term
"cellular society" for reference to Malaysia because the phrase
reflects the presence of inter-communal hostility, localiza-
tion of ethnic residence, limited inter-ethnic contact and the

ethnic specialization of economic roles.[16]

Malaysia's delicate communal balance is the result of a flood of Malay, Chinese, and Indian immigration occurring at the turn of the century, a migration motivated chiefly by the economic promise of tin and rubber. Today, however, immigration is restricted and very small; 85 per cent of the present Malaysian population was born on Malaysian soil.[17]

Malaysia, like almost all of Southeast Asia, is a relatively underpopulated area with only eight and a half million people on nearly 129,000 square miles of territory. But people are spread about the country unevenly, with all but about a million of the total population living on the mainland peninsula. Over three quarters of the population is concentrated on the peninsula's developed west central coast and foothills.

Malaysia's people are chiefly rural agrarians and for most[18] the kampong (village) is still the locus and focus of life. However, over 25 per cent of the population lives in areas of 10,000 or more people, making Malaysia the most urban country in Southeast Asia. Urbanization on the peninsula alone increased by 105 per cent between 1947 and 1957, an astonishingly high rate. Leading mainland cities are Kuala

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[16] Dobby, op. cit., p. 132.

[17] K. G. Tregonning, Malaysia (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1965), p. 7.

[18] About 60 per cent of the population lives in areas of under 1,000 in population.

Lumpur, Georgetown, Ipoh, Klang, Johore Bahru, and Malacca,[19] all of which are located in the tin and rubber belt of the peninsula's west coast. This western littoral forms Malaysia's core. It is separated from the rest of the peninsula by the mainland's central backbone of mountain and jungle, and from the Borneo states by 400 miles of the South China Sea. The peninsula's west coast is clearly Malaysia's "front door;" of the 36 cities of over 10,000 population located there, only four are on the eastern coastal fringe. Huge Sarawak state, about the same size as all of the peninsula's eleven states, has less than a million people and its principal towns, Kuching and Sibu, are small.[20] Sabah state is also scantly populated (475,000) and its major towns, Sandakan and Jesselton, totaled only 28,805 and 21,714 at the 1960 Census.

Malaysia's society is an exceedingly complex one, a fact that is disguised even by categorizations such as those in Table 1. None of the ethnic compartments presented there are homogeneous entities; ethnology is merely the basis of the society's vertical divisions. Each ethnic category in fact comprises a heterogeneous assortment of peoples, sometimes speaking mutually unintelligible tribal dialects, often of differing clans, or with diverse regional ties, or of different socio-economic status or class, or with diverse ideological allegiances. Any meaningful survey of the social situation

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[19] With populations of 316.2, 234.9, 125.8, 75.6, 75.1, and 69.9 thousands respectively.

[20] Estimated at 60,000 and 30,000 respectively.

must look separately at each communal category to bring to
light the basis of these vertical and horizontal societal
divisions.

The Malays. The Malays[21] are the brown-skinned Mongolian
descendants of the second of two southern migration waves from
the Asiatic interior during the 6th and 2nd Centuries before
Christ. The first wave comprised those autochthonous aborigi-
nal groups known today as "indigenous" peoples of Malaysia.[22]
The second great migration pushed the peoples of the first
wave from the coastal plains into the jungle interior. Known
as the Deutero-Malays or coastal Malays, and probably migrat-
ing from the Yunnan region of China between 2,500 and 1,500
B.C., this second group comprised the forebears of the present
Malay population of Malaysia; they are the dominant Malay type
in Southeast Asia.[23] Malaysia absorbed later medieval and sub-
sequent early modern migrations of this Malay type from Java,
Sumatra, Celebes, and other Indonesian islands. While they are
sprinkled throughout the regions today comprising Malaysia, they
are most concentrated in estuary settlements on the peninsula
mainland. Today, immigration is of little importance; over 95

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[21] The term "Malay" is used to refer to those of Malay
racial stock; it includes Indonesian immigrants but excludes
the Malaysian Aborigines. The term "Malayan" is used in the
literature to refer to any inhabitant of the short-lived inde-
pendent peninsula Federation of Malaya.

[22] Indigenous peoples will be discussed separately below.

[23] The Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese peoples of
Indonesia, for example, are also of Malay ethnic stock.

per cent of all current inhabitants were born on Malaysian soil.

Approximately 3,754,700 Malays today reside in Malaysia, Malay being a term vaguely defined to include all who possess Malay phenotypical traits, practice the Muslim religion, habitually speak the Malay language, and who observe Malay customs.[24]

Malays are found mostly in mainland Malaysia; only 138,700 live in the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. While Malays reside in all parts of Malaysia, they are concentrated in the northern agriculture states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, and in the central state of Pahang; these are the only states in which they comprise a majority of the population.[25]

Most Malays live in rural areas of Malaysia; little more than 10 per cent live in urban areas. They comprise only about 20 per cent of Malaysia total urban population and among major cities over 10,000 in population, they have a municipal majority only in Butterworth, Kota Bahru, and Trengganu.

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[24]It is interesting to note that in ethnic-proportion-sensitive Malaysia, even a Chinese or Indian can become a "Malay" for counting purposes. The Malay-dominated government frequently subsumes all "indigenous" peoples under the title Malay in official publications. The Census defines Malay "for practical purposes" as a blend of "the ideas of geographic and ethnographic origin, political allegiance, and social affinities and sympathies." A Chinese or Indian adopted by Malay parents and brought up as a Malay is officially designated a Malay; also a person of mixed blood who calls himself a Malay is officially counted as such.

[25]Forming 67.7, 78.4, 91.6, 92.1, and 57.2 per cent of each of the above state populations respectively.

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often been overstated.

Nearly every Malay is a Muslim[29] and the mukim (parish) and mosque are still focal points of Malay kampong life. Each Malay boy goes through a period of Koranic study. Religious services mark the life crises (birth, circumcision, acceptance into the faith at completion of religious studies, marriage, and death). Weekly sabbath services (Fridays) and various holidays[30] are considered important events. Those having made a Mecca pilgrimage are accorded special respect and are entitled to wear a white songkok (head-dress). While Islam has no priesthood, there is a clear religious hierarchy headed by the King and the state Sultans, traditional protectors of Malay religion and custom, a hierarchy that extends to the local mosque officers.[31]

While the Malay masses see themselves as devout Moslems, and this self-image is consequential, it is partially erroneous to state that all Malays are Moslem. The formal, transplanted, five-pillared teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, as interpreted through the Koran, do not fully encompass many of the elements of the Malays' belief structure. In practice,

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[29]To such an extent that religion was dropped from the Censuses of 1947 and 1957, because, as the superintendent noted, the entire Malay population is Mohammedan.

[30]For example, the Muslim New Year, the birthdate of Prophet Muhammad, the end of fasting month (Hari Raya Puasa), and the day of return from the Mecca Pilgrimage (Hari Raya Haji).

[31]The imam or prayer leader, the kathi or theological judges, and the guru or religious teacher.

ancient ritualistic customs, superstitions (e.g., belief in hantu--spirits), animist beliefs, and other pre-Islamic[32] elements combine with Islam to form a heterogeneous and complex belief structure which blends inconsistent elements. "The hantu are invoked in the name of Allah and Moslem terms sprinkle the rites and prayers to the spirits."[33]

Sectarian and regional differences split Malay Moslem ranks. While most are members of the Sunni[34] or orthodox sect, Shi'ites also exist in numbers. Regionally, peninsula Malays of the pious northeastern states are far more conservative in their religious beliefs and practices than are their west coast coreligionists.

The class stratification of Malay society has been traditionally characterized by a sharp polarization of the mass of the kampong dwellers, and the few in the ranks of the aristocratic elite. Today this is still a dominant horizontal division of Malay society, although the stark gulfs between socioeconomic educational statuses are recently being increasingly bridged as educational, economic and other opportunities for upward mobility grow better.

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[32]See J. N. McHung, Hantu Hantu: An Account of Ghost Belief in Modern Malaya (2nd ed.; Singapore: Donald Moore, 1959). Islam was brought to Malaysia by Arab traders in the 15th Century. See K. P. Landon, Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

[33]Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Malaya (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958).

[34]The two Muslim factions are divided as the rightful successors of Muhammad. Differences in observances also exist.

Religion's power to bridge this class gap has long been lauded. Pye calls it, "...unquestionably the strongest cohesive force throughout Southeast Asia."[35] This is an overstatement in respect to Malaysia; religion's full integrative potential in Malaysia, with Islam the state religion, accounts for only the Malay 44 per cent of the total population, and as noted, Islam has a minor splintering effect even among Malays.

Different kinship systems also segment Malay society. There exists the matrilineal kinship (adat perpateh) grouping of the state of Negri Sembilan and parts of Malacca on the one hand, and a bilateral (i.e., non-lineal) kinship organization new thought typical of the rest of Malay society in the remaining states.[36] These kinship groupings contribute to the Malay's definition of societal relationships.

Among Malay communities there are also local differences in the rate and extent to which immigrant Indonesians are absorbed by assimilation. Historically, Sumatrans have assimilated quickly and completely, but Javanese have more difficulty. They sometimes "live in well nigh complete isolation, forming their own communities, speaking dialects not understood by other Malays, marrying among themselves, and being governed, so far as local authority is concerned by their own

[35]Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 328.

[36]Maurice Freedman and M. G. Swift, "Rural Sociology in Malaya," Current Sociology, VIII, No. 1 (1959), 2.

leaders."[37] The west of mainland Malaysia contains numerous villages with the name Kampong Java, indicating the extent of this geographic isolation.

Notable regional differences also exist between the mountain-divided Malay settlements of the west coast and those of the northeast mainland. Malays from the latter area are generally taller than those from the southwest. Northeast mainland Malays also tend to lead more conservative, traditional religious lives, and like Malays in Sarawak and Sabah, their culture has been least touched by colonial experience. They also have lower literacy rates than their mainland west coast brethren and exhibit distinctive differences in cultural and political outlook.

Despite the complex heterogeneity of the Malay segment of Malaysia's society, there exists a definite Malay culture in which the key elements are probably the shared Muslim religion, common Malay language and anthropological origins, plus the distinctive, tradition-encrusted, rural, parochial, agrarian way of life.

The Chinese. The Chinese communal compartment of Malaysia's society today numbers 3,023,000, forming a huge minority that comprises roughly 36 per cent of the country's total population. As is true throughout Southeast Asia,[38] Malaysian

[37] Loc. cit.

[38] Chinese residents of Malaysia comprise about one-fifth of the approximately 15 million Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, who form significant minorities in every country in the area.

Chinese are an unassimilated and perhaps unassimilatable pariah minority of great significance, especially in the economic field.

Most Chinese are late immigrants to Malaysia. Although there have been Chinese-Malaysian contacts "...at least since the 7th Century and possibly to circa 100 B.C.,"[39] as late as the mid-1700's their number approximated only a "very few thousand"[40] merchants and miners. Only with the late 19th Century establishment of the Pax Britannica did the numerically great Chinese influx begin. Migration motivation was mainly economic and the Chinese came as intended sojourners[41] to make their fortunes and then return home. However, many stayed to make Malaysia their permanent home. Today, with further Chinese immigration long legally checked, three-quarters of all Malaysian Chinese are Malaysia-born; by contrast, in 1921 this was true of a mere 20 per cent of the total Chinese population.

Of Malaysia's 3,023,000 Chinese, 2,670,000 live on the mainland peninsula and virtually all of them reside in the tin and rubber belt of the west coast. They are remarkably urban; nearly three-fourths of all mainland Chinese live in cities of

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[39] Hodder, op. cit., p. 23.

[40] Smith, op. cit., p. 62.

[41] Charles A. Fisher, South-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1964), p. 641. Fisher notes that between 1921 and 1931 eighty of every hundred Chinese arrivals returned to China. Most of them came from Southern China's coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi.

over 10,000 population. This settlement pattern is duplicated in the Borneo states. Sarawak's 243,000 Chinese residents are also coastal and urban; over 60 per cent of them live in the urban districts of Kuching, Miri, and Sibu.[42] The state of Sabah's 110,000 Chinese are also concentrated in coastal urban areas of Jesselton and Sandakan. Nearly every town in Malaysia has a Chinese majority![43]

It is usually reported that Chinese are chiefly Confucianists in religion, with some Buddhists and Taoists, but this is not strictly true. In fact, a leading authority reports that religion is relatively unimportant among Malaysian Chinese:

"...the majority of Malayan Chinese seems to be able to do without what is understood in the West as 'religion,' and are satisfied with moral and social codes instead."[44] In practice Chinese belief structure manifests a melange of many often contradictory belief systems: Confucianism,[45] Buddhism, Taoism, animism, ancestor worship, and the deification of local

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[42]See Judith Palmer, "A Distribution Study of the Chinese in Sarawak," The Sarawak Gazette, XCI, No. 1285 (Kuching, March 31, 1965).

[43]The relatively minor exceptions are Alor Star in Kedah, Kota Bahru in Kelantan, and Butterworth in Penang.

[44]Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956), p. 13.

[45]While probably practiced only by the intellectual few, more than any other source it forms the basis of Chinese custom in that it is concerned with social and political relationships as well as individual conduct. See Purcell, loc. cit. See also Alan J. A. Elliott, Chinese Spirit-Medium Cults in Singapore (London: Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics; Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 14, 1955).

Malaysian heroes. These are the key elements in a "very complex and intricate belief pattern defying accurate analysis."[46]

Like the Malay societal segment of Malaysia, the Chinese communal category is far from homogeneous. Notable among its divisions is the diversity of Chinese dialect groups to be found; these groupings are associated with differences in custom and social life, and coincide not only with the province of origin in China, but also to a considerable extent with residential location in Malaysia and occupation. Most Malaysian Chinese (87%) fall either into the Hokkien (31.7%), Cantonese (21.7%), Hakka (21.8%), or Tiechieu (12.1%) groups.

Hokkien are largely urban and commercial, concentrated in Penang, Malacca, Selangor, Johore, and Sarawak. Cantonese are mainly shopkeepers and live mostly in Perak, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang. Hakka are mostly rural mixed-gardeners and tin workers concentrated in the Kinta Valley of Perak and in Sabah. Hainanese are specialists in personal services and live mostly in Malacca, Negri Sembilan, and Trengganu.[47]

Many of these dialects are mutually unintelligible among the Chinese and efforts to teach kuo yu (Mandarin), the national language of China, have only recently increased.[48] Literacy is low; just over half of all Chinese were able to read a notice or write a letter in any language according to

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[46]Ginsburg and Roberts, op. cit., p. 302.

[47]See Hodder, op. cit., p. 42 ff.

[48]Fisher, op. cit., p. 645.

the 1957 Census. There is a small urban Chinese segment of
Malaysian society, to be found mostly among older mainland fam-
ilies, who are exclusively English-speaking.

Other lines along which Chinese are divided include eco-
nomic status and activity (e.g., wealthy businessmen, tin and
rubber workers, and the mixed-farmer), rural versus urban ele-
ments, diverse ideological allegiances (e.g., Pro-Peking ver-
sus Pro-Formosa elements), and new versus older Chinese immi-
grants to Malaysia.

Rural peninsula Chinese were sharply affected by the Emer-
gency--that 12 year period (1948-1960) of intense fighting
against the mostly Chinese communist guerrillas--as a result
of Government resettlement programs designed to remove the
mostly Chinese jungle fringe squatters to new villages [49] in
order to prevent their exploitation as a food and recruit sup-
ply for the guerrillas. Resettlement had the effect of creat-
ing more closely knit rural Chinese communities and of awaken-
ing Chinese political consciousness; it also increased the his-
torically apolitical Chinese interaction with the Government.

As a result of the virtual ethnic monopoly of Malaysian
economic life by the Chinese, plus the disparity of religious
and cultural heritages among Malaysia's peoples, there is a
persistent undercurrent of anti-Chinese communal antagonism

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[49] The program was also called the Briggs plan. Five hun-
dred and fifty new villages were built and 500,000 people (85%
Chinese) were resettled. See Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A
Political and Economic Appraisal (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 55 ff.

amongst Malaysia's non-Chinese inhabitants.

The Indians. The 818,600 Indians[50] today living in the Federa-
tion of Malaysia comprise less than 10 per cent of the total
population. In common with the Chinese, Indians have long had
contact with Malaysia but began to immigrate in numbers only
with the establishment of the 19th Century Pax Britannica.
Indians were also motivated to move to Malaysia mostly by
money, and while intending to be sojourners,[51] many stayed to
become permanent unassimilated minority residents of Malaysia.

India-Malaysian contact extends at least to the 1st Cen-
tury A.D., when Indian traders began to arrive at Malaysia's
western littoral to barter for gold-dust, camphor wood, and
the gums of the peninsula's jungle. This early Indian contact
began the enduring Malaysian permeation of Indian influence
evident in modern Malaysia's "...religion, political system,
law, astrology, medieval medicine, literature, music, sculp-
ture in stone, metal-work, and the weaving of silk."[52] Indeed,
Indians probably first introduced Malaysia to the Western

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[50] The term "Indian" is used here to include Pakistanis,
Ceylonese, and Indians. Unfortunately, almost no literature
on them exists. See, however, Usha Mahajani, The Role of
Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya (Bombay: Vora and Com-
pany, Publishers Private Ltd., 1960).

[51] Indians were even more transitory than the Chinese;
average duration of Indian residence in the pre-war period was
under three years. Fisher, op. cit., p. 643.

[52] Hodder, op. cit., p. 23.

world.[53]

Most Indians (over three-fourths) in Malaysia today are Tamil-speaking Hindu descendants of immigrants from Southern India. Immigration was checked by the Indian Government in 1938 following a dispute over immigration conditions. Over 60 per cent of all Indians in Malaysia today are Malaysia-born, in contrast to the 12 per cent of 1921.

Over 60 per cent are rural residents associated with rubber estates. Indeed they were first recruited[54] to mainland Malaysia to tap rubber. Malaysian Indians nearly all live in mainland Malaysia; only 5,600 live in the Borneo States. Most are still estate-dwellers, with major concentrations located on the rubber-planted developed western coasts of Selangor and southern Perak. The approximately 40 per cent of the total Indian population residing in urban areas are to be found in the largest cities and towns.

Over three-fourths of the Indians are united in the Hindu

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[53]Ptolemy's geography and atlas, which was published in Alexandria in the middle of the second century A.D. refers to the Malay Peninsula as the Golden Chersonese, which is how, in their own language, Indian writers had described it centuries before.

[54]Indians were first indentured for three year periods at individual rubber planters' expense, for work on the peninsula. In 1910, the kangany system was instituted allowing licensed recruiters to seek rubber workers for mainland Malaysia in Indian villages. This system was abandoned when worker needs were filled by non-recruited unassisted immigrants in the 1930's. Emigration quotas were enforced by the Indian Government until abolished in 1938. Hodder, op. cit., p. 47.

faith, with the remainder being chiefly Muslim.[55] In practice, Hinduism is very complex. There are six orthodox sects (of Puranic Hinduism): Vaishnavas, Shivas, Saktas, Ganapatyas, Saurapathas, and Sinarthas. Each of these sects constitutes a comprehensive assortment of beliefs, rituals, and theologies ranging from pantheism to atheism. The complexity of actual religious observances is magnified as traditional folk beliefs and superstitions mingle with the dictates of formal Hinduism. Each 'estate, for example, is likely to worship a different plurality of gods. Common celebration of key festivals, however, veneers much of this vast complexity. The New Year, Thaipusam, Deepavali, and Ponggol[56] are major Hindu holy-days that are widely observed.

Language also divides the Indian community, with about 80 per cent speaking Tamil, and the remaining 20 per cent being divided among the two remaining southern dialects of Telegu and Malayalim, and the northern Indian dialects of Punjabi, Maharatti, Bengali, Marwari, Pushtu, and Sindi. While Indian dialect groups are not as pronounced in their differences as are the Chinese groups, as with them Indian dialect groupings

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[55] This religious fact gives this small proportion of Indians a ritual communion with Malays and lifts the religious ban of intermarriage present for Chinese and Hindu Indians among Malays. Still, Indian men and Malay women have intermarried only to a small extent. Freedman and Swift, op. cit., p. 7.

[56] Thaipusam is the festival day upon which devotees fulfil vows as penance; they usually involve corporal punishments. Deepavali is the traditional and symbolic festival of lights. Ponggol is a harvest festival of three days, held in January.

correspond with differences in custom and social life, with place of origin in India, and to a considerable extent with place of residence and occupation in Malaysia.

Like the Straits Chinese, the northern Indian immigrants account for most of the Indian urban residents, merchants, and professional men. Punjabi and Sikh policemen and watchmen have long been a distinctive feature of the Malaysian urban scene. The larger southern Indian group (80 per cent) with "...the exception of a small proportion who work as clerks or storekeepers, and the members of the Chettyar caste who have earned an unenviable reputation as money-lenders have remained in purely labouring jobs."[57]

Caste and ideology further splinter the Indian societal segment of Malaysia. While caste exclusiveness is not pronounced in Malaysia, even non-Indians distinguish between "Bengalis" and "Klings," the Bazaar Malay terms for northerners and southerners. The pro-Pakistanis and pro-Indian segments of Indian society correspond closely to the religious split of the Indian population between Hindu and Muslim.

In short, like the other ethnic categories of Malaysia, the Indian branch is far from homogeneous. One writer notes: "possibly the only thing in common among all Malaysian Indians is their love and pride for India."[58] Even this statement is

[57] Fisher, op. cit., pp. 642-644.

[58] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaya and Singapore," G. M. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 276.

true only if one excludes Pakistanis, Ceylonese, and those who have substituted Malaysian for Indian national pride.

Indigenous Peoples. Current estimates place Malaysia's total population of indigenous peoples at 716,000. They comprise a minority of 8.5 per cent of Malaysia's peoples. Most of the widely diverse indigenous tribes live in the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah; only about 50,000 live on the mainland peninsula of Malaysia.

The indigenous[59] mainland peoples are little-known, primitive nomadic aborigines who live chiefly in the peninsula's inaccessible jungle regions. They probably came to the peninsula from the Asiatic interior circa 6th Century B.C. Today these autochthonous slash-and-burn primitives form three main groups, the Semang (Negroids), Semai-Temiar (Australoids), and Jakun (Proto-Malays). They have never been accurately counted or studied and live today largely outside of the framework of Malaysian society and politics.[60]

Over 700 thousand of Malaysia's indigenous peoples live in the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. There are six main groups: Sea Dayaks, Land Dayaks, Melanau, Dusun, Bajan, and

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[59]The word "indigenous" is a politically charged one in Malaysia. Malays consider themselves the indigenous people of the country and frequently use the word to distinguish themselves from the Chinese. As used here, the word indigenous does not include Malays.

[60]For further discussion see D. Holsman, Noone of the Ulu (London: Heinemann and Company, 1958); J. B. Robinson, Transformation in Malaya (London: Secker & Warburg, 1956); and J. Slimming, Temiar Jungle: A Malayan Journey (London: John Murry and Company, 1958).

Murut. Indigenous peoples comprise a majority in Sabah; in
Sarawak they form a third of the population and are the larg-
est single group.

The Sea Dayaks[61] or Ibans, as they are more accurately
called, have a total population of 246,000, making them the
largest group of indigenous people in Malaysia. While they
are found throughout Sarawak, most are concentrated in the
state's Second and Third administrative Divisions along the
inland banks of rivers. Ibans are short, muscular, often tat-
tooed and long-haired; they live in longhouses in homogeneous
communities and possess their own language and distinctive cul-
ture.[62] Famous for their now largely abandoned practice of
head-hunting and piracy, Ibans are today mostly rural agrari-
ans who cultivate dry and wet rice and other cash crops such
as rubber. A small number of Ibans are Christian-converts who
live in coastal areas and work as civil servants, teachers,
clerks, or oil-workers at the Miri field to the north, but
most still retain their traditional pagan beliefs, longhouse
residence and rural style of life. Ibans comprise roughly a
third of Sarawak's population, slightly outnumbering the
Chinese.

The Land Dayaks, like the Ibans, are native to Sarawak;

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[61] The term Sea Dayak is a misnomer today; they are an
inland people. The term probably derives from the Ibans' once
notorious but now abandoned piracy. The term Iban simply
means "person" in the native language.

[62] For a good short discussion of the Ibans, see Nigel
Heyward, Sarawak, Brunei & North Borneo (Singapore: Eastern
Universities Press, 1963).

they number approximately 61,000 and live in the hilly regions
of Sarawak's 1st Division. Land Dayaks resemble Ibans in sev-
eral ways: in physical appearance, their longhouse dwellings,
their rural residence, and traditional pagan religious prac-
tices. In contrast to the Ibans, however, Land Dayaks are cul-
turally and linguistically heterogeneous to a degree that is
remarkable for such a small number. There is, for example,
marked local variation in custom, and at least six major dia-
lects: Bukah, Biatah, Singhi, Jagoi, Slakau, and the tongue
of the Ulu Sadong people.[63] Unlike the Iban, the Land Dayak
is mild-mannered and conservative; even when their land is
impoverished by over-use of the typical Dayak slash-and-burn
dry rice cultivation methods, the parocial Land Dayak refuses
to shift areas or move from his traditional village. As with
the Ibans, Land Dayaks define social stratification simply on
such bases as the mere accumulation of wealth;[64] there seems
to be no elaborate social stratification system.[65]

The Melanaus are a small group of Sarawak people who were
counted at 46,000 at the last census. Like the Land Dayaks,
they are a heterogeneous folk who speak a number of related
dialects, and exhibit variety in local cultural observances.

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[63]Loc. cit.

[64]Land Dayaks call their local chiefs Orang Kaya, which
means literally "rich man." See Malaysia: Year Book 1963-64
(Kuala Lumpur: A Malay Mail Publication by the Straits Times
Press, Ltd., 1964), p. 24.

[65]For a more detailed discussion of Land Dayak life, see
W. R. Geddes, The Land Dayaks of Sarawak (London: 1954).

The Melanaus are a people in transition. Some still live in longhouses and continue to practice the traditional primitive religion, but today most do not. Many have become Muslims and have intermarried with Sarawak Malays. They are coastal residents of Sarawak's Third and Fourth Divisions; they grow padi, cultivate small rubber holdings, fish, and work in the timber industry as loggers. The production of sago (a starch made from Malaysian palm pith) was formerly a chief Melanau specialization, but demand dropped in recent years and sago production has now been de-emphasized.

The Dusun or Kadazan people form the largest homogeneous population group in Sabah, numbering approximately 152,000. The Dusuns, like most of Malaysia's other aborigines, were probably originally coastal dwellers; they were pushed into the Sabah lowlands and interior hills when the present coastal dwellers arrived with their more advanced cultures and technology. The more primitive Dusans were pushed farthest into hills of the Tambunan and Ranou regions of the Sabah interior. They are a semi-nomadic, longhouse-dwelling dry-padi growing people. Their more advanced brethren who live on Sabah's lowland west coast, were not pushed so far into the interior. This group is not nomadic and they have abandoned longhouse dwellings in favor of separate family houses. Lowland Dusans are also rice producers, but they practice the more advanced wet-padi cultivation methods. They are consequently landowning small-holders who live in more prosperous permanent settlements. More than any other indigenous group, lowland Dusans

have intermarried with Chinese traders.[66] Despite these important internal differences,[67] together the hill and lowland Dusuns are a distinctive ethnic group. They are Sabah's chief rice producers.

Sabah's Bajau or Bajan peoples are a small group of 63,000 who live on the east coast. The term Sea Gypsies is also applied to them and reflects their notorious pirate past. Today most still have a sea-focused life as fishermen or dockworkers; however, a large Bajau community in the Kinabalu region also growsrice and raises cattle. Because sea-focused activities tend to be just beyond subsistence levels, cattleraising is probably the Bajau's more important contribution to Sabah's economy.

Sabah's Muruts are a small group (about 22,000) of extremely primitive people who live in the remote mountain regions near the Indonesian and Sarawak interior borders. They, like Malaysia's peninsula aborigines, practice a shifting, largely subsistence agriculture (dry-rice, tapioca), although they intermittently collect jungle produce or tap

[66] Heyward notes that "...the majority of Chinese towkays or shopkeepers in outstations have Dusun wives. The children are brought up sometimes as Chinese, sometimes as Dusuns." Heyward, op. cit., p. 49.

[67] The distinction between hill farmers and wet-padi cultivators is of immense importance throughout Southeast Asia and generally so-making corresponds to the division between Southeast Asia's "haves" and "have-nots." Dusuns are a curious example u⁻ a people still straddling this fundamental transition. See Robbins Burling, Hill Farms and Padi Fields: Life in Mainland Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

rubber for quick cash. They are known as excellent hunters who use blow-pipes, spears, and dogs with great skill.

In addition to the Ibans, Land Dayaks, Melanau, Dusun, Bajan, and Murut peoples mentioned above, there are over 100,000 other peoples in other very small tribal groups,[68] who live in the depths of Borneo's interior. They are too little known to be here discussed separately; they are generally jungle-primitives, with similar socio-economic patterns focused about shifting agriculture, hunting, and longhouse dwellings.[69]

In summary, Malaysia's social configuration is a conglomeration, horizontally divided by linguistics, culture, religion, tribe, regional ties, ideology, occupational specialization, and sharply polarized socio-economic classes. Malaysia's societal platform has four heterogeneous ethnic legs. These dominant demographic characteristics have crucial economic and political ramifications. Possessing almost none of the traditional attributes of nationhood,[70] Malaysia faces an integrative crisis of the first order.

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[68]For example, the Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit, Bisaya, Punan, Kedayan, and many others.

[69]For more information see Tom Harrisson, "The Peoples of North and West Borneo," Wang, Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). See also Sarawak, Annual Report, 1962 (London: HMSO, 1963) and North Borneo Annual Report (London: HMSO, 1963).

[70]For a good discussion of these attributes, see Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), especially Part Two.

The Economic Setting

Malaysia's economy is ultraprosperous. Per capita income is one of the highest in all Southeast Asia. There exists a consistently favorable balance of trade, a good capital investment and economic growth rate, a revenue surplus, little unemployment or inflation, a prosperous middle class, a generally favorable population-resource relation, a well developed transportation system (on the mainland's developed west coast), and a sound currency linked to the Sterling Area.[71]

Paradoxically, this bright picture has a duller reverse side. Malaysia's economy is also underdeveloped and overspecialized. Scarcely a fourth of the land is occupied, rural life remains at a subsistence level, and export specialization in tin and rubber—the twin bulwarks that support Malaysia's national economy—leaves Malaysia extremely vulnerable to world prices and economic instability.[72]

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[71]For good detailed discussions of Malaysia's economy, see the articles by Gayl D. Ness, James C. Jackson, and K. T. Joseph in: Wang, Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey, op. cit., T. H. Silcock and E. K. Fisk, The Political Economy of Independent Malaya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), C. D. Hoover (ed.), Economic Systems of the Commonwealth (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962), K. E. Mackenzie, Malaya: Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore (London: HMSO, 1952), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Development of Malaya (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), and T. H. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959).

[72]Average annual post-war price fluctuations in tin and rubber equalled 29.4 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively. Silcock, "The Economy of Malaya," Hoover, (ed.), op. cit., p. 330.

The Four Segments of Malaysia's Economy. To understand the economy of Malaysia it is necessary to look separately at each of its four fairly distinct sectors: the semi-subsistence food production sector of small agriculture and fishing, the export sector of the estate and mining enterprises, the commercial sector, and the manufacturing sector.

Despite tin and rubber wealth, Malaysia basically has a non-commercial, modified subsistence, food producing, agrarian economy. Food production occupies more of the labor force than any other economic activity. There are three main food-production activities: padi cultivation, fishing, and mixed farming. Rice being the dietary staple of nearly all Malaysians, it is not surprising that padi cultivation engages a labor force second only to rubber. Nevertheless, Malaysian padi cultivators produce only about two-thirds of the country's needs. This is mainly because padi production is a near Malay monopoly and is village organized on a small plot subsistence base; urban dwellers are thus forced to import their rice requirements. The fishing industry is the prime animal protein source for nearly all Malaysian ethnic groups. Fish are taken by traditional methods from the rivers and seas mostly by Malays and indigenous groups of Sabah and Sarawak; distribution, however, is almost wholly in the hands of Chinese. The third key component of the peasant modified subsistence economy is the Chinese-dominated mixed vegetable farming industry. These market-garden holdings usually operate on a semi-commercial basis in combination with the rearing of some stock. Limited activity also exists in fruit trees, handicrafts, and

other minor economic pursuits.

The export oriented plantation and mining industries have brought Malaysia fame, fortune, immigrant minorities, a colonial master, and economic development unmatched in Asia. Dominated by rubber and tin respectively, the estate and mining industries form the foundation of Malaysia's wealth. Of the two, rubber is by far the most important by criteria of numbers employed, national income contribution, government revenue contribution, and profits for investors.[73] Rubber is not only king in Malaysia, but it is lauded as the most valuable industry in the entire British Commonwealth; it is claimed that the Malaysian rubber industry saved the United Kingdom from bankruptcy in the critical post-war years:[74] Nearly all rubber is grown in mainland Malaysia (6,130 of 7,000 square miles used for rubber throughout Malaysia) in the west coast states of Kedah, Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan. About half of total production is grown on large estates of 100 or more acres and 60 per cent of these are owned by European holding companies. Small holdings (5 acres or less) are held mostly by Malays; medium holdings (25-99 acres) are nearly all Chinese owned. Malaysia produces a third of the world's natural rubber supply and is its largest producer. Directly and

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[73]Rubber employs more people than any other industry; it accounts for almost half of Malaysia's income (SM1,500 million in 1961). See K. G. Tregonning, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 55.

[74]Malaysian rubber earned more dollars between 1947 and 1951 than "all the industries and trades of the metropolitan country put together," Fisher, op. cit., p. 610.

indirectly it supports over half the country's population.

Other commercial agriculture production of importance includes the oil palm industry (located on large estates in Sabah and the peninsula mainland), the copra industry (mostly small holdings), the pineapple industry (produced for export mostly in Johore), the Manila hemp and cocoa industry (mostly Sabah-centered), the Sarawak-centered pepper industry, and other minor and/or experimental crops. Timber is a major crop in Sarawak and especially Sabah, where at Sandakan over 70 million cubic feet is produced annually.

Tin has long dominated Malaysia's mining or extractive industries. It is found in huge deposits and is alluvial and thus easily accessible by strip-mining methods. These factors, combined with cheap transport in developed western Malaysia, allow low-cost production and a consequential enjoyment of a favorable competitive position.[75] More concentrated tin is produced in Malaysia than in any other place in the world--about 40 per cent of world's total supply. Nearly all production sites center in Perak's Kinta Valley and in Selangor; two-thirds of them are owned by Europeans, the rest mostly by Chinese. Mechanized methods of production are being increasingly introduced with the result that relatively few persons are directly employed in the industry.[76]

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[75]This is illustrated by the fact that the United States finds it economically more feasible to buy tin from far away Malaysia than from closer but less competitive South American markets.

[76]50,737 in 1957, of which 70 per cent were Chinese.

Because tin dominates the mineral export scene, it is
sometimes overlooked that Malaysia is also the largest iron
ore producer in the Far East. Export value was $M140 million
in 1960 for the high grade ore which is found chiefly in
Trengganu, Perak, and Johore on the mainland. Japanese capi-
tal developed the industry and Japan remains the key buyer.

Some petroleum deposits are being worked in Sarawak's
Miri-centered field, but production is declining annually
(59,000 long tons in 1960). Sarawak's autonomous neighbor,
tiny oil-rich Brunei sits astride the main oil field in the
area. Other mineral production in Malaysia is small; gold,
tungsten, bauxite, ilmenite, and monazite production are the
most important of these.

A third broad sector of the Malaysian economy is its com-
mercial segment rooted in the entrepot centers of Penang and
Singapore.[77] About a third of Malaysia's Gross National Product
is derived from trade and its ancillary agencies such as bank-
ing, shipping, storage, insurance, etc. Some goods are impor-
ted in bulk and handled with no treatment; other goods are
imported and sorted, graded, treated, repackaged, etc. This
latter type of operation is by far the more profitable. Goods
of neighboring nations are imported and re-exported to Western
countries, and the commodities of Western nations are imported

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[77] While politically distinct from Malaysia, the indepen-
dent Republic of Singapore's interlinkage with Malaysia's eco-
nomy is extremely close. For example, there is a common cur-
rency, close private and government consultation on fiscal pol-
icies, and the plain economic fact that over 40 per cent of
Malaysia's trade is handled through Singapore.

and re-exported to nearby lands. Trade is conducted chiefly with the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.

The industrial or manufacturing branch of the Malaysian economy until quite recently consisted of little more than the processing of profitable export commodities (the smelting of tin, milling of rubber, canning of pineapples, extraction of coconut oil, mineral oil refinement, curing of fish, etc.), and the maintenance, servicing, transport, and ancillary industries which were directly and indirectly dependent upon export products of the Malaysian interior. Before the war, other manufacturing was limited to simple food processing (biscuits, soft drinks, flour milling, etc.) and the production of the simplest consumer goods (tobacco products, matches, soap, rubber shoes, etc.). With the post-war political impetus for industrial expansion and diversification, considerable economic development has occurred under planned government direction and stimulation. A large textile mill was recently opened in Johore, a new cement factory was recently built just north of Kuala Lumpur, and Petaling Jaya, adjacent to the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, is today a major and model industrial center. Other industrial sites are being developed and are growing at rapid rates.

Economics and Ethnology. Malaysia's communal compartmentalization is exacerbated by the fact that to a remarkable extent race corresponds with occupational specialization. Malaysia has a plural economy as well as a plural society. Moreover, Malaysia's economy is characterized by a large degree of

foreign, mostly British, ownership of key industries.

In the semi-subsistence food-producing sector of the econ-omy, ethnic specialization takes the following form. Malays and, in Sabah and Sarawak, indigenous peoples have a near mono-poly in padi-production. In the fishing industry, Malays also are predominate, comprising roughly two-thirds of all fisher-men; the remainder are chiefly Chinese but with a small propor-tion of Borneo aborigines. In the mixed-farming of vegetables and in stock-rearing--the market-gardening sector of the econ-omy--Chinese specialize. These very small plots (often one acre) are heavily fertilized, constantly cultivated, and cross-cropped with methods and an intensity that is perhaps uniquely Chinese.[78]

The export-orientated plantation and extractive industries engage an almost entirely non-Malay work force, and are to a large extent foreign-owned. European limited companies own over 60 per cent of all rubber estates, the remainder being mostly in Chinese hands. The labor force is 50 per cent Indian and about 30 per cent Chinese. Nearly 60 per cent of all work-ing Indians are rubber estate workers.[79] Medium sized holdings are nearly all Chinese owned. Small holdings are usually held by Malay padi growers or fishermen who are part-time rubber

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[78] The peninsula-concentrated Emergency period (1948-1960) saw the resettlement of many of the Chinese jungle-fringe squatters who were mixed farmers, and New Villages resettle-ment disrupted traditional agricultural methods (e.g., use of human feces for fertilizer); as a result, production fell.

[79] Fisher, op. cit., p. 612.

tappers who live near large estates where their latex is sold. The tin industry ownership and labor pattern is similar. Malaysia's numerically negligible Europeans own 60 per cent of the tin industry and more than three-fourths of this is controlled by merely three European agencies.[80] The 40 per cent remainder of the tin industry is owned by individual or small syndicates of Chinese. The tin-mining labor force is 70 per cent Chinese with the remainder being mostly Indian.

The commercial sector and the manufacturing sector of the Malaysian economy are both dominated by Europeans and the Chinese. European firms control roughly half of the import-export activities.[81] Chinese control is predominate over the other half but is shared to an extent with Indians. The labor force of the manufacturing and industrial sector is predominantly Chinese and to a far lesser extent Indian. Local entrepreneural activities are the forte of the industrious Chinese, and until quite recently this pariah entrepreneural-activist role was one Malays and indigenous peoples have been content to let them almost exclusively play.

Occupational specialization by race is thus pronounced in Malaysia, as is foreign ownership and control. Communal hostility is aggravated and is to some extent caused by this economic division of labor which lets the enterprising Chinese

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[80]Silcock, in Hoover (ed.), op. cit., p. 341.

[81]J. Norman Parmer, op. cit., p. 269.

predominate[82] in all activities save subsistence agriculture and fishing. Moslem Malays are offended by pork-eating, pig-raising Chinese, for example, and increased Malay, Indian, or indigenous participation in economic life is hampered by "the existing capital structure of the Chinese community, which is so closely linked to family and social contacts that non-Chinese are almost wholly excluded."[83] Tension and resentment is felt by the Malay agrarians who feel that only Malays are "true" Malaysians, when they face the daily fact that their standard of living is considerably lower than most Chinese and Indians upon whom they must depend for supplies and credit. Estimates of individual incomes show the relative poverty of the Malays; in 1957 as in 1947 "aggregate Chinese incomes are approximately two and a half times as great as aggregated Malay incomes, and...a little over one-fifth of the total of individual incomes went to Malays, while a little under three-fifths went to Chinese."[84]

It is extremely difficult to change this established pattern of communal-economic role specialization. While racial

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[82]Fisher, op. cit., p. 639, declares that Chinese in fact "form a complete capitalist society in themselves and apart from their former exclusion from the administrative civil service, are found in every major occupation necessary for the effective running of the country."

[83]Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy..., op. cit., p. 124. For an interesting discussion of largely illegal Chinese clan activities, see Leon Comber, An Introduction to Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1957).

[84]Silcock and Fisk, op. cit., p. 1.

specialization perhaps begins with special aptitudes or contacts, as Silcock notes, it "tends to be maintained by social and cultural pressures, making it difficult for a newcomer to find acceptance or for an employer to take on a stranger."[85]

The economic foundations of Malaysia described above have ramifications that spill over from the economic into the political system of Malaysia, in a manner and form that will be subsequently described and analyzed below.

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[85]Silcock, in Hoover (ed.), op. cit., p. 354.

CHAPTER III

MALAYSIAN POLITICAL HISTORY: AN OVERVIEW

The Federation of Malaysia emerged as a single Southeast Asian political entity in September 1963; it has existed in its current form only since August 1965, when upon Singapore's expulsion it became a thirteen rather than a fourteen state federation. To understand this short-lived state we must look to its past and its parts and explain how and why it was pieced together. Political history is overviewed here not for its own sake, but for purposes of understanding the current political scene.

In untangling the evolution of political form and fact in Malaysia, one is immediately struck with the great diversity of structures and the great frequency with which these were changed. In order to impose a degree of order upon this multiplicity, it is analytically convenient, despite the hazards of periodization, to distinguish five main periods; each is roughly coterminous with fundamental formal change in governmental structure: 1. the "Traditional," Pre-Western Period (1500-1867), 2. the Colonial Period (1867-1942), 3. the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945), 4. the Post-War Interim and Emergency (1945-1955), and 5. the period of political development into Malaysia (1955-1965).

For each of these periods, a macroscopic portrait of the major features of the governmental arrangements will be

presented with focus upon the salient features of both the formal political organization and the actual patterns of political behavior. Only salient features of the theory and practice of Malaysian politics over time are presented, and special attention is paid to evidence that actual behavior contrasted with formal norms.

The "Traditional," Pre-Western Period

One must be arbitrary in defining what is "traditional" or indigenous in Malaysian polites, because in a sense there was no traditional indigenous political system in early Malaysia at all. "From the earliest times the history of the Malayan peninsula has been less a Malayan history than that of the essentially foreign interests which happened to converge upon it."[1] Throughout most of their history the components of present-day Malaysia remained on the periphery of political units centered elsewhere, in India, China, Thailand, and Indonesia.[2]

It was not until 1400 A.D. that a Malay prince established a dynasty centered on the Malay peninsula, at the west coast settlement of Malacca. This event, comments J. M. Gullick, "...marked the beginning of an indigenous system of

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[1]Ginsburg and Roberts, op. cit., p. 421.

[2]See Brian Harrison, South-East Asia: A Short History (3rd ed.; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966) and D. G. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).

major political units in the Malay Peninsula."[3] The early
political history of Borneo is obscure, but it is known that
the ancient Sultanate of Brunei[4] was well established on the
northwest coast of Borneo in the 15th and early 16th Centuries,
claiming hegemony over all of Borneo, Palawan, and the Sulu
Archipelago.[5]

The mighty Malacca Sultanate lasted for only a century[6]
until the Portuguese captured it in 1511 because of its key
position on their Cape route to China. While the Portuguese
made no significant inroads into the peninsula, they ended the
Malacca Sultanate with the expulsion of the Malay dynasty. In
Borneo at about this time, the Brunei Sultanate was already in
a period of declining power when Magellan's fleet visited the

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[3]J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western
Malaya (London: The Athlone Press, 1958), p. 7.

[4]Records indicate that Borneo had extensive early inter-
national contact. Chinese annals record trade activity from
the Sung Dynasty onwards. The Mongol Kublai Khan knew the
area (1292), and Marco Polo comments on the extensive Borneo-
China trade (1291). Originally, a vassal of the Java-centered
Majapahit Empire, the Sultan of Brunei moved under Chinese
hegemony circa 1370. Brunei became powerful and semi-
independent during the late 15th and early 16th Centuries.

[5]See K. G. Tregonning, North Borneo (London: HMSO,
1960).

[6]The best history of this period is Paul Wheatley, The
Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the
Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500 (Kuala Lumpur: University of
Malaya Press, 1961).

Sultanate[7] in July 1521.

It is mainly from the remnants of the expelled Malacca Sultanate and the Brunei Sultanate, together with certain northern peninsula sultanates that managed to free themselves from Thai control, that the foundation of Malaysia's state system was formed. It is this collection of assorted, relatively autonomous, political units, as they evolved during the period 1500-1870[8] that are considered "traditional" for the purposes of this study.

Although evidence is scanty and despite the considerable variety among the Malay peninsula river sultanates that gradually evolved from the expelled Malacca nobility, together with the Brunei Sultanate, all exhibited similar basic characteristics; it is possible to generalize about them.

These feudal, mostly patriarchal states each reflected a

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[7]This is true despite the inflated account of Pigafette, Magellan's chronicler of the Borneo visit. Brunei's "prestige and profit were rather precariously based upon piracy, and was then already starting into decline. It almost dropped from view...until 1775..." Willard A. Hanna, Sequel to Colonialism: (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1965), p. 40.

[8]In terms of territorial cohesion, the peninsula Malaysia states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Johore, Kedah, Trengganu, Perlis, and Kelantan, did not evolve to their present boundaries until 1824, with the latter four being freed from Siamese suzerainty only in 1909. Sarawak began as a southern province of the Brunei Sultanate and under the rule of the Brooke family evolved to its present form with Brooke accretions of territory from 1841 to 1906. Sabah, also originally a part of the Brunei Sultanate, grew to its present size from territories ceded to the British North Borneo Company and antecedent business interests by the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu between 1865 and 1906.

traditional pattern of government; they were all Islamic,[9] all
were based upon Hindu conceptions of royalty, and similar cus-
toms, established during the power-peaks of the Brunei and
Malacca Empires.[10]

Ignoring minor differences between them, all exhibited
the following formal features. At the apex of the political
system was the royal family, with the Sultan at its head, who
was drawn from a royal patrilineage. In theory the Sultan was
an absolute monarch, "his authority buttressed by some of the
'divine king' attributes of earlier Hindu dynasties."[11] His
title was Yang di-Pertuan Besar, "he who is made lord." As
the formal head of state, he was vested with majesty, sanctity,
and supernatural power. The absolute nature of his formal
authority is reflected in the public obeisance which was
required of the Sultan's district chiefs at political ceremon-
ies in which the unity of the State was re-validated. In form,
government at each of the three levels in the hierarchy of
state, district, and village was performed in his name. The
very word for government was (and is) kerajaan--the state of

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[9]Islam was brought to Malaysia by Arab traders in the
15th Century. Sultan Parameswara of Malacca and Sultan
Mohammed of Brunei were both converted in the early 15th Cen-
tury. See Brian Harrison, "The Coming of Islam," in Harrison,
South-East Asia..., op. cit., pp. 50-60.

[10]See Robert Hein-Geldern, Conceptions of State and King-
ship in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program,
Cornell University, Data Paper No. 18, 1956) and Ginsburg and
Roberts, op. cit., p. 501.

[11]Gullick, op. cit., p. 8.

having a ruler. The Sultan possessed supreme authority and all governmental functions were under his final direction. With the aid of his royal kinsmen and executive assistants, the Sultan stood at the peak of an aristocratic sacredotal hierarchy and was in form the repository of all political power.

The picture of government presented above stands in stark contrast to actual traditional political practices. The Sultans never matched their formal authority with actual control; they were essentially river-overlords[12] in a largely unoccupied land. For example, district chieftains, far from being the mere agents of the Sultan, typically could and did flout the authority of the Sultan with impunity and at will. Not only did they possess more actual power but some of them were wealthier than he was.[13] Referring to the Yang di-Pertuan of Negri Sembilan, Richard Winstedt notes:

"He was supreme arbiter and judge, if the territorial chiefs chose to invite him to adjudicate, which they never did. He was Caliph or head of the Muslim theocracy in any territory where the local chief did not arrogate the title for himself--and he always did."[14]

Of the period before British rule, the Sultan of Johore is reported to have intimated that he was never more in fear of

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[12]Silcock notes, "...The sultans were changed from river-overlords to effective rulers of a land area by deliberate policy of British civil servants and by the opening up of communications." Silcock and Fisk, op. cit., p. 6.

[13]Gullick, op. cit., p. 8.

[14]Richard Winstedt, Malaya and Its History (5th ed.; London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1958), p. 83.

assassination than at the public obeisance ceremonies.[15]   In the realm of adjudication "in practice the chiefs usurped the powers of the Sultan. They tried any cases which they pleased, passed such sentences as they wished, and kept all the fines."[16]

In sum, the Sultans of Malaysia's traditional Malay states had vast formal authority but little effective control. Power was usurped and exercised with impunity by local district chiefs. In fact, the Sultans were little more than port-kings and river-lords, who exercised symbolic control of ill-defined regions in competition with petty chiefs and marauding pirates. In fact with revenues uncertain, piracy became endemic to the Malay imperial aristocracy itself throughout the area.[17]

The Colonial Period

Despite the fact that the Portuguese and the Dutch were undoubtedly the first to establish themselves in Malaysia, the colonial era did not truly begin until the start of British penetration and consolidation in the Malay peninsula. The Portuguese occupied Malacca from 1511 until 1611 when the city was seized by the Dutch, who in turn occupied it, with a 23-year British interruption, until 1824. Despite this longevity, however, scholars seem agreed that Portuguese and Dutch

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[15]Gullick, op. cit., p. 48.

[16]Ibid., p. 115.

[17]See Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World (Canberra: F. W. Cheshire, 1963).

influence was negligible. Throughout this period the tradi-
tional Malay river states were affected but little, and they
maintained their tenuous independence in geographic isolation.

British inroads into Malaysia began as early as 1786 when
Captain Francis Light, under the auspices of the British East
Indian Company, occupied almost uninhabited Penang Island on
the peninsula's west coast. The Company expanded its Malaysian
influence from Penang to Singapore in 1819 and officially to
Malacca in 1824, but demonstrated little interest in these
three settlements, much less in the peninsula or in Borneo;
its focus of activity was in India. After a nine-year inter-
lude under the British India Office, the three territories
were transferred from the domain of the Company to the British
Colonial Office in 1867 and were constituted The Crown Colony
of the Straits Settlements. Sarawak's fantastic colonial his-
tory began with the career of one James Brooke, who in return
for his successful intercession in a local rebellion of Malays
and Land Dayaks against the Brunei Sultan, was ceded what is
now part of the Kuching region of west Sarawak and installed
as Rajah and Governor of Sarawak in late September of 1841.
In Sabah, while the off-shore island of Labuan was acquired by
Britain in 1847 and various American and Australian commercial
interests held territory in the area as early as 1865, colonial
rule did not actually begin until the formation of the British
North Borneo Company in 1881.

The colonial period of Malaysia can thus be said to have
begun roughly in 1867. In fact, nowhere in all Southeast Asia,
save Java, did colonialism get started as a planned systematic

process before that date.[18] With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, a dormant century after first Malaysia-British contacts, British interest in Malaysia surged into intense activity.[19] Taking different forms in different sections of Malaysia, British penetration between the years 1867 and 1942 evolved into essentially five administrative patterns: 1. direct rule in the three Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, 2. a centralized form of indirect rule in the four Federated Malay peninsula states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, 3. indirect rule in the five unfederated peninsula states of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu, and Kelantan, 4. Brooke Family dynastic rule in Sarawak, and 5. British chartered company rule in Sabah. A brief look at the theory and practice of colonial administration in each of these complex patterns follows.

The Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements was headed by a Governor, who was appointed by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, and who was advised by an Executive and Legislative Council. Singapore, Penang, and Malacca were thus directly ruled and considered an integral part of the possessions of the Crown; persons born within them were accorded British subject status. The Crown Colony form of government

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[18] Helen G. Matthew, Asia in the Modern World (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1963), p. 246.

[19] For a detailed analysis of the reasons for and the mechanics of this new birth of interest, see C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

established did not change significantly during the colonial period and in structure it was almost identical to other British crown colonies.[20] The governor sat at the apex of the administrative structure with powers that were theoretically close to absolute. Responsible only to the Crown, and controlling an official majority en the Executive and Legislative Councils, he possessed final administrative, legislative,and financial authority. As Mills notes, the governor was a benevolent despot in theory; early governors were far more prone to use their legal powers than were later ones, who though still theoretically all-powerful, seldom acted without the support of the councils and private associations.[21] There was, however, at no time doubt that the governor held both the form and the substance of power and responsibility.

British influence in the Malay peninsula was extended to the states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, initially with apparently genuine reluctance, in order to quell the mounting civil disorder[22] which had begun to spread from them to the Straits Settlements. In similar treaties concluded separately with the state Sultans between 1874 and 1888, it was agreed that in return for British "protected status"

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[20]Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York: Macmillan Company, 1937).

[21]Lennox Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 3-4.

[22]For an excellent account of 19th Century British attempts to quell civil disorder, see Nicholas Tarling, op. cit.

the Sultans would accept a British resident adviser whose advice was to be followed in all matters except Malay religion and custom. There was no question of a transfer of sovereignty; the Colonial Office expected the British Residents · merely to assist the Sultan with responsible advice. In practice, however, from the very beginning the Residents saw that "moral suasion meant impotence, and that to introduce reforms they must everstep their instructions and risk the displeasure of the Colonial Office."[23] While legally the Sultans remained the rulers, despite repeated Colonial Office admonishments, the Residents gradually took complete control over the state governments. While nominal control of the Residents was the responsibility of the Straits Settlements Governor, in practice Residents were very largely independent.

With the expressed intention of both of increasing control over the Residents and of decreasing their usurped power while concomitantly increasing the power of the Sultans, in 1896 the four states were linked to form the Federated Malay States. By the terms of the establishing treaty, control over the Residents was to be assumed by a Resident-General in Kuala Lumpur, who in turn was to be controlled by a High Commissioner. Thus, in theory the Sultans remained independent absolute monarchs accepting British advice. The gradual unanticipated political consequence of the Federation, however, proved to be that both the Sultans and the Residents declined in power

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[23]Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia, op. cit., p. 45.

before a centralized administration from which they were iso-
lated. By 1909, the federal government of the four states had
virtually complete control of all aspects of their administra-
tion. In the same year, again with the expressed intention
of increasing the powers of the Sultans, a Federal Council was
established with the Sultans, Residents, the Resident-General,
High Commissioner, and four unofficial representatives as mem-
bers. Again, however, this move unexpectedly still further
decreased the Sultans' power, because the Federal Council
usurped what meagre powers the Sultan's State Councils had
retained. "By the beginning of the 'twenties the Residents
and Sultans had become the 'forgotten men' of the overcentral-
ization of Kuala Lumpur."[24]

In the Federated States of Perak, Selangor, Negri
Sembilan, and Pahang, there was a persistently wide divergence
between the form and actual practice of British colonial admin-
istration: the four legally sovereign Sultans were figure-
heads, formally indirect rule was actually direct, and the fed-
eral formula actually meant amalgamation in practice. This
artificial situation prevailed in roughly the same form until
1942.

Under the impetus of the 1906 rubber boom, the British
extended their influence to the remaining peninsula states of
Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis in 1909 when state
Sultans passed by treaty from Thai to British suzerainty.

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[24]Mills, Loc. cit., p. 49.

Together with the southern state of Johore, which had a long
history of British influence extending to 1819, these four
states became known by the negative designation Unfederated
States because they formally came under British influence
after the establishment of the Federated States to which they
were frequently compared. This temporal fact had practical
significance, for, "having witnessed the effects of the resi-
dent system and federation upon the sovereignty of their
colleagues in the Federated States, the sultans were at consid-
erable pains to maintain their independence."[25]

Under the terms of treaties separately concluded between
1909 and 1923, however, the Sultans of these five states
agreed to administrative arrangements with the British which
were formally similar to those initially concluded by their
Federated colleagues. Each agreed to accept a British Advisor
(contrast Resident), whose advice would be heeded in every mat-
ter save religion and Malay custom in return for British "Pro-
tected Status." Again there was no formal shift in sover-
eignty; in theory the states remained independent Malay abso-
lute monarchies. The Advisers, like their predecessors under
the Resident system, were under the formal direction of the
Governor-High Commissioner and were to advise but not to rule.

While the Advisers in varying degrees soon wielded consid-
erable de facto power and gained practical control of key
posts in each of the five states and thus moved quite far

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[25]Ginsburg and Roberts, op. cit., p. 435.

beyond their mandate to advise, nevertheless, British control
of the Unfederated States never reached virtual take-over as
it had in the Federated States. British advice was not insis-
ted upon when the Sultan was opposed to it, unless the matter
was of paramount importance; unlike the Federated States, in
each of the Unfederated States the administrative hierarchy
was manned by substantial proportions of Malay civil servants;
in addition, State Council meetings were conducted in the
Malay language as well as in English. These facts should not
disguise the fact that British control was real and the Sul-
tans were practically dependent. However, in these five Unfed-
erated peninsular states, indirect rule was actually approx-
imated.

Sarawak's first white Rajah, James Brooke, ruled the law-
less land from 1841 until his death in 1868. While his power
was absolute in theory, the enlightened Brooke took care to
respect local custom and traditions and ruled indirectly
through hereditary Malay chiefs. Further territorial cessions
from the Sultan of Brunei enlarged the first Rajah's holdings,
and when his nephew, Charles Brooke, succeeded him in 1868,
great strides had been made in the establishment of law and
order, and the suppression of piracy, head-hunting, and slav-
ery. Charles Brooke greatly enlarged Sarawak[26] during his

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[26]In 1861 Roger Brooke had been ceded lands and rivers
between the Sadong to Kidurong Point, by the decaying Sultan-
ate of Brunei. Further cessions moved the border to the Baram
River in 1882, the Trusan River in 1885, and by purchase from
the North Borneo Company to the Lawas River in 1905.

fifty-year reign and continued the policies of his uncle. The relatively prosperous and largely pacified state was accorded British protection in 1888, but the Rajah continued to reign as before. Charles Vyner Brooke became the third white Rajah, succeeding his father in 1917. He intended in 1941, the Brooke dynasty centenary year, to cap his successful reign by granting a constitution, abrogating his absolute powers and instituting a beginning of self-government in the area, but the Japanese occupation thwarted the execution of his plan.[27] The Rajahs were paternal despots who administered with a small European and smaller Malay-elite civil service. A legislative and executive assembly existed but was purely advisory; the Rajah had final say on all key legislative and financial matters.

Sabah's colonial past took root later with the granting of a Royal Charter to the British North Borneo Company in 1881.[28] The Company was unabashedly in Borneo for profit, and little political, social, or economic development took place. The private company was badly managed and stayed on the verge

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[27]For details see Sir S. Runciman, The White Rajahs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[28]Before this an American named C. Le Moses had obtained a ten-year lease over northeast Borneo from the Sultan of Brunei in 1865, which he sold to an American syndicate that held the titles until 1877 when an Australian baron named Overbeck obtained permanent cession of the area from the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu. Overbeck attempted a settlement in Borneo, but it failed. The British became interested because Borneo was near their China trade-route, and they wanted to keep rival nations--especially Germany--from the area. See K. G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule (North Borneo 1881-1946) (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1958).

of bankruptcy, although piracy, head-hunting, and slavery were suppressed, and the indigenous peoples' religions, customs, and land rights were protected. In the year 1888 the British government signed treaties with the North Borneo Company, Rajah Brooke of Sarawak, and the Sultan of Brunei, establishing a British Protectorate over Sabah and Sarawak, and the tiny bit of territory left to Brunei. These treaties were to be the basis of British-Borneo relations until 1946.[29] The actual administration of Sabah under the Company's rule was headed by Governors seconded to Sabah from peninsula Malaya's civil service. Borneo had no efficient civil service through most of the Company's rule, although after 1925 the Company did secure Oxford and Cambridge University cadets for use as administrators. Purcell notes that "the whole territory was administered by 30-60 of the officers thus recruited."[30] The British North Borneo Company's administration of Sabah continued until the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Malaysia's disparate parts thus gradually came under the colonial aegis of the British and approached World War Two under the Mother Country's protection with no less than 12 separate governments and five varieties of colonial administration.

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[29]Tregonning, Malaysia, op. cit., p. 20.

[30]Victor Purcell, Malaysia (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1965), p. 174.

The Japanese Occupation

Roughly two hours before the first bombs began falling on
Pearl Harbor, initial Japanese landings took place in the
north Malay peninsula near Kota Baharu, Kelantan.[31]   Unpre-
pared Malay, Chinese, Indian, British, and Australian defend-
ers were unable to quell the rapid Japanese advance and fell
back on Singapore where, after a fierce stand, they surrendered
on February 15, 1942. In the southern prong of their attack
the Japanese had already captured the whole of north Borneo by
January 1942. Thus, in the brief period of seventy days, all
of present-day Malaysia fell into Japanese hands; there it
would remain for forty difficult months, roughly three and a
half years. This humiliating defeat of Malaysia's treaty-
bound British protectors created a crucial political watershed
in Malaysian history. The conquest and occupation experience
fundamentally disrupted pre-war society and began the perman-
ent end of British colonial rule.

Japanese occupation administration was Singapore-cen-
tered. The Straits Settlements were directly incorporated as
Japanese territory, while in the peninsula Malay states exist-
ing governmental structures were maintained with Japanese
directors assigned to native rulers. The Japanese also tried

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[31]Landings began at 4:55 p.m. Greenwich time on December
7, 1941. See Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (New
York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1963), pp. 518-526. See also A. E.
Percival, The War in Malaya (London: Eyre and Spottiswoodie,
1949). For the other side's view see Masanosu Tsuji,
Singapore: The Japanese Version (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1961).

joining the Malay peninsula to the island of Sumatra for administrative purposes and ceded the four mainland Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu to Thailand.[32]

Japanese military governors pursued disparate policies toward the ethnic groups of Malaysia. While all groups suffered severe hardships and cruelties at Japanese hands, the following differential ethnic pattern emerged. In keeping with a general anti-Western bias, the Japanese interned Europeans in prison camps, replaced English with the Japanese language in schools, destroyed Western monuments, and in general strove to humiliate Westerners.[33] Eurasians with their marked British loyalty were also given special mistreatment. On the one hand, the Indian community was "encouraged in its Indian nationalist sympathies; the Azad Hind, or Free India government, was enthusiastically organized in Singapore in 1943,"[34] and recruiting for the Indian National Army took place; on the other hand, Indian estate laborers were forcefully conscripted for work on the infamous Burma-Thailand "death-railway." Of some 60,000 conscripted, over 40,000 died, and a mere 20,000 returned to Malaysia.[35] The Japanese also promoted latent

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[32]See Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role In Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[33]J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya: A.D. 1400-1959 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 259.

[34]Parmer, op. cit., p. 249.

[35]Gullick, op. cit., p. 81.

Malay anti-Chinese sentiment and sought the cooperation of the
Malay community in roles as informants, and for general police
work. Attempts to requisition Malay farmers' rice crops
largely met with Malay resistance in the form of crop neglect.

No Malaysian ethnic group suffered more extensively from
systematic Japanese severity than the Chinese, who had sup-
ported the National Government of China's resistance to the
Japanese invasion of China. In anticipation and in consequence
of the atrocities committed against them, a part of the Chi-
nese community organized what appears in retrospect to have
been the only effective resistance to the Japanese conquerors.
A great many of the anti-Japanese fighters were Chinese commun-
ists who from positions in the jungle countryside undertook
guerrilla activities against the Japanese under the peninsula
leadership of the Malayan Chinese Party (MCP).[36] MCP resis-
tance plans were encouraged by the British for the militarily
expedient reasons and MCP leaders were given guerrilla tactic
training by British officers in the period 1941-1942. Late in
the war British air-drops of supplies and men were sent to
them from bases in India; in return, the MCP promised to pro-
vide rear harassment to the Japanese during the British

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[36] The MCP was formed in 1930 as a consequence of the
Kuomintang-Communist split in China in 1927; the group was
active among peninsula Chinese factory, mine, and plantation
workers in the thirties. The British imprisoned and deported
many of its leaders as a consequence of Moscow-directed anti-
British activities that became intense during the period of
the Russo-German alliance. When the alliance collapsed and
Russia and Britain became allies, the MCP in 1940-1941 shifted
with the Moscow line to the support of the British.

re-conquest invasion of Malaysia planned for fall 1945.[37]

Operating under the banner of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the MCP accumulated a force of approximately 7,000 men by 1945. League with the British was a mere war time expedient; post-war plans called for British expulsion from the Malay peninsula and the establishment of a Chinese controlled Communist People's Republic of Malaya.[38]

The re-conquest of Borneo had begun in early 1945 in the Kelabit uplands, Labuan and at Miri, with Allied pre-landing bombing causing the destruction of nearly every principal town in Sarawak and Sabah. When the atomic bomb caused the unexpectedly sudden surrender of Japan in August 1945, throughout Malaysia a chaotic month-long interregnum ensued between the Japanese collapse and the return of British and Australian troops in September 1945.

While there was confusion in Sarawak and Sabah as well, the interregnum affected peninsula Malaysia more dangerously as the MCP was the only effectively armed and organized force on the mainland. Here the guerrillas flourished, creating the impression that they had defeated the Japanese, conducting kangaroo courts to deal with suspected Malay collaborators and

[37]A dramatic account of the role of British "stay-behind" groups in these actions is found in E. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London: Chatto & Windus, 1953).

[38]Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.

leaving little doubt that they were in control.[39] Malay reprisals against Chinese followed, and many serious racial incidents occurred which threatened to escalate into widespread communal warfare. Order was only gradually restored with the arrival in strength of British troops in September. The MCP did not immediately resist the British return to the peninsula; they participated in victory celebrations with the British and agreed to disarm and disband their army.[40]

Throughout Malaysia the British return was widely celebrated, but Britain reclaimed a far different Malaysia from the one she was forced to leave. The physical and social disruption wrought by war was tremendous. Crime, disorder, food shortage, inflation, economic stagnation, disease, war damage, and popular disillusionment were all widespread; Malaysia was on the verge of a collapse into chaos.

The raison d'etre of the British presence in each part of Malaysia had been Britain's role as protector; Britain's defeat doomed much pre-war-style British prestige. In addition, the war's end found Malaysian racial tensions at an all time high, and left on the peninsula the "best organized and most experienced [Communist] party in Southeast Asia."[41]   Of

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[39] Saul Rose, Britain and South-East Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 128.

[40] This move, later regretted, reflected a MCP shift of tactics in an attempt to gain control of Malaysia's inchoate labor movement and to build popular support. But while many arms were turned in to the British, large caches of left-behind Japanese armaments were hidden in the jungle.

[41] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, op. cit., p. 11.

more political importance, the public lethargy characteristic of pre-War Malaysia was dead forever, a fact immediately obvious on the peninsula if less so in Sabah and Sarawak. Internal forces unleashed by the war experience combined with sparks spilling over from the independence struggles in Burma, India, and Indonesia, to kindle for the first time the inchoate coals of nationalism on the Malaysian scene.

The Post-War Interim and Emergency

During the period from September 1945 until the middle of 1946, in keeping with improvised British wartime plans, all parts of Malaysia were governed by a British Military Administration under the direction of Admiral Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia. During this tumultuous period, effective efforts were begun to deal with the problems of restoration of order, regulation of food supplies, restoration of medical services, revitalization of the economy, and general rebuilding. At the same time, the British Government ironed out its war-debated constitutional proposals for a reorganized governance in Malaysia.

The solutions for Sabah and Sarawak were the easiest and first to be executed. In Sabah the directors of the North Borneo Company decided that their never prosperous company simply could not afford to rehabilitate the heavily war-damaged state and petitioned the British Government to take over. Their petition to the Crown was successful, and on July 15, 1946, Sabah moved directly from British Military Administration to the status of a British Crown Colony.

In Sarawak, Mountbatten's military administration ended in April 1946 with governmental authority reverting to the third Rajah Brooke. Less than six months later, however, in October 1946, the Rajah decided to cede the state to the British Crown.[42] Sarawak's legislative Council Negri approved the Rajah's cession by a narrow majority in May 1946, and finally in July 1946 Sarawak became a British Crown Colony.

Post-war plans for peninsula Malaysia were complicated and did not go so smoothly. Britain first tried to avoid reverting to the complex pre-war regime. She envisaged a multi-racial unitary British protectorate comprised of the nine peninsula Malay states and the settlements of Penang and Malacca, but with the exclusion of Singapore which was to become a separate British Crown Colony.[43] The new plan was called the Malayan Union, and it was made public in late 1945 and early 1946.[44] To inaugurate the Malayan Union required treaties with the Malay Sultans which transferred sovereignty

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[42]A variety of factors induced the Rajah to make his decision. Prominent among them were the following: the Rajah was aged, ill, and lacked confidence in his heir; Sarawak needed British aid to repair the extensive war damage that was beyond the Rajah's means; and a British Labour Government did not look with favor on dynastic rule. See Rose, op. cit., p. 147.

[43]Singapore was excluded for essentially three reasons: the Malay States feared dominance by Singapore with her large Chinese population which would create a Chinese majority if the island were included; Singapore's free-port status would unduly complicate revenue proposals; and Britain wanted to retain her Singapore naval and air bases separate from a political unit that might soon become independent.

[44]Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution (London: Cmd. 6742, H.M.S.O., 1946).

to the British Crown and reduced their power to advice on mat-
ters of Malay custom and religion. To achieve this end, Sir
Harold MacMichael was dispatched to the peninsula in October
1945 and with remarkable celerity returned to London with
unamended identical treaties signed by all nine Sultans.[45]

The Malayan Union proposals and the MacMichael mission
met with great opposition both in England and in peninsula
Malaya. In Britain distinguished former administrators of
Malaya (including Sir Frank Swettenham) articulated their pro-
tests in fiery speeches, pamphlets, and letters to The Times.
Their efforts encouraged local Malay opposition, and in common
opposition to the Union proposals, several local Malay associa-
tions united to form the first purely political organization
in Malaysian history,[46] the United Malay Nationalist Organiza-
tion (UMNO). Founded in early 1946 under the presidency of
Malay aristocrat, Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, UMNO defended the tra-
ditional power and sovereignty of the Sultans and condemned
the Malayan Union proposals vigorously. With the backing of
UMNO, the Malay Sultans themselves spoke out in opposition to
the treaties which were "forced" upon them by MacMichael.

Undeterred, the British ended their Military Administra-
tion on April 1, 1946, with the appointment of Sir Edward Gent
as the Malayan Union's first Governor. But the Sultans

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[45]Sir Harold MacMichael, Report of a Mission to Malaya:
October 1945 - January 1946 (London: Colonial No. 194, H.M.S.
O., 1946).

[46]T. H. Silcock and U. A. Aziz, Nationalism in Malaya
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950).

boycotted Gent's installation ceremonies at UMNO urging and a continuously vigorous opposition was maintained. In the face of it, the British Labour Government backed down and agreed to negotiate a more acceptable constitution with the Malays.[47] While the Malayan Union proposals were in legal effect until February 1948, they were never fully inaugurated.

After a series of discussions between the British, UMNO, and the Sultans, a plan for a Federation of Malaya emerged.[48] This plan returned state sovereignty to the Sultans, who were with a Malay chief executive (Mentri Besar) were to govern states of limited power with the advice of a British Adviser. A strong federal government, headed by a Crown-appointed High Commissioner (with an Executive Council and Federal Legislative Council appointed by him), was established and assigned strong central powers. A Council of Rulers (the Sultans) was also provided with whom the High Commissioner was required to consult on policy questions. Special provisions were included to safeguard "the special position of the Malays" and citizenship provisions were narrowed in concession to Malay fears of Chinese dominance.

This Federation of Malaya plan was formalized by joint action of King George and the nine Malay Sultans by official

[47] The decision to negotiate with the Malay community alone in effect meant a reversion to pre-war consideration of the Malays as the privileged citizens of Malaya.

[48] Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Working Committee (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1947).

agreement[49] and came into being on February 1, 1948. Non-Malay groups accepted the Federation, which resulted from discussions in which they were given little part, with hostility. They in particular objected to the exclusion of Singapore and to the agreement's pro-Malay provisions. Their protests, however, proved ineffectual and, with the establishment of the Federation, they were in the main silenced.

Within months after the formation of the Federation of Malaya, the new peninsula government was forced to deal with an armed communist bid for power. The revolt began in 1948 as a result of a shift by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) from its largely unsuccessful tactics of labor movement infiltration, strikes, and riots. It is now widely accepted that the MCP call to revolt was a response to a general Moscow directive to all Southeast Asian communists to take to arms, the summons being delivered at the Calcutta Communist Youth Conference of February 1948. Before they could be arrested, MCP leaders disappeared into the Malayan jungle where they had secret arms caches which had been hidden from the British during the MCP's incomplete disarmament at the end of the Japanese occupation. Their insurgent inspiration came from both Moscow and Peking. Peninsula Malay was merely beginning to overcome post-war problems of security, inflation, unemployment, food shortages, and general demoralization. With

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[49]The Federation Agreement, 1948 (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya Government Press, 1952).

guerrilla-terrorist attacks on men and property, the MCP[50] sought to take advantage of these conditions of unrest and, by disrupting the peninsula's economy, sought to provoke a popular revolt in favor of a Communist Peoples' Republic of Malaya.

The MCP failed to realize any of its aims but cost Malaysia thousands of men and millions of dollars[51] to cope effectively with it. The Federation Government's declaration of a State of Emergency in June 1948 was to extend 12 long years until its ceremonial termination on July 31, 1960. At the peak of their strength the terrorist bands totaled between 5,000 and 10,000, most of whom were Chinese; their civilian support organization, called the Yin Yuen or People's Movement, was relied upon to supply food, money, information, and recruits. Government forces combated the terrorists both directly in the field and indirectly through psychological warfare, and the elimination of their sources of supply. To achieve the latter result, the Briggs Plan for resettlement of the more than a million, mostly Chinese (86 per cent), jungle fringe squatters into New Villages was most effective. These more than 600 Government-defended New Villages with rigid food control schemes effectively deprived the communist terrorists

[50] Now under the banner of the Malayan Races Liberation Army and led by the experienced guerrilla leader, Ch'in P'eng, who won fame and British gratitude for his anti-Japanese activities during the war and occupation.

[51] Russell H. Fifield estimates Emergency military and civilian casualties at over 11,000; not counting property damage he estimates the cost of suppressing the revolt at US$500 million, Southeast Asia in U. S. Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 175.

of vital food and supplies.[52] General Sir Gerald Templer, who
was appointed High Commissioner upon the 1951 guerrilla assas-
sination of Sir Henry Gurney, so successfully coordinated
civil and military activites that by the mid-fifties the tide
had been turned against the guerrillas and largely won. By
1960 only about 500 guerrillas remained deep in the peninsula
interior near the Thai border, and the Emergency could be offi-
cially terminated.[53]

Political Development into Malaysia

On the mainland of today's Malaysia, with the easing of
guerrilla war tensions and the improvement of public confidence
and morale, important political events began to take place
rapidly which were to hasten the peninsula's Federation Govern-
ment along the road to political independence. Local town
council elections were introduced in 1951; village councils
became elective in 1952. In the same year citizenship laws
were liberalized, allowing more Chinese to qualify. An
improved ratio of non-Malay versus Malay civil service
appointments was conceded (one non-Malay to four Malays).

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[52]The plan also permanently altered the settlement pat-
tern of peninsula Malaysia. Most New Villages became permanent
and today about 500 still dot the peninsula's territory. See
Kernial Singh Sandu, "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya,"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, V, No. 1 (March 1964), 143-
77.

[53]For the best accounts of the Emergency, see Anthony
Short, "Communism and the Emergency," Wang, Gungwu (ed.)
Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 149-160, and Lucian Pye, Guerrilla War-
fare in Malaya, op. cit.

More unofficial representation in the councils was permitted and a modified cabinet system was instituted. These political developments reflected British faith in the merits of a gradual escalation of indigenous practical political experience from local to village to state and finally to national levels.

In the important Kuala Lumpur municipal council elections held early in 1952, a decisive pattern of political party activity was established. Background to the crucial contest was as follows. UMNO president, Dato Onn, believing that a non-communal party was prerequisite to Malayan independence, attempted in 1951 to establish a representative non-communal party known as the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), which he hoped would attract members both from UMNO and from the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA),[54] both of which were communal in membership and program. When Onn failed to attract either support or members from UMNO, he resigned his presidency of that party to devote his efforts to IMP activity. The test of strength between the IMP, UMNO (now led by Tunku Abdul Rahman), and the MCA came with the Kuala Lumpur elections. UMNO and MCA leaders, in fear that a decisive victory by IMP would lead to member-defections from their groups, formed a pre-election Alliance in the contest won nine of the eleven contested seats. The IMP was thereafter stifled; as a winning communal party combination, the Alliance formula

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[54] Formed as a political party in 1949 to represent the non-communist Chinese community. Sir Cheng-Lock Tan was the first president.

was extended to all local elections held thereafter. To the surprise of many critics, the Alliance not only held together under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman but grew rapidly in strength and emerged from Malaya's first series of state elections in 1954 as the Federation's most effective political organization. The victory-emboldened Alliance then pressed the British for an early national election and an elected majority on the Federal Legislative Council. The British yielded to most UMNO demands and, with the concurrence of the Malay Rulers, scheduled peninsula Malaya's first general elections for July 1955.[55]

Further strengthened by support of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC),[56] the Alliance campaigned on a program of Merdeka (malay for freedom or independence) within four years, economic development, measures to end the Emergency, expanded social services, a communally-acceptable education policy, and their record of effective opposition to the British. Running a full slate of 52 candidates (35 Malays, 17 non-Malays), the Alliance achieved a land-slide victory of 51 of 52 contested seats. Chief Minister Rahman headed the Alliance Government.[57]

Five months later Alliance leaders were in London with

[55]52 of the 98 seats on the Federal Legislative Council were to be elected. The remainder were appointed members.

[56]The Indian communal party founded in late 1946, drawing inspiration from India's independence struggle.

[57]Francis Carnell, "The Malayan Elections," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (December 1955), 315-30.

representatives of the Sultans, pressing for a stepped up schedule for full independence for the peninsula within two years. The London mission was an unqualified Alliance success. A target date for full independence was set for August 31, 1957, and a Commonwealth commission of five constitutional experts was charged with recommending a constitution for an independent Malaya.[58]

The Commission, chaired by Britain's Lord Reid, acted with dispatch and reported in early 1957.[59] Its recommendations were accepted almost without modification in the final draft of the constitution. Basic features as finalized for passage by the Federation Legislative Council were as follows: The Federation of Malaya was to be a constitutional monarchy ceremonially headed by a Paramount Ruler (Yang de-pertuan Agong) selected from among the nine Malay state Sultans for a five-year term. Actual federal executive powers were to be vested in a legislatively responsible Cabinet of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister chosen from the majority party in the legislature's lower house. A bicameral federal Parliament was to consist of a fully-elected 104-member House of Representatives (Dewan Ra'ayat) holding office for five years, unless dissolved sooner, and a 38-member indirectly elected (22 members elected by state legislatures and 16 appointed members)

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[58]Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference Held in London in January and February 1956 (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya Government Press, 1956).

[59]Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957 (London: Colonial no. 330, H.M.S.O., 1957).

Senate (Dewan Negara).

The eleven state governments, vested with residual powers, were to be headed by the Sultans (or Governors in Panang and Malacca) with actual executive power vested in a chief minister (Mentri Besar) and his cabinet who were to be collectively responsible to their unicameral fully-elected state legislatures. Malay was designated the Federation's national language, and English was to be recognized as a second official language for a transitional ten years. Islam was to be the national religion with freedom of worship guaranteed to all other faiths. Special Malay privileges in civil service appointments, scholarships, land reservations, and business opportunities were to exist indefinitely under supervision of the Malay Paramount Ruler.

These final proposals were submitted to the Federal Legislative Council in July 1957 and received unanimous approval. First national elections in independent Malaya were set for 1959; until then, it was agreed that the Federal Legislative Council elected in 1955 would continue in office. The members had approved of a federal government with strong central powers and a federal supremacy clause. Finally, on the appointed day of August 31, 1957, at ceremonies held in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman declared the Federation of Malaya (Persekutuan Tanah Melayu) a sovereign democratic and independent state. Few of the peninsula Federation architects dreamed that, as constituted, it would have a short life of only six years before

becoming the framework and heartland of a larger Federation of Malaysia incorporating the British Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah.

Because the story of Malaysia's formation provides a rich store of data on the new system's current operation, it will consequently be detailed in Part III of this study, and in this historical overview chapter only the bare bones need be presented.

Having consolidated his position as the peninsula's leader with an overwhelming Alliance victory in the 1959 general elections, in May of 1961 Malayan Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman jolted the world with the following proposal:

"Sooner or later Malaya should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. ...it is inevitable that we should look ahead to ...a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation."[60]

Reaction to the Malaysia proposal in Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and tiny Brunei was mixed. Singapore had at this time progressed from a British Crown Colony to the status of a semi-autonomous state within the British Commonwealth, with a Prime Minister and Cabinet responsible to a fully-elected 51-member legislature. Elected in 1959, Lee Kuan Yew's Peoples' Action

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[60] Tunku Abdul Rahman in a Singapore speech to the Foreign Correspondents Association of Southeast Asia on May 27, 1961. Reported in Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia: New Factor in World Politics (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1964), p. 7.

Party (PAP) Government enthusiastically endorsed the proposal and, after negotiations with Kuala Lumpur on terms, held a special referendum on the issue in September 1962. Despite the vigorous opposition of the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) Party, 71 per cent of the Singapore electorate voted in favor of the PAP supported merger plan.[61]

In the Borneo state of Sarawak at the time of the 1961 Malaysia proposal, little political development had taken place since the war. Still a Crown Colony with a British Governor, by 1961 only representative local and district councils existed which indirectly elected a majority of unofficial members of the state legislature (Council Negri). The year 1961 found the Crown Colony of Sabah even more retarded in its political advancement; only local governmental authorities existed, and while manned by unofficial members of Sabah's various communities, none were elective. With such undeveloped political machinery, it was very difficult to gage the reaction of the Malaysia proposal in both of these Borneo states. Consequently a special five-man Malayan-British Commission was appointed to visit Sarawak and Sabah to ascertain Borneo opinion on the Malaysia proposals. Appointed in January and

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[61]Lee Kuan Yew's PAP had long supported merger with the peninsula and had run on a peninsula-Singapore merger platform in 1959, but the UMNO dominated Alliance Government in Kuala Lumpur was not receptive to merger before 1961 because of a long lasting fear of upsetting the peninsula's racial balance with Singapore's Chinese population. With the addition of the Borneo states, no Chinese majority would accrue, a factor that contributed to Kuala Lumpur's change of heart. See Lee, Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1962).

reporting in June of 1962, the Commission reported that a substantial majority of the people favored merger.[62]

Tiny Brunei at first seemed to welcome the merger plan, but after an unsuccessful internal revolt in December 1962, the Sultan was reinforced in his decision to decline to join,[63] and the tiny enclave was excluded for the time being from the Malaysia plan.

Events moved quickly in 1962 toward realization of Malaysia. Britain was warmly sympathetic to the merger plan from its inception,[64] and after talks with Malayan officials in August 1962, the two governments agreed in principal on the necessary legislation to implement the plan. This agreement was endorsed by peninsula Malaya's Parliament and by Singapore,

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[62] Chaired by Britain's Lord Cobbold, the Commission spent two months in the two states, interviewed over 4,000 persons, held public hearings, and invited all groups to submit their views. See Report of the Commission of Enquiry: North Borneo and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya Press, 1962).

[63] In addition the Sultan did not join for fear of losing his state's oil revenue; the question of the Brunei Sultan's precedence among the Sultans of the peninsula states also could not be resolved. When A. M. Azahari, Brunei's key political leader of the major party Ra'ayat, revolted, the Sultan concluded, despite the rebellion's rapid British suppression, that too many of the people of Brunei opposed the merger prospect. See Willard A. Hanna, "The Course and Consequence of Insurrection," The Formation of Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 126-138.

[64] Among other reasons, because it was a convenient way to divest herself of the colonies moving toward independence while protecting her interests in the region with Commonwealth ties.

Sarawak, and Sabah's respective governments.[65] It called for the inauguration of a fourteen-state Federation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963, and an intergovernmental committee was formed to draft the new constitution.

Unexpected international hostility to the Malaysia plan by Indonesia and the Philippines, however, was to delay the time schedule. The Philippines revived an ancient claim to Sabah and opposed Malaysia's formation mainly on that ground.[66] Indonesian leaders blasted the plan as a neocolonialistic plot to encircle Indonesia and announced a policy of "Confrontation."[67] At a series of high-level international meetings between Malaysian, Indonesian, and Philippine leaders, it was agreed in June and early August of 1963 that Malaysia would be welcomed if a special United Nations team were sent to Sabah and Sarawak and found public opinion in favor of the Malaysia plan.

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[65]The Malayan parliament voted its approval on August 15, 1962. The Singapore referendum signified that island's approval on September 1, 1962. The Legislative Council of Borneo approved the plan on September 12, 1962, and the legislative council, Negri,of Sarawak followed suit on September 26, 1962.

[66]The Philippines claimed that the Sultan of Sulu's Sabah claim, to which their government was legal heir, was still a valid one in that he had leased rather than sold the area in the mid-19th Century. See H. B. Jacobini, "Fundamentals of Philippine Policy Toward Malaysia," Asian Survey, IV, No. 11 (November 1964), 1144-51.

[67]See Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," Asian Survey, IV, No. 6 (June 1964), 904-13; and also, Richard Butwell, "Malaysia and Its Impact on the International Relations of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, IV, No. 7 (July 1964), 940-46.

This decision meant postponement of the projected inauguration date beyond August 31, 1963, until the United Nations team made public its report. The Constitutional Commission had in the meantime made public its recommendations[68] in February 1962, and the Malaysia Agreement was formally signed in London on July 9, 1963; it was endorsed by the legislatures of Great Britain, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah during late July and August.[69]

The United Nations' Borneo investigation published its report on September 14, 1963,[70] finding that a majority of the Sabah and Sarawak peoples favored the Malaysia plan. Just two days later, on September 16, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was proclaimed a sovereign and independent state within the British Commonwealth.

Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia found the United Nation's mission report satisfactory, and accordingly diplomatic links with Kuala Lumpur were severed, and both nations withheld recognition of the new state. Indonesia's opposition continued under the banner of Confrontation and was to prove the more strident and overt during the period 1963-1965.

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[68]Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (London Cmnd. 1954, H.M.S.O., 1963).

[69]Malaysia: Agreement Concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore (London: Cmnd. 2094, H.M.S.O., 1963).

[70]Report to the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations Malaysia Mission, 1963).

until Sukarno's power base slipped from under him in 1965-1966, and Confrontation was ended by Indonesia's new military leaders.

The fledgling Federation of Malaysia was scarcely 23 months old when on August 9, 1965, Singapore state was suddenly expelled from Malaysia and became an independent island republic. Overestimating Alliance commitment to the Malaysia framework and thus never considering separation a realistic possibility, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew took the political gamble of loudly raising the issues of racial equality, Malay rights and privileges under the banner of a "Malaysian Malaysia" from the inchoate organizational base of a PAP led united pan-Malaysian opposition; for reasons webbed inextricably with perceived political expediency, idealism, and personal ambition, Lee began a frontal assault upon Alliance policy and Kuala Lumpur leadership. As Kuala Lumpur-Singapore conflict broadened and intensified, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman found himself increasingly pressured for remedial action, especially by ultra-conservative UMNO Malays, who were haunted and incited by the historic Malay hantu of Chinese domination. Perceiving a threat to his leadership within and without the UMNO-dominated Alliance and the immediate imminence of violent racial conflict, possible civil war, and demands for severely repressive measures, the Tunku concluded it was his imperative duty to cut Singapore adrift before Malaysia collapsed into chaos. Malaysia thus became a thirteen-state Federation.

Thus in the short span of a score of momentous post-

bellum years, Malaysia underwent the catalytic experiences of British Military Government, the terrorist Emergency, and the troubled task of constitutionally feeling its way to independence. In each of its parts, practical political experience was gained in the successively held local, state, and regional elections which gradually transferred key governmental positions from British to Malaysian hands. And, finally, constitutional machinery was constructed for a parliamentary democracy on the British model, and all of Malaysia achieved independent control of her destiny. It is amazing that all these events occurred in a land of pre-war lethargy and political quiescence. Still, Malaysia is an artificial amalgam forged under British guidance from anachronistic political fragments with all of the paraphernalia but few of the attributes of nationhood,

Figure 1

Malaysia's States and Their Historical Groupings

States	Straits Settlements Colony	Federated States	Malayan Union	Federation Malaya	Federation Malaysia
Singapore	X		X		X*
Malacca	X		X	X	X
Penang	X		X	X	X
Perak		X	X	X	X
Selangor		X	X	X	X
Pahang		X	X	X	X
Negri Sembilan		X	X	X	X
Johore			X	X	X
Perlis			X	X	X
Kedah			X	X	X
Kelantan			X	X	X
Trengganu			X	X	X
Sabah					X
Sarawak					X

Note: X indicates membership.

* Singapore was a member of Malaysia from 1963 to August 1965.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In common with many "new" post-war states, the Federation of Malaysia faces an integrative crisis of the first magnitude. Writing about Malaya on the eve of independence, Rupert Emerson accurately described Malaysia of today:

"Divided from each other in almost every respect, the peoples of Malaya have in common essentially only the fact that they live in the same country. In race, religion, language, culture, economic interests, and the other attributes usually associated with the existence of a nation, their outstanding characteristic is not unity but profound diversity."[1]

How did this diversity and dearth of shared values come into being and persist? To declare it the result of diverse and disparate political socialization is not simply a flirtation with tautology; it is an explicit attempt to seek the source and ontology of that political portion of individuals' lives. Finding the loci of determinants and shapers of political orientations is of special concern to those who wish to change and direct them into desired channels. While an investigation that explicitly attempts to identify and characterize the sources and shapers of the heterogeneous political lives of Malaysians can be accomplished only partially at this time, this should be no deterrent for it is possible to paint the

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[1] Rupert Emerson, writing in the Foreword to Frank H. King, The New Malayan Nation: A Study of Communalism and Nationalism (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p. v.

broad features of the process, and this will spotlight what needs more detailed and systematic scrutiny.

Important guidelines for an inquiry into Malaysian political socialization are to be found in the general theoretical literature and in the demographic structure of the Malaysian population. The former sharpens focus upon what we are looking for; the latter tells us more about the population being analyzed.

Recent Western research in political socialization[2] suggests that there are two stages in the process of political learning. The first stage is primarily latent; it is also the most basic, the most rapid, and the most binding. It typically transpires during early childhood, emanating from the child's experiences in his primary social structures. In the family, for example, the child is socialized into a pattern of parental authority, discipline, and decision-making. While never disappearing, latent political socialization diminishes in intensity with growing child maturity, and the child enters a second political socialization stage in which predominately manifest political syndromes are transmitted. Starting typically in early contact with secondary societal structures (e.g.,

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[2] The basic synoptic work is Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959). See also I. L. Child, "Socialization," G. Lindsey (ed.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Lewis A. Froman, Jr. "Personality and Political Socialization," Journal of Politics, XXIII (May 1961), 341 ff.; and Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," (private reprint of an article scheduled for publication in, The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1966).

entering school), the manifest socialization stage continues throughout one's life of unavoidable contact with social structures that embody and transmit political messages--for example, religious organizations, peer groups, work groups, political organizations, governmental structures, etc. Thus the character and content of one's political socialization depends to a decisive degree upon the nature and intensity of the type of primary and secondary social structures that fill an individual's life space. It is a continuous process.

In investigating Malaysian socialization, we are in effect looking at the political biographies of the country's more than eight million inhabitants, a clearly unmanageable task without rather gross classification of identifiable patterns into broad categories. Aggregate demographic information, however, permits the preliminary identification of major categories of socialization types or patterns. For example, the racial structure of the population is an obvious guideline in Malaysia, begging the question of the nature of a distinctive communal pattern of socialization. The tenability of this hypothesis is reinforced by the close correlation of race with other major Malaysian population variables such as language, residence place, religion, economic role, and culture. Aggregate demographic data offer other guides to a socialization inquiry; for example, the population's age structure permits a rather accurate basis for assessment of the numbers of Malaysians who personally experienced a major socializing event such as the Japanese occupation.

The types of social structures that have been and are

instrumental in the political socialization of the inhabitants
of Malaysia are undoubtedly myriad. We are nevertheless,
almost surely on sound ground when we mark as major the follow-
ing structures: the family, the school, religious organiza-
tions, communal organizations, political and governmental
organizations, work-groups, and voluntary associations. The
socialization impact of major events such as British colonial-
ism, the Japanese occupation, the Emergency, and the formation
of Malaysia must also be assessed, as well as the diffuse but
important impact of social forces such as urbanization, secu-
larization, and nationalism.

The framework devised for this socialization inquiry is
an eight-category typology based on distinguishable Malaysian
political socialization patterns: 1. the Malay Political
Elite, 2. the Malay Peasant-Proletariate, 3. the Chinese Busi-
ness Elite, 4. the Chinese Worker-Peasant, 5. the Indian Pro-
fessional Elite, 6. the Indian Laborer, 7. the Aboriginal Urban
Elite, and 8. the Rural Aborigine. Each of the above cate-
gories represents an empirically distinguishable Malaysian
political sub-culture, as will become clear as each is dis-
cussed separately below.

The Malay Political Elite

While all Malays share an essentially common culture that
sets them apart from other Malaysian ethnic categories, the
way of life of Malays in upper social class brackets separates
them from their lower socio-economic class Malay brethren as
well. This small and frequently aristocratic Malay elite has

a distinctive socialization pattern.

Malay society has been sharply polarized since ancient times, when the Rajah or aristocratic class provided the warlords, chiefs, administrators, and Sultans, who maintained a deep social gulf between themselves and the peasant Malay masses (ra'ayat, subjects) whom they ruled. Members of this Malay Rajah class acquired their status by royal birth; they maintained it by closing entry to leadership positions to all save those to whom traditional kinship loyalty was due--other Malay nobles enmeshed in the complex and extensive family trees of the traditional Malay port-kings and river-lords.

The West first made contact with Malaysia through this Malay ruling class, and its impact changed it drastically. With an initial preference for indirect rule, the British attempted to maintain the traditional ruling hierarchy and tried to convert the Malay nobility into civil servants. However, as J. M. Gullick notes, "...lack of education combined with traditional attitudes to the obligations of kinship and the customary perquisites of authority (misdescribed by the British as 'nepotism' and 'bribery') rendered the old-style Malay aristocrat unsuitable as a partner in the new regime."[3]

British colonial efforts to transform the Malay Rajah class into "effective" bureaucrats unleashed the powerful forces of Westernization and secularization. One of the first inroads was the British implantation of facilities for Western

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[3]Gullick, op. cit., p. 41

lay education for Malay nobility. In 1905, a special Malay College was established at Kuala Kangsar in Perak, modeled after the English public school. Here Malay nobility from all of peninsula Malaysia were to be trained for the administrative service. Throughout the colonial period, the British considered the Malay nobility the indigenous administrative elite of the land; they maintained the facade of Malay sovereignty and reinforced it by according deference to Malay nobility and encouraging the preservation of the Malay language, religion, and customs insofar as they did not interfere with British interests.

Yet, despite the symbolic British maintenance of the traditional framework of Malay life and culture, inexorably Westernization caused reality to deny its efficacy. It became increasingly clear that the Malay nobility was sovereign in mere form and subservient in fact. Traditional Koranic schools were continued, but western secular education correlated with administrative mobility. Malay continued to be "the language of the land" but those who learned English as well got ahead much faster. Malays were the "indigenous people" of Malaysia, but Western development stimulated a flood of Chinese and Indian immigrants that threatened to create a non-Islamic immigrant majority in the land in their stead.

The Japanese occupation interrupted British rule in Malaysia but did not essentially change their pattern of rule; for reasons of their own, the Japanese maintained the facade of Malay power and ruled through the Malay aristocratic administration as did the British before them. When the British

attempted to return, however, they found the Malay elite
unwilling to accept the pre-war status quo. The war had demon-
strated that Asians no longer had to accept European domina-
tion, and with inspiration from nationalist movements else-
where in Asia, the Malay elite no longer was willing to toler-
ate the deep gap between their symbolic status and their actual
power, as the case of the marked Malay opposition to the post-
war British Malayan Union proposals illustrates. Malays more-
over saw the wealth of "their" land falling increasingly into
the hands of Chinese immigrants who were beginning to demand
equality of political status as well. When alienated Chinese
attempted to seize power violently in the 1948 Emergency, the
last shackles of apathy were jarred from Malay limbs, and the
Rajah class was transformed into a vigorous nationalist group
with demands not only for the preservation of the form and the
restoration of the fact of Malay supremacy, but for political
independence from Britain as well.

It is this privileged heritage and catalytic experience
that makes the socialization pattern of current members of the
Malay political elite distinctive. It has been an irregular
and in many ways incongruous socialization pattern, shaped to
a large extent by fortuitous events.

In contrast to other Malays, the upper-status heirs to
this heritage form a distinctive political sub-culture in
Malaysia today. They have been reared in a rural milieu of
aristocratic or otherwise privileged Malay families. Their
fathers met the British at the water's edge and came to terms
with them that allowed the continuation of their traditional

privileges. They have been given access to Western secular
education and have learned English at school and in dealing
with British administrators who have been around all of their
lives. While they are among the privileged few in Malay soci-
ety, they soon discover that increasing numbers of Chinese and
Indians are their economic superiors, and that by comparison
their family incomes are modest. The avenue for mobility is
the English university and preparation to join the administra-
tive service led by the British. At school they come into con-
tact with other Malay youths of similar status, with similar
frustrations and hostility that crystallize into a mixture of
resentment and envy toward the non-Malay and the British to
form inchoate Malay nationalist sentiment. They feel threat-
ened by and suspicious of their non-Malay neighbors who are
pork-eating non-believers with little political power but more
prosperous economic life-styles and political ambition. They
are both envious and resentful toward the British because,
while they protected the form of Malay political supremacy,
they took the substance of power for themselves and both per-
mitted and encouraged the immigration of non-Malays to work
their tin and rubber industries. Finding their frustration
and ambivalence shared by others, they become bolder in their
demands, ardent Malay nationalists insistent on the preserva-
tion of Malay rights and privileges.

It is ironic that the path to political organization and
to independence in a sense added to the Malay elite's psycho-
logical dissonance. For, unlike colonial rulers elsewhere,

the British Governors cooperated with Malay nationalism and
the path to independence was tranquil and nonviolent. Malay
nationalists were thus deprived of the psychological satisfac-
tion of throwing the British out. As a result, current Malay
leadership suffers from a crisis of identity. Throughout Asia
nationalist movements overthrew the indigenous aristocratic
elites that were associated with the colonial regimes; Malay-
sia was an exception. When the British granted Malayan inde-
pendence, the Malay leader was left with the disconcerting
heritage of admiration for an ex-colonial master, mixed with
hostility toward him for destroying the basis of traditional
power. He had a Westernized background that made him more at
home in a European environment than in his native land, a secu-
lar culture and English-speaking tongue that separated him
from the masses of his own native ethnic group, an economy to
manage in which Malays had little participant role, plus a
multi-racial society. It is a frustrating socialization heri-
tage that leaves him today with an ambivalent orientation
toward political objects. As heirs of the ancient Malay polit-
ical order, the Malay leaders demand special treatment for
Malays, as is traditionally their due, but find this difficult
to justify in the framework of a Western equalitarian educa-
tion. Traditional prerogatives of leadership of a privileged
Malay community are at odds with equalitarian governance of a
modern inter-communal state. Yet the leadership feels compel-
led to attempt to perform both of these roles at the same time.
How to salvage the relevant and scrap the anachronistic from

the traditional past is his most crucial problem. The adjustment process is still in progress.

The socialization pattern of the Malay political elite sub-culture is personified in the background of the Malay elite's chief leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia. He was born in 1903 in the small town of Alor Star in the State of Kedah, the fifth son of Kedah's Sultan. Tunku (Malay for Prince) Rahman attended English and Malay medium primary schools in his home town. He attended the English-medium Penang Free School in that nearby state and went on to St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, in Great Britain on a state scholarship where he took his B.A. degree in 1925. Returning home, he entered the Kedah State Civil Service in 1931 and served as District Officer in various areas. He returned to London to study law and, after many interruptions, received his LL.B. in 1949, whereupon he became a deputy public prosecutor in the colonial legal department. He had become an ardent nationalist while studying in London with other Malay aristocratic youths and became active in the United Malays National Organization when he returned home. He was elected to the presidency of that party in 1951 and from this base led the country to independence and became its first chief executive. The Tunku is a devout Muslim but smokes and occasionally drinks. He alternates between Western and traditional style dress and speaks both Malay and English. He has been married to an English woman but divorced her to marry his

current Malay wife to whom he has been married for 25 years.[4]

The Malay Peasant-Proletariat

The Malay peasant and urban worker form a distinctive Malaysian political sub-culture. Their heritage separates them from the Rajah class Malay as well as from other Malaysian communal categories. Traditionally, as a member of the Malay ra'ayat or masses, he was ruled paternalistically by his aristocratic Malay betters, and his political role was the passive one of subject. The advent of British colonialism did little to change life directly for the Malay peasant; as we have seen, the British directed their attention to the Malay aristocracy. Even when the British partially opened educational doors to non-aristocratic Malays, few peasants were affected either in number or depth. J. M. Gullick notes: "The Malay school system was designed to make the son of the fisherman or the peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had been....the aristocratic class were quick to criticize in the legislative council any supposed tendency of the Malay schools to produce white collar workers."[5] Nor was the traditional subsistence economy of the Malay peasant affected greatly by colonialism. The tin and rubber industries were manned by immigrant Chinese and Indians. The Malay peasant

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[4] See Harry Miller, Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, First Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1959).

[5] Gullick, op. cit., p. 203.

could not be induced to leave his rural kampong. As a conse-
quence of this heritage, the Malay peasant in Malaysia today
is, save for the aborigines, the least urbanized, least Wes-
ternized, and least secularized sub-culture of the country.

For the rural 90 per cent of the Malay ra'ayat, life is
kampong-centered, economically poor, conservatively pious, and
a tradition-encrusted repository of Malay-Muslim parochialism.[6]
In this setting the Malay peasant child's life is geared to
the subsistence agrarian or fishing life pattern of his par-
ents, who probably have little or no formal education and
strong feelings of hostility toward their non-Muslim economic
superiors to whom they must go for credit, to sell their fish,
and to pay off the mortgage on their lands.[7]

It is within the close-knit rural extended family and kam-
pong structures that the Malay peasant receives his primary
socialization; here the transmission of Malay tradition, the
inculcation of Islamic religion, the learning of the Malay
language, and first perceptions of the world begin for the
Malay peasant child.

The rural Malay receives a period of Koranic study from
the village religious leaders. It is probably here that he
first formally learns that "his" government is based on Islamic
principles with Malay Sultans at its formal head. Here also

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[6]Life in Malay kampongs has not been adequately studied.
See, however, Thomas M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing
Village in Southern Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1960).

[7]Silcock and Fish, op. cit., p. 2

he learns the religious element of exclusiveness that separates
him from his Chinese and Indian neighbors, who do not partici-
pate in village Islamic life. This is reinforced in the rela-
tively few cases where the Malay peasant goes on to formal edu-
cation at a government primary school for here only other
Malay children will be his peers. The non-Malays' children
will be separately attending their own vernacular-medium pri-
mary schools.

Upon leaving school the Malay peasant is likely to take
up a fishing or small padi-planting occupation as did his
father before him. Adult life continues to be village-cen-
tered and religiously oriented. There are regional variations
in the extent to which this is so. The most conservative kam-
pongs are located on the peninsula's east coast where there
are large and relatively compact Malay populations in the
states of Kelantan and Trengganu. Here politics and religion
are so closely intermingled that theocratic political orienta-
tions are not uncommon. In these states during the 1959 elec-
tion for example, "the credulous Malay villager was being told
that he risked punishment in the next world, if not in this
one, if he voted for UMNO candidates who had compromised with
the infidel Chinese."[8] The small Pan-Malayan Islamic Party
(PMIP) returned its nine representatives to the Dewan Ra'ayat
from this area and they are all ultra-conservative local Malay
religious leaders.

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[8]Gullick, op. cit., p. 139.

In sum, the milieu of political socialization for the
Malay peasant is the rural kampong. In keeping with his tradi-
tional subject heritage, the Malay peasant of today is social-
ized to a politically passive orientation. He is uninformed,
largely uneducated, and characterized by rural parochialism,
religious piety, and a strong hostility toward non-Malays. He
is personified by the anonymous kampong fisherman with largely
apolitical interest who lives remotely in Malaysia's hinter-
land.

The Chinese Business Elite

The heritage of the Chinese elite in Malaysia is that of
the financially successful pariah. Most Chinese came to main-
land Malaysia as temporary sojourners to make money in the tin
and rubber industries of the peninsula before returning home
to China but many remained permanently. Those who came earli-
est and prospered evolved into a political sub-culture that is
distinct today from recent-immigrant lower-class Chinese labor-
ers, as well as from all other Malaysian communities. They
form the Chinese elite of Malaysia today.

Historically, the Chinese of all classes have always been
regarded as aliens in Malaysia. Even the "Baba" or "Straits"[9]
Chinese, who are locally born and can trace their family's res-
idence in Malaysia back for over a century, have never been

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[9] So called because most lived in concentrations in the
Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. They
were also sometimes called "The Queen's Chinese" because of
their loyalty to Great Britain.

fully integrated into Malaysian society. During British rule
the Chinese were "protected persons" and were encouraged to
come to Malaysia and allowed the opportunity to help develop
the land, but they were denied entrance to the Malayan colonial
civil service, were never considered the political subjects
of the Malay Sultans, and were subjected to other discrimina-
tions designed to remind them that they were aliens in a land
that belonged to the Malays.

Today the heirs to this heritage are the longer tenured
Malaysian Chinese, who form the business elite. This unique
sub-culture controls more of Malaysia's private wealth than
any other ethnic community in the country.[10] They are remark-
ably achievement-oriented and commercially-minded. They are
"accustomed to long and regular hours of work. To a sharp
degree their Weltanschauung centers around income; few observ-
ers have failed to note the inner drive--something not unlike
the 'Protestant ethic' which Tawney has traced in the West--
which keeps the parish Chinese at the job."[11]

The predispositions of the enterprising Chinese are shaped
in their primary socialization structures. Of these, the Chi-
nese family structure has been with good reason called "the
most important element in the social organization of the

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[10] Annual average income per head for all Chinese was
M$848 in mainland Malaysia in 1957, in contrast to M$459 for
Malays and M$691 for Indians. Silcock and Fisk, op. cit.,
p. 3.

[11] Robert E. Gamer, "Political Socialization in Three
Working-Class Neighborhoods of Singapore," (Singapore: July
1965), p. 22. (Mimeographed)

Chinese."[12] Typically of joint family type--consisting of parents, unmarried children, their married sons and their wives and offspring and perhaps other generations--the Malaysian Chinese family is characterized by its extreme intimacy and cooperative norms, strong filial lines of parental authority extending from the head of the family down the male line, and the high status accorded to male offspring.

The Chinese clan (tsu) consists of all persons of the same surname who are ostensibly able to trace ancestry to a common source and is a structure of great socialization importance. Tsu leaders--the eldest males or best educated males or more socially prominant males--set ancestor worship dates, settle clan disputes, and provide mutual help services.

Because most Chinese of this sub-culture were locally-born, they have received their primary socialization on Malaysian soil in this type of close-knit urban family and clan group within which the father played a central and traditionally authoritarian role. Here the child learns to cooperate with the family and clan to achieve success in one of the few avenues of social mobility open to Chinese in Malaysia--the world of business. They have been remarkably effective; as Fisher notes: the Chinese "form a complete capitalist society in themselves and apart from their former exclusion from the administrative civil service, are found in every major occupation necessary for the effective running of the country."[13]

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[12]Ginsburg and Roberts, op. cit., p. 52.

[13]Fisher, op. cit., p. 639.

Historically denied any recognized political status in Malaysia other than that of the alien, the Chinese have succeeded in their upward mobility with the strategy of remaining apolitical and turning inward toward their fellow Chinese to specialize in the cooperative amassment of capital.

The political socialization pattern of the Chinese raised in such a milieu has the following characteristics. He is urban born of prosperous Chinese entrepreneur parentage. In the family and clan he learns to feel smugly superior to his Malay neighbors who earn less, work less, study less, and yet have a monopoly of political power in the community. He learns to resent the hostility of his non-Chinese fellowman and is soon made to realize that politics is a dangerous topic outside of the clan and is better avoided. To get ahead he will need to acquire skills that will insure success in the business or professional world. For current members of the Chinese elite this meant learning English in order to deal with the British colonials who controlled the economy. He consequently entered an English-medium school and went on to the university for business and professional training. Upon graduation he entered the family business or began to practice law or medicine, quite prepared to remain as apolitical as was his father.

But the war jolted the Chinese from their political apathy, especially when strident Malay nationalism began to take a decidedly anti-Chinese tinge. Reluctantly he was drafted by circumstances into the role of defender of Chinese

rights and privileges. Outnumbered, unliked, reticent, and unorganized, the Chinese watched with concern as the equalitarian principles of the British post-war Malayan Union were defeated by Malay nationalists, and the traditional Malay political culture was enshrined in the Federation of Malaya with special privileges for Malays and second-class status for the Chinese. In alarm the Chinese organized the Malayan Chinese Association to salvage what they could by appeals to the more moderate Malay leaders. The modus vivendi that resulted, for the most part, meant Chinese submission and concession to the fact of Malay political superiority, as indicated by the special positions of the Malays under the constitution of the Federation of Malaysia.

MCA concessions to UMNO Malays have placed the Chinese political leaders of today further out of touch with the Chinese masses who accuse them of selling out their legitimate rights for the sake of political expediency. But aside from frustrating moments of self-doubt, MCA leaders of the Chinese business elite take the view that they salvaged all they could from a situation that could have been far worse.

With such a socialization, the Chinese business subculture finds itself today at the head of a politically alienated ethnic community, with its leadership challenged by the masses from whom their Westernized, English, secular background and conservative business orientation sets them widely apart.

The political socialization pattern of the Chinese business-political elite is personified in the career of MCA

leader, Tan Siew Sin, current Malaysian Minister for Finance.
He was born in the urban Straits Settlement city of Malacca in
1916 of a prosperous family that had resided in Malacca for
four generations. His father, Tan Cheng Lock, was a wealthy
rubber and tin magnate, who became the founder and first presi-
dent of the Malayan Chinese Association. Tan Siew Sin
attended high school in Malacca, college in Singapore, and law
school in London; he is exclusively English-educated and
speaks no Chinese but has late in life gained a working knowl-
edge of Malay. He worked for the British Information Service
in India during the war and at its conclusion returned to
Malacca to help manage the family business. With the support
of his father, he became active in politics and was elected to
the Malacca City Council in 1946 and eventually succeeded his
father as MCA president. He is a reticent man on political
matters, especially as they touch on ethnic questions. We
nevertheless have an excellent insight into his political
views and orientation as a result of the recent publication of
two of his private letters written in 1956, that read in part
as follows:

"...we have to give in to them [UMNO Malays] because
they happen to be stronger and I do not think this
is a satisfactory principle on which to base our fu-
ture relationship....We have 'o yield to expediency
on issues which concern not only us but may well af-
fect the future of our children and our grandchildren.

...In the present stage of the country's development,
we must face the fact that communalism exists in a
big way. Even the Malays, with their over-whelming
voting strength want their 'special rights' written
into the Constitution. Some of them are not satis-
fied with their present plums, i.e., the majority of
posts, and the best of them too, in the public ser-
vice; they want to extend this highly discriminatory

form of legislation into industry and commerce.

...I am sorry to sound so pessimistic but I must admit...that I am pessimistic about the future of Sino-Malay relationships. There is however, one silver lining and that is the reasonable and sensible attitude so far adopted by the top UMNO leaders. The question which inevitably arises is, 'How long will they last?' ...[there is] an intensely narrow-minded, racialistic and fanatical attitude on the part of the whole of UMNO, apart from a handful of the top leaders. ...[yet] outside UMNO the position might even be worse.[14]

The Chinese Worker-Peasant

While the Chinese business elite enjoys a measure of reluctantly accepted political influence by virtue of its control of the economy, the Chinese coolie-class worker and peasant has almost none. His heritage is one of poverty, ignorance, alienation, and violence.

In the flood of immigration to Malaysia in the 19th Century, the Chinese coolie from southern China was thrust into an alien environment to shift for himself. To help him survive, mutual self-help societies were organized on a secret basis. While some were legitimate, many turned to criminal activities that the colonial police were never able to suppress completely. Even today there are over 300 secret

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[14] These letters were written to a Chinese colleague during the heated MCA-UMNO negotiations for the formation of the Federation of Malaya held in 1956. The MCA has never recouped the ground lost here, and their concessions were written into the constitution of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The letters were published to embarrass Tan by Lee Kuan Yew in 1965 in a Singapore publication, Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965), Appendices A and B.

societies in Singapore and about 50 on the peninsula. All
potentially and many actually criminal organizations, they
"have succeeded by the use of violence and intimidation in
obtaining control over hawkers, hotelkeepers, prostitutes,
trisha-riders, taxi-drivers, dance hostesses, boatmen, and
even some of the shipping contractors."[15]

While in the main apolitical, the Chinese worker-peasant
has been strongly influenced by leftist ideology. Reflecting
events in mainland China, the Malayan Communist Party was
formed in the 1930's with Chinese workers forming most of the
membership. During the war it was these Communist Chinese
workers who took to the jungles to form the only effective
Malaysian Japanese-resistance movement. As we have seen in
Chapter III, at the war's end it was this group who became the
Chinese Communist guerrilla terrorists of the twelve year Emer-
gency beginning in 1948. As Pye has shown in his excellent
study of the socialization and recruitment of captured Commun-
ist Chinese terrorists,[16] the guerrillas were deeply alienated
Chinese workers who saw no hope of achieving a dignified sta-
tus in British and Malay dominated Malaysian political life
other than by violence. Deep alienation remains a characteris-
tic of Malaysia's Chinese laborer today.

With this heritage, the Chinese worker-peasant forms a

[15]Leon Comber, An Introduction to Chinese Secret Soci-
eties in Malaya, op. cit., p. 41.

[16]Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, op. cit.

unique political sub-culture in Malaysia today.[17] His political socialization takes place in a poor crowded urban milieu. Traditional primary groups have been disrupted for many Chinese workers, both as a consequence of his relatively recent immigration from China and the extensive forced Resettlement Plan that changed over a million Chinese jungle fringe dwellers into urban residents almost overnight during the 1948-1960 Emergency.[18] Thus, for many, the street gang or secret society has replaced the family and clan as the primary socialization structure.

Although the situation is improving, most Malaysian Chinese workers have never been to school and are illiterate. Those few who have are almost exclusively Chinese-educated, and, as Douglas P. Murray has noted, "In Malaysia the social division between hua ch'iao [Mandarin for "Chinese abroad"] who received a basically Chinese education and those schooled in English is almost as significant as the distinction between Chinese and Malay."[19]

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[17]The best studies of Malaysian Chinese workers are Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: Colonial Office, 1957); William H. Newell, Treacherous River: A Study of Rural Chinese in Northern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1962); Barrington Kaye, Upper Nankin Street, Singapore: A Sociological Study of Chinese Households Living in a Densely Populated Area (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1960); and Robert Gamer, "Political Socialization in Three Working Class Neighborhoods of Singapore," op. cit.

[18]Kernial Singh Sandu, "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya," op. cit., 143-177.

[19]Douglas P. Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," China Quarterly, XX (October-December 1964), 88.

Most hold unskilled jobs such as hawkers, porters, tri-
shaw drivers, construction laborers, and rubber millers, but a
few have semi-skilled positions in such occupations as shop
assistants, haulers, butchers, plumbers, and repairmen. Sal-
aries are low and living-style is consequently quite poor.[20]

In such an environment the Chinese worker is alienated,
and he learns to resent sharply his political inferiority; he
doesn't have the balm of economic prosperity possessed by his
successful Chinese brethren. He has little feeling of politi-
cal efficacy and, in increasing numbers, is rejecting the con-
servative, monied leadership of the MCA business elite.[21]
This pattern of dislocation, alienation, and seething resent-
ment makes the Chinese peasant group potentially the most dan-
gerous sub-culture in Malaysia today. A heritage of violence
and extremist political activity already exists. So long as
they continue to be denied an equalitarian political status
and a share in Malaysia's economic prosperity, they will con-
tinue to make easily recruited fodder for agitational politics

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[20]For example, Gamer, op. cit., reports that among the
poorer strata of Singapore's Chinatown, over 35 per cent of
the heads of households reported incomes of under M$100 (US$33)
a month and have little education. Most live in small cub-
icles or under roof beams of shophouses that rent for M$10-30
a month. Kaye's Upper Nankin Street, Singapore, op. cit.,
reports that lower class Chinese in his sample had an average
of 6 square feet of floor space per adult inhabitant and his
belongings in their cubicle dwellings.

[21]Another reason why Lee Kuan Yew was ejected from the
Federation. His bid for pan-Malaysian leadership on socialist
principles was attracting wide attention among Chinese workers
and was a threat to the MCA political monopoly among the penin-
sula's Chinese.

and extremist movements.

The sub-culture's socialization pattern is personified by the Chinese urban hawker who lives in poverty and works for an inadequate wage. He is anonymous, uneducated, and uninformed. With little time for politics, he is largely apathetic. Yet his alienation makes him an easy target for the agitator with a plan to make his life better. He has little to lose.

The Indian Professional Elite

While most Indians in Malaysia are Tamil-speaking Hindu migrants from Southern India who work on the peninsula's rubber estates, a select few are not. Coming disproportionately from Northern India, this elite group is by contrast an urbanized, Westernized professional class. This wealthy Indian subculture of Malaysia has a distinctive heritage and political socialization.

The Indian professional elite of Malaysia has a heritage in Malaysia that in many ways resembles that of the Chinese business leaders. They too were never integrated into Malaysian society and were considered aliens until the post-war period by the British colonial regime. They are also an urbanized, sophisticated sub-culture who, again like the upper class Chinese, are English-educated. The decisive difference is that the Indian group was and is small, never totaling more than ten per cent of Malaysia's population. Because of their small numbers Indians have been able to stay on the periphery of racial battles that have been fought between the numerically large Malay and Chinese communities. This is not to say that

they were spared all discrimination; they too were long barred
from the civil service and have been forced to accept a secon-
dary status in a Malay political culture. But they have been
able to escape the main brunt of Malay hostility because it
was chiefly directed at and borne by the Chinese.

Educated Indians in Malaysia today were roused from polit-
ical apathy by the nationalist movement in India, the birth-
place of their parents. During the Japanese occupation, as we
have detailed in Chapter III, Indians were encouraged in their
nationalist sympathies. Following the war Indian political
life took on a Malaysian focus for the same reason as did the
Malaysian Chinese: in reaction to Malay nationalism. Follow-
ing the MCA example, the Indians organized the Malayan Indian
Congress (MIC) to come to terms with UMNO for an Indian-Malay
post-war modus vivendi. The terms for the MIC were to be the
same as they had been for the MCA: accept Malay political
supremacy and an essentially Malay political framework; like
the MCA, the MIC had no choice but to accept.

The socialization pattern of the Indian elite is personi-
fied in the career of V. Manickavasagam, Malaysia's current
Minister of Labour, and vice president of the MIC. Manickavas-
agam was born in Kuala Selangor in the Malaysian state of
Selangor in 1926. Both of his parents were born in Madras,
India, but they moved to Malaysia and prospered in business.
He attended school in the Klang suburbs of Kuala Lumpur and
graduated from high school in 1943. He became interested in
politics early in his teens and served as local youth secretary

for the India Independence League. His interest turned from
Indian to local politics at age 20 when he became one of the
founding members of the MIC and served as Secretary of the
Klang branch of the party. He became a nominated member of
the Klang Town Board in 1949 and served as a town councillor
until 1954. In 1958 he became first vice president of the MIC
and stood for election in the 1959 Malayan elections to the
Dewan Ra'ayat with success and was returned again in 1964.

The Indian Laborer

Indian laborers form a sub-culture apart from that of the
urban Indian professional and other Malaysian ethnic communi-
ties. Over 60 per cent of all Malaysian Indians are Tamil-
speaking Hindu descendants of Southern Indian immigrants who
today are rural dwellers associated with rubber estates.
Together with a smaller number of Indian urban manual workers
they comprise a distinctive Malaysian political sub-culture
with the following key characteristics.

The vast majority are raised in relative poverty in hous-
ing units located on rubber estate labor lines or in small
over-crowded urban working districts. The Indian estate-
dwelling population is typically of homogeneous social composi-
tion due to recruitment methods of the colonial era--workers
for a single estate were recruited from the same locale in
India. Socialization, therefore, takes place in an isolated
rural milieu. While the urban worker is likely to have more
inter-communal contact in daily life than Indians living on
the almost exclusively Indian estates, he too is likely to

live in a semi-ghetto with other Indians in the workingman's
section of the towns. Family life among both the rural and
urban Indian workers reflects their mother country patterns,
although the strong authority structure of the work situation,
especially the regimentation of labor on estates, has done
much to disrupt traditional patterns of social life and family
authority. Caste consciousness, for example, is much less pro-
nounced in Malaysia than among mother country Indians.[22]

Education has been surprisingly extensive among Malaysia's
Indian laborers, a fact that makes the Indian literacy rate
the highest of any ethnic group in the country.[23] The reason
for this is quite simple. Rubber estate proprietors were
required by law to provide facilities for at least a primary
education for all children of estate laborers during the colon-
ial period; the same rule applied for Indian laborers who
worked for the British government in the towns. These Tamil
schools were required wherever there were at least ten Indian
children. But, despite this extensive application, educational
standards were generally not high, and most students attended
the vernacular medium schools only through the primary level.
It, therefore, has not changed the ex-student's opportunity
for social mobility extensively, and most leave school to take

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[22] For further discussion of this topic, see Freedman and
Swift, op. cit., 7.

[23] 51 per cent of peninsula Malaysia is literate according
to the 1957 Census; Indians have the highest literacy rates,
Chinese are next, and Malays are the lowest. 1957 Population
Census of the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government
Printing Office, 1960), pp. 92-96.

jobs at the same general level as those held by their parents.
They have remained relatively untouched by the forces of urbanization, secularization, and Westernization.

The socialization of the Indian laborer is typified and
personified by the Tamil-speaking Indian rubber tapper who
lives with other Indians in a self-contained rural estate
milieu. Working long hours for little pay, he is little interested in and usually physically remote from the urban-centered
focus of Malaysian political life. His life is localized on
and near the rubber estate and his interests are parochial.

The Aboriginal Urban Elite

This distinct Malaysian sub-culture is regionally located
in Sarawak and Sabah, and comprises the political elite of the
Borneo states. It consists of those indigenous tribal leaders
who are secularized, urbanized, and Westernized and who have
assumed prosperous economic and locally powerful political
roles in these two East Malaysian states. They are English-
educated, reside in the key cities on the coastal shores, and
come from the more powerful indigenous tribes that inhabit the
area.

The socialization pattern of this political sub-culture
is personified in the background of Dato Donald Stevens,
Malaysia's ex-Minister for Sabah Affairs. Stevens was born in
the city of Kudat, Sabah, in 1920 of Anglo-Kadazan Roman
Catholic parentage. He was raised in Sabah's chief cities of
Jesselton and Sandakan and received an exclusively English-
medium education through the secondary level at Sacred Heart

mission school in Jesselton and Sandarkan. He then became a
school teacher and a journalist. As with most Sabah inhabit-
ants, Stevens' political activity is very recent. His first
governmental job was at age 34 when he was appointed to the
Sabah Legislative Council by the British. Thereafter, he
became an editor and publisher of the Sabah Times, the major
English newspaper in the state, while at the same time main-
taining his seat in the Legislative Council. In the late
1950's and early 1960's, when the British began to introduce
local self government, Stevens became a founding member of the
United Kadazan Organization. He was an early supporter of the
Malaysia plan and was one of the chief leaders to negotiate
the state's entry conditions with Kuala Lumpur. In the first
state elections he became Chief Minister of Sabah, and soon
after was appointed Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs in 1963.

Stevens, like many of the indigenous Sabah elite, did not
care for the decidedly Malay character of the new Malaysia,
particularly the tendency to consider all Borneo indigenous
peoples as Malays despite their distinct tribal culture and
heritage. He, therefore, applauded Singapore Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew's "Malaysian Malaysia" movement based on class
rather than racial divisions. When Lee was ejected from the
Malaysia framework, Stevens resigned his Federal post and
returned to Sabah disgruntled and publicly expressed doubts
about whether Malaysia would endure. Stevens is easily the
best known and most popular man in Sabah and his "second
thoughts" about Malaysia were and are widely shared.

The Rural Aborigine

This political sub-culture is one about which very little is known. Separated from other Malaysian sub-cultures by dense jungle and a century of cultural development, the autochthonous jungle dweller is largely unintegrated into political life in Malaysia.

Although they have never been accurately counted, there are probably about 50,000 in the jungles of main Malaysia and over 500,000 in the Borneo states. As was seen in Chapter II, they are extremely diverse culturally, with most engaged in primitive shifting cultivation occupations deep in the jungle hinterland.

Although the peninsula Emergency and more recent jungle warfare in the Borneo-centered Confrontation with Indonesia increased the Malaysian government's contact with them, it is certain that most aborigines have little, if any, grasp of Malaysia, or even of the states in which they reside. They occupy the extreme end of the periphery in Malaysian politics, with few having any political conception of the modern state system to which they nominally belong.

Alliance Government Efforts to Re-Shape Socialization

While never using the terms, leaders of the Malaysian Alliance Government are aware of many of the ramifications of the jaggedly uneven and communally correlated socialization process. The myriad diversity of Malaysian society seems at every turn to hamper their efforts to govern. Predictably, the government's reaction to manifest and problematic

consequences of diversity has been to attempt to minimize differences and in so far as possible to eradicate them. But efforts to unify Malaysian society are tempered by three perhaps universal entrapments of the human condition. In the first place, Malaysian leaders have only a limited grasp of the origins of Malaysian diversity and, consequently, have little understanding of how it can be changed.[24] Secondly, Malaysian leaders are themselves the products of the very processes they seek to change. The determination of desired directions of social change is thus both subjective and highly contentious. The model of a renovated Malaysian society that is exulted by Malaysia's currently dominant leadership is itself the product of values in the political elite sub-culture. No national agreement on a model for emulation exists. And third, even with understanding and a model for emulation, crucial factors in socialization cannot be controlled. Events intervene with unintended consequences,[25] for example, and the Malaysian political culture prohibits direct governmental tampering with such crucial socialization structures as the family.

As a consequence of these difficulties, especially the nation's lack of shared national goals, the Malaysian leaders

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[24]This statement is not meant to be critical of Malaysian leadership; academic specialists on social change do not pretend to understand it completely.

[25]For example, Lucian Pye notes: "...the process of political socialization was dominated primarily by the unpredictable consequences of the forces of social change. ... Southeast Asians were jarred into political involvement by the harsh effects of the Second World War and the Japanese occupation." Almond and Coleman (eds.), op. cit., p. 127.

articulate their goals of social change only in broad, ambiguous terms and must direct their public statements toward an undifferentiated public.[26] Thus, a principal device that Malaysian leaders use, in the expressed hope of achieving unity from diversity, is the public exhortation to emulate their vaguely defined national model of a "good" Malaysian society. For example, at a mass rally at Stadium Merdeka in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman launched National Solidarity Week by declaring:

> "Now I...ask you to stand united in defence of our freedom. We must stand together as one, united in our boundless love for our motherland, Malaysia. ...Everyone must understand that patriotism and loyalty must come first, last, and always, overriding any differences of opinion on internal matters. Each and all of us must give his full attention, his utmost devotion, for the sake and for the good of Malaysia."[27]

There is a constant effort to paper over differences and to wish them away. For example, in a recent nationally broadcast speech to the Alliance Party Convention, Prime Minister Rahman spoke these words:

> "It is not possible for such a big party not to have little troubles here and there. But if you put the interests of the country, the people and the party above all things, all these troubles will just blow away."[28]

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[26] Pye has noted that this is characteristic of all developing nations. See his "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX, No. 3 (August, 1958), 482.

[27] Speech heard by this writer in Kuala Lumpur, Monday, November 16, 1964.

[28] Speech heard at the Alliance Convention by this writer in Kuala Lumpur, April 17, 1965.

In Malaysia today the Malays are clearly the politically dominant ethnic group and, consequently, the dominant model held up for emulation and imitation by the Malay-dominated leadership is a Malay political culture. While it is rationalized in terms of blending all cultures into a Malaysian national identity in an equalitarian multi-racial political order, there is no denying that the Malay political elite expect non-Malays to do most of the changing. This fact emerges clearly when one looks at the substance of Malaysian policy in areas that affect political socialization and recruitment.

The Symbolism and Framework of Political Life. The Federation of Malaysia was almost totally cast in and embellished with the traditional Malay political culture. The symbolic focal point of the nation is the monarch or Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a Malay Sultan from one of the traditional Malay states of the peninsula. He is elected for a five-year term by other Malay Sultans who together form the Conference of Rulers, or Majlis Raja-Raja. In every state except Sarawak and Sabah,[29] the ruler is also the Head of the Muslim religion. The symbolic personification of the Federation is thus a sacro-political official from traditional Malay culture. Islam is constitutionally designated as the "religion of the Federation," although "other religions" may be freely practiced. The national language is Malay. The Malaysian flag pictures the

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[29] A Malaysia formation concession to the religious diversity of the Borneo states.

crescent of Islam. Malays are officially regarded as the "indigenous" people of Malaysia and, as such, are constitutionally guaranteed "special privileges" in respect to governmental appointments, scholarships, and land-holding. The National Anthem (Negar Ku: Malay for My Country) is a traditional Malay song.[30] In short, almost the entire symbolic apparatus of Malaysia is derived from Malay political culture. The very boundaries of the country's constituent states are the frontiers of the traditional Malay Sultanates.

The Malay political elite jealously guard these symbolic prerogatives, and challenges to them do not go unsanctioned. When the Chinese Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, attempted to organize a pan-Malaysian movement for a "Malaysian Malaysia" with less Malay emphasis in 1965, Singapore was evicted from the Federation. A main reason for the eviction was Lee's attack on the Malay symbolic monopoly on political life.[31]

Language. One of the main thrusts of Malaysian leaders' efforts to reshape the diversity of the country into unity has been in area of language. The promotion of Malay as the National Language (Bahasa Kebungsaan) of Malaysia has received high priority. A Language and Literature Agency (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka) was established in 1959 to spear-head the

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[30] Derived from the anthem of the State of Perak, Terang Bulan.

[31] For an excellent discussion of the symbolic and other aspects of the dispute, see Lee, Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, op. cit.

development of the Malay language and to encourage its use.
We have already seen that a rudimentary grasp of Malay is pre-
requisite for naturalized Malaysian citizenship. According to
the constitution, English but not Chinese, Tamil, or other
Malaysian tongues will continue to be regarded as an official
language until 1967, when Malay will become both the national
and the sole official language. In anticipation of the 1967
cut-off date, the Malaysian government has been officially
discouraging multi-lingualism and undertaking a large scale
public relations campaign to stimulate the increased use of
Malay. For example, the Government has conducted several
National Language Months[32] during which Malay song, poetry,
Koran-reading, poster, and oratory contests have been held.

While the non-Malay communities, especially the Chinese,
have repeatedly asked for a postponement and gradualism in the
introduction of a Malay-only policy in 1967, the UMNO Malay
dominated Alliance Government remains adamant and insists that
its 1967 decision must stand. Critics of the 1967 cut-off
date are publically castigated with Government approval.
For example, Assistant Minister of Culture, Engku Mohsein
bin Abdul Kadir, recently scolded Malaysian youth groups:

> "I regret that the voluntary youth movements in this
> country have not made greater use of the national
> language. This shows that they are not cooperating
> with the Government to implement the policy to make
> the national language the sole language by 1967.
> ...Malaysian youths must think and act as Malay-
> sians. They must not adopt too much of the Western

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[32]A misnomer: national language "month" continued from
June to August of 1965.

styles."[33]

The language issue was another reason for Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia; while accepting Malay as a National Language, Lee Kuan Yew's PAP Government had a multi-lingual policy of four official languages of equal status (Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English), a position that clashed with the policy of Kuala Lumpur.[34] Sabah and Sarawak are not covered by the 1967 deadline.

Education. Education is probably the field in which current Malaysian leaders have made their most strenuous efforts and attached their highest hopes for amalgamating Malaysia's diverse cultures into a new Malaysian identity. Government expenditures in the field of education totaled about one-fourth of Malaysia's budget, even at the height of Confrontation in 1964.[35] When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the states of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak were given local autonomy in

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[33]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 16, 1965.

[34]"We have defused the bomb," declared Lee in the aftermath of Singapore's 1965 split from Malaysia...there is a fuse already set for August 31, 1967. We are lucky we are now slightly apart and the fuse does not affect us." The Mirror: A Weekly Almanac of Current Affairs (Singapore: Government Printing Office), I, No. 33, October 16, 1965.

[35]M$403 million of M$2,009 million total revenue. Far Eastern Economic Review: 1965 Yearbook (Hongkong: December 21, 1964), p. 212.

the field of education.[36] The two Borneo states lag far
behind mainland Malaysia in educational development; education
has in the main been left to private voluntary organizations,
and the State government's have only recently entered the
field.[37]

In mainland Malaysia, educational policy is clear, and it
is hoped that the Borneo states can be integrated into it in
the near future. Here the basis of policy is a Malaysian-
oriented curriculum with common content syllabuses in a nation-
ally operated system in which the Malay language is gradually
to become the exclusive medium of instruction. A compulsory
6-year (form) primary program is offered in either Malay, Eng-
lish, Tamil, or Mandarin according to parents' wishes. Govern-
ment operated secondary schools have a 5-year (form) program
in Malay and English only.[38]

The problem in implementing this policy has been that non-
Malays have jealously clung to their own private schools. The

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[36]While education was declared a "federal subject," the
policy and administration of education in Sarawak and Sabah
were to remain unchanged until the State governments decided
otherwise. Singapore was excluded and retained autonomy in
education, mainly because of her opposition to Kuala Lumpur's
policy.

[37]For example, in Sarawak only two primary schools were
managed by the government in 1965, and the state's eight secon-
dary schools were set up only in 1957. Local government has
responsibility in the educational area. Sabah's educational
development is even more retarded.

[38]See Report of the Educational Committee (Kuala Lumpur:
Federation of Malaya, 1956), and Report of the Educational
Review Committee (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya, 1960).

government has tried to woo students away from them with financial assistance offers at the price of conformity to national standards, but with only mixed success, especially among the Chinese community. In 1965, there were 1,408,890 students in primary and secondary schools on the peninsula; of these 105,891 are in private Chinese, Tamil, and English schools, and an additional 1,041 are in conforming private but government "assisted" schools. These figures indicate a substantial, mostly Chinese, hold-out in private schools but should not obscure the fact that the National School program has been comprehensively applied and covers the vast majority of the pupil population.

University education is in English and Malay only, and the focal point is the National University of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur. Here the student enrollment is 1400 of which more than 50 per cent is Chinese, 20 per cent Malay, and 25 per cent Indian, Ceylonese, and other races.[39] This racial imbalance in favor of Chinese has persisted since the University's founding, despite preferences for Malays in Government Scholarships.

Can this Malaysian education system unify Malaysia's diversity? While problems abound, the general acceptance of a national system of common content at the primary and secondary levels provides grounds for long term optimism. Despite the continuation of primarily ethnic socialization in more potent

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[39] Willard A. Hanna, "Take Off Point in Higher Education," The Formation of Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 77-88.

primary structures such as the family, the current school-age
generation in Malaysia will have far more in common than did
their parents as a result of their educational experiences.
There have been overt attempts at political socialization of
the school population by increasing the emphasis on "Civics"
courses, and this too will probably in the main have its homo-
genizing effect.[40] More pessimistically, it should be observed
that the thrust of the Malaysian educational goal of develop-
ing a new Malaysian citizen means the acceptance by non-Malays
of the Malay symbolic domination of the political order and, to
a considerable extent, requires de-Sinifying Chinese, de-Indian-
izing Indians, converting indigenous peoples into "Malays," and
the continuation of the special educational privileges of the
Malay community. These factors will keep education in the
realm of political controversy in Malaysia for the foreseeable
future.

Conclusions: While rationalized in the name of the creation of
a distinct Malaysian identity by fusing all Malaysian cultures,
the Malay-dominated Alliance government has pursued policies
that attempt to deflect the socialization process in the direc-
tion of the desired goals of the Malay elite. These goals are

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[40]"Civics" training has to date focused on the most for-
mal aspects of the political system, not unlike similar secon-
dary training in the United States, and has carefully avoided
sensitive topics such as race. This emphasis is likely to con-
tinue. Writer attended a "Seminar on Teaching of Civics in
Secondary Schools," held by the National Union of Teachers
(Malaya) at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, April 10-
13, 1965. See also E. H. G. Dobby, Civics for Young Malayans
(London: University of London Press, 1951).

characterized by a desire to maintain the political status quo, thus insuring the survival of the current national leadership; the government attempts to improve the social and economic status of Malays while integrating all non-Malays into an essentially Malay political culture.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Political recruitment is the process by which individuals are drawn into political life and given special political role socializations.[1] As in all political systems, the spectrum of roles to which one can be recruited in Malaysian politics is broad. Some Malaysians are only partially and imperfectly recruited into the Malaysian polity. Some, as in the case of many of Malaysia's jungle aborigines, cannot be considered recruited into political life at all. Others are recruited to mere citizenship and voting roles, or perhaps to more active political roles as political opinion leaders. Still others make politics a full-time career.

Recruitment to participant roles is historically novel in Malaysia. As Bone has noted, "political life in Southeast Asia has never involved more than a minute fraction of people who acted out their power struggle on the back of masses so absorbed in their own village life that they were scarcely conscious that it was taking place."[2] While this situation has changed rapidly since the attainment of political independence, it is in the main still true.

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[1] See Almond and Coleman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[2] Robert C. Bone, Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 12.

Understanding who participates, who does not participate, and the intensity of participation in Malaysian politics is essential to grasping how the Malaysian political system operates. Viewed with a wide angle focus, one can analytically distinguish four levels of political roles in Malaysia. At the highest level are those in national leadership roles, including those individuals who, with or without official capacity, participate in, or have ready access to, the national decision-making process. Closely related are those individuals occupying a second level of roles who function as political auxiliaries, that is, those persons in the second echelon of leadership who function in intermediary roles between the national leadership and the local political leadership levels. A third general level of roles is formed by local political activists whose role of political influence is confined to a localized territory, such as one or more Malaysian states. Finally, there is the category of the political periphery, a large general level of roles comprised of those who are merely nominally involved in Malaysian politics, or who play intermittent part-time roles such as the occasional voter, or at the extreme end of the continuum, the remote aborigine who is unaware of any participation in Malaysian politics at all.[3]

Eight Malaysian political sub-cultures or patterns of political socialization were isolated in the last chapter's

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[3]The four participation categories listed above are adopted and adapted from Richard Rose, "Participation in Politics," Politics in England (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 83-102.

discussion of political socialization. This eight-fold typology will serve again in the present analysis of political recruitment. It will be demonstrated that patterns of political socialization relate very closely to levels of political recruitment.

National Leadership Roles

The men who occupy the highest national political offices in Malaysia, Federal Ministers, key-members of Parliament, senior civil servants, pressure group leaders, and top party leaders are a small group occupying over-lapping positions who constitute both the formal and the actual political decision-makers.[4] Overlap of formal and informal political roles of power is extensive. For example, Tunku Abdul Rahman is concomitantly formally and informally the accepted spokesman of the Malay community, the formal and actual leader of UMNO, and officially (in his role as Prime Minister) and unofficially the nation's top decision-maker and a member of Parliament, Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin is at the same time the unquestioned head of the Chinese business community, the President of the MCA, and chief spokesman for the upper-class Chinese.

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[4] This group probably numbers no more than 200. Those who actually participate directly in a major national decision probably number no more than 50, with a group of about five to ten being decisive. For example, in the decision to evict Singapore from the Federation, no more than 50 people knew of the decision before its public announcement, and the decision was actually reached by Tunku Abdul Rahman in consultation with five of his Federal Ministers who constitute his "inner cabinet." See Robert Tilman, "Malaysia's Political Elite," Wang, Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia, op. cit.

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Indian Minister of Works V. T. Sambanthan is head of the Indian community, the MIC, and a member of Parliament. This overlap and close correspondence between formal and actual political decision-making roles is surprising; in most underdeveloped nations the reverse is generally true, and there is little correspondence between the form and fact of political power.

Of Malaysia's eight political sub-cultures, the Malay political elite is clearly the most powerful; in fact they hold a virtual monopoly on the nation's top leadership roles.[5] Their recruitment pattern has been decisively influenced by their status in the colonial era and by the catalyst of the war. Without doubt the most important structure of recruitment has been the civil service. As we have seen elsewhere, the British transformed the traditional Malay aristocratic class into a group of administrative specialists, and for the most part excluded non-Malays from their ranks. This was "the typical career of the Malay of aristocratic or upper-class origin whose initial opportunities of getting a secondary education were rather less constricted."[6] War experience and reaction to the gestation of Chinese nationalism had the effect of politicalizing the Malay civil service. Heretofore politically quiescent, the Malay civil service ranks became the

[5]For example, they occupy the nine key posts of the Federal Cabinet of 16 men; they control both houses of Parliament, occupy the majority of the senior civil service posts, most of the judicial posts, control the national political party, and occupy all of the symbolic leadership posts such as the Monarchy, Sultanates, etc.

[6]J. M. Gullick, op. cit., p. 203.

seedbed of Malay nationalism; almost all of the founders of
UMNO were at the same time civil servants. The politicaliza-
tion of the Malay civil service was moreover carefully nur-
tured under the paternalistic protection of the British in the
immediate pre-independence period, and gradually key administra-
tive positions were transferred to UMNO Malay hands. Indepen-
dence for Malaya was thereafter negotiated with these Malay
leaders and largely on their terms. With the attainment of
independence, paramount political power thus remained in Malay
hands, both symbolically and in actual fact.

While the Malay political elite thus co-opted the lion's
share of national political roles, this does not mean that
other sub-cultures have no political roles at the national
level. It does mean that the Malay community has been success-
fully able to insist that its values should form the core of
the cultural and political framework of Malaysian national
life. It also means that to a considerable extent the Malay
community can control the non-Malay's access to national polit-
ical roles.

Under these terms and conditions, members of the Chinese
business elite and the Indian professional elite share some
political roles at the national leadership level. Their accep-
tance has been the result of inter-communal bargaining which
assured them a role at the expense of performing it within a
Malay dominated polity. This is also true of the very few

members[7] of the indigenous elite who occupy national roles.

All non-Malay occupants of national leadership roles have similar recruitment patterns. For the most part barred from the civil service, they have been recruited directly from their private business and professional lives by party organizations and the opportunity to stand for local political office.

Having been filled in this way, almost exclusively from merely four of Malaysia's eight political sub-cultures, the current occupants of Malaysia's top political roles have some characteristics in common. They together comprise the most educated, Westernized, secularized, and urbanized elements in the country. Most important among features held in common is the national leadership's almost exclusively English-medium educational background. As Silcock notes: "The top leadership in all political groups so far has been English-educated ...."[8] English is the medium of almost all political communication at the higher levels. But it should not be assumed that the English-educated form a single social and cultural unit. As Ratnam notes: "...they [the English-educated] have not become assimilated into an entirely separate unit, but retain, in varying degrees, their own communal affiliations."[9]

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[7] Their total is under 40. There are 26 members of the lower house of Parliament, four in the Senate, two Federal Ministers, and a mere handful of upper civil service posts and the judiciary.

[8] Silcock and Fisk, op. cit., p. 11.

[9] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), p. 140.

In sum, national leadership roles in Malaysia are disproportionately held by the dominant Malay community but are shared to a limited extent by Chinese, Indian, and indigenous elites on Malay-set terms. For the Malays, the main structure for recruitment has been the civil service and the UMNO party. For Chinese, Indian, and indigenous role incumbents, political recruitment has been in the main directly from private life in the business and professional world, and by election to local government authorities. While nearly all of Malaysia's current national leadership shares a common secular English education and Westernized background, they do not form a homogeneous group; their ethnic communities remain their key reference groups.

Political Auxiliary Roles

Political recruitment to the level of intermediary roles between the national leadership and local leadership levels is in the main dominated by the same sub-cultures that pervade the national level of Malaysian political life. One of the chief reasons this is so is that the national leadership can, to a major degree, control access to positions at this level. Consequently, this second echelon of political roles is manned mostly by UMNO Malays but is shared by MCA Chinese, MIC Indians, and in Sarawak and Sabah by the indigenous elite as well.

The key differences between recruitment to this level and the level of national leadership are that a broader class, age, educational background, and political spectrum is represented.

Gullick makes note of some of these differences in the follow-

ing observation:

> "The Alliance politicians of the second rank, the
> back-benchers in the federal parliament, the minis-
> ters and majority leaders in state or municipal
> councils, are of a different type. Most of them are
> of the new Malay middle class, or the middle-range
> of Chinese commerce, with a leavening of Indian pro-
> fessional men, mainly lawyers. They too may have
> had a secondary school education, but they lack the
> assurance which comes from high birth or inherited
> wealth."[10]

While the politicians, of whom Gullick speaks, are impor-

tant political auxiliaries, they are by no means the only type

of auxiliary role incumbents. Religious leaders, businessmen,

bureaucrats, scholars, trade union leaders, clan leaders, jour-

nalists, members of the nobility, and other persons of posi-

tion and/or status play important political auxiliary roles.

What distinguishes these persons from those playing local

activist roles is their access to the national leadership

level and their social status or official positions. The com-

bination of these elements makes it possible for such persons

to serve as links or intermediaries between the national and

local political levels. These persons serve as opinion lead-

ers and national information screens because of their concern

with and access to political information at the national level;

their status and/or position makes them an important channel

of national political information.[11] For example, the members

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[10] J. M. Gullick, op. cit., p. 214.

[11] For a more extended discussion of the role of opinion
leaders, see Chapter IX's treatment of their role in the polit-
ical communication process.

of the Malay royalty often are to be found in auxiliary roles
at the state level, as Gordon Means suggests;[12] despite the
fact that they are nongovernmental, their special status in
Malay society makes them important transmitters of information,
and molders of attitudes and ideas about Malaysian national
politics.

Among the auxiliary incumbents with governmental or party
positions, age has become a significant recruitment factor.
Malay bureaucrats were rapidly projected into senior civil ser-
vice and important party positions in the immediate pre-
independence period. This movement created a vacuum in the
middle civil service and party ranks that was filled predomin-
ately by inexperienced Malays who were fresh from private or
university life. This process of "Malayanization," and after
1963 "Malaysianization" continued in the immediate post-
independence period and is now largely complete.[13] The cru-
cial point is that in the gradual transition to independence,
no shift of power to a younger generation has yet occurred.
This is atypical of Southeast Asian independent regimes.[14]

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[12]Gordon P. Means, "Malayan Government and Politics in
Transition," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Political Science, University of Washington, 1961), p. 24.

[13]Today about 90 per cent of all posts are held by Malay-
sians who have replaced first the British colonial official
and, after independence, the British ex-patriots who remained
in their careers. See Robert O. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transi-
tion in Malaya (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964).

[14]Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," in Almond and Coleman,
op. cit., p. 128.

The very young who flooded the middle ranks of the civil service during the transition to independence, when their seniors were seizing the senior civil service and political posts, thus are in fierce competition for promotion, and the older generation has not yet been removed. The abnormally young age structure of the middle ranks of the service moreover "will restrict recruitment for a decade or two."[15]

This phenomenon of generation-conflict within the major ethnic elite compartments of Malaysian life is especially acute among non-Malays who were denied any access to the civil service until 1953 and, thereafter, only with the now constitutionally sanctioned ratio of one non-Malay to every four Malays. They are in sharp competition for the second echelon roles of the polity and are increasingly impatient for their "conservative" elders to move over to make room for them. A typical example of this attitude is revealed in the remarks of Mr. Yap Chin Kwee, who holds the middle-level auxiliary role of political secretary to a Federal Minister. In a recent Kuala Lumpur address to a local MCA branch, he appealed to the "old guard" to make greater efforts to look after the interests of the Chinese, adding:

"...slowly and steadily a new class of MCA politicians, professionals in the assessment of the minds and hearts of the people is emerging on the political scene. They represent the new order of things to come and will replace those who were drafted into politics by circumstances."[16]

[15]Gullick, op. cit., p. 216.

[16]Speech reported in The Malay Mail, Wednesday, September 2, 1964.

In sum, while leadership in second echelon roles of the Malaysian polity comes from the same elite sub-cultures as do national leaders with the Malay group dominant here as well, role incumbents are younger, less experienced, and impatient because their mobility is blocked by their seniors. While still within the elite brackets of their ethnic sub-cultures, they come disproportionately from the lower socio-economic and educational ranks of their respective elite cultures.

Local Activist Roles

Malaysians who are recruited to local activist roles exhibit far more diversity of background and orientation than do those at the national and auxiliary levels. The extent to which they differ from the upper levels is a good measure of the extent to which the major role incumbents are unable to control local political recruitment. The fact of greater diversity should not obscure the undeniable fact that local activist roles are dominated by the same forces and sub-cultures that are preponderate at the higher levels. UMNO Malays dominate here as they do at the upper levels, in unequal partnership with MCA Chinese and MIC Indians, from the privileged sub-cultures of the nation. Together they control an overwhelming majority of political positions at the state and local levels.[17] Because the exceptions to this generalization

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[17]The Alliance UMNO, MCA, MIC partnership controls every state government except for Trengganu, Kelantan, Sarawak, Sabah, and of course the now expelled PAP Singapore government. It also controls all but a handful of local government positions.

are more interesting, this point is usually obscured.

The best recent example of a local activist attempting to leap to the level of a national political role is Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. When viewed in this framework, the whole Malaysia-Singapore conflict that resulted in Singapore's expulsion in 1965 becomes far more clear. Lee's power base was and is centered in Singapore state; his whole "Malaysian Malaysia" movement was an attempt to expand from that base to a regional and then national level. With a moderate socialist platform that declared "the Chinese bus driver has more in common with the Malay bus driver than with the Chinese bus owner,"[18] Lee was making a direct challenge to the ideological and organizational premises of the established and nationally entrenched UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance political elite. The latter's control of the constitutional machinery enabled them to nip Lee's bid to enter the national scene in the bud by the expulsion of Singapore from the Federal union.

Other, less threatening, local political activists continue to exist within the Malaysia framework who are at odds with the dominant elite sub-cultures. Members of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) are the largest single group in this category. This conservative theocratic party stands for a narrow Islamic Malay nationalism and has its greatest strength in the rural and backward states of Trengganu and Kelantan where there are heavy concentrations of Malay peasants

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[18] Lee Kuan Yew, in a Singapore speech quoted in The Sunday Times. (Singapore), Sunday, November 12, 1964.

from whom the party draws its localized electoral strength. Its leadership has been recruited from local Islamic religious structures and nearly all are Muslim "teachers." The dominant UMNO-MCA-MIC national elite has been able to keep the PMIP localized by taking the wind from the sails of their leaders. By diverting national resources, which they control, into such projects as mosque building and rural development, PMIP support has been successfully wooed away to UMNO, and this religious group has been prevented from reaching the national level.

The same pattern exists for the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), which is confined to the city of Ipoh in the mainland state of Perak. A multi-racial party in form but almost exclusively non-Malay in fact, the PPP is led by the two Seenivasagam brothers, wealthy and locally popular Indian attorneys. It draws its strength from Ipoh's Chinese workers who are disenchanted with the conservative MCA leadership, but it has been excluded from the national leadership level by the dominant Alliance sub-cultures and has been locally confined.[19] The tiny United Democratic Party, with a locally confined power base in Penang, has had a similar fate. Led by Dr. Lim Chong Eu, an ex-MCA President, it also draws its main strength from Chinese workers. It also threw its meager support to Lee Kuan Yew's united opposition that has now collapsed.

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[19] The PPP supported Lee Kuan Yew's Malaysian Malaysia program and had joined with him in a united opposition, but with Singapore's ejection the movement has folded up.

The Socialist Front[20] is another organization of local political activists that has only regionally confined strength. It has been subject to internal disunity that constantly threatens to tear it assunder. It makes a non-Communist socialist appeal to all races but finds most of its support among leftist urban non-Malay workers. The Socialist Front's vulnerability to charges of communist infiltration also has allowed the central government to detain a number of the Socialist Front's members and leaders with central police powers for political arrest. Beset with these problems, the Socialist Front has been unable to move beyond the level of local agitational politics.

In sum, political roles at the local level are manned by representatives of nearly all of Malaysia's political sub-cultures, but are dominated by the same ethnic-power configuration that exists at the national level.

The Periphery

For the vast majority of Malaysians, regardless of communal or class background, politics remains a peripheral part of their daily lives. To what extent and in what roles do they participate in Malaysian political life?

One of the most rudimentary form of political participation is attainment of the status of citizen. While all inhabitants of Malaysian territory are subject to Malaysian law,

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[20]Formed in 1957 by the Federation of the Malay Party Ra'ayat and the non-Malay Labour Party, which is the stronger of the two. See Chapter VI for a fuller discussion.

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the status of citizenship is more difficult to acquire, especially for non-Malays. It is true that there is a common Malaysian citizenship for all 13 of Malaysia's states; anyone born in the area on or after independence is automatically a citizen providing that at least one of his parents is a permanent resident. And with only minor exceptions, anyone who was a citizen in one of the pre-Malaysia constituent territories is also a Malaysian citizen. The rub rests in the latter provision, for especially in mainland Malaysia it was far easier for a Malay to meet the citizenship requirements than for non-Malays. For persons born in Malaysia before independence to become citizens, they must be 18 years old, local residents for at least five of the seven years preceding the application, be of good character, have "adequate" knowledge of the Malay language, and swear an oath of allegiance to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia.[21] These provisions, especially the Malay language clause, make it difficult for non-Malays to achieve the status of citizen.[22] As a result of these provisions, today in Malaysia there is a racial disparity favoring Malays in the ranks of the citizenry. Recruitment to the role and status of citizen has been selective, and today and for

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[21] See Malaysia, The Federal Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1964), Articles 14-31.

[22] Again, Singapore was an exception. Unwilling to accept the stringent peninsula formula for citizenship which would exclude many of the city's non-Malay speaking Chinese, Lee Kuan Yew negotiated a separate citizenship for Singaporeans that was non-transferable to other parts of Malaysia. This anomaly was yet another reason for Singapore's expulsion.

decades to come, there are and will be far more Malay citizens
than non-Malay citizens of the Federation. Figures on this
politically sensitive topic are not available, but we have a
relatively good index of the results in voting records, for
this role can only be played by citizens.

Members of the Malaysian periphery who are recruited to
the role of voter are thus drawn exclusively from the ranks of
the citizenry, who in turn have been recruited on a racially
disparate basis. In the 11 states of peninsula Malaysia at
the time of the 1964 general elections, there were 2,775,000
names on the electoral rolls; of these, 2,057,504 cast ballots
in the election. In the Sarawak state-wide general elections
of 1963, there were 302,786 registered voters and 185,616
votes cast. At the time of Sabah's first general election in
1962, a total of 217,903 registered voters existed; of these,
159,831 cast their ballots.[23] Thus, the total number of regis-
tered voters in Malaysia totals 3,285,689; those actually vot-
ing totaled 2,403,251. Relating these figures to Malaysia's
total population of 8,487,000, we find that registered voters
comprise 38.7 per cent of the population; those actually per-
forming in the role of voter comprise 28.3 per cent of the
total population.

There are no official figures on the communal composition
of the electorate in Malaysia, but reliable estimates have

[23]There have been no pan-Malaysian general elections to
date. In Sarawak, voting figures are distorted because 47,576
registered voters were in uncontested wards. Sabah's contest
was a local authority election.

been made that indicate that a large majority is comprised of
citizens of the Malay community. K. J. Ratnam indicates that
in mainland Malaysia, Malays comprise 56.8 per cent of the
electorate; Chinese, 35.6 per cent; Indians, 7.4 per cent; and
others, .2 per cent.[24] We can safely assume that this estimate
is roughly correct for the whole of Malaysia, although, of
course, the "others" category would go up to approximately
five per cent with the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak's indi-
genous populations, and this would be reflected in slightly
smaller percentages in the Chinese and Indian categories.

In most cases the political party is the structure that
recruits the electorate to the role of voter. All of Malay-
sia's parties are communal in fact, if not in form, and while
there are a few exceptions,[25] communal voting is the pattern.
The party that has attracted most of Malaysia's electorate is
the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance, a united tripod of communal parties.
On the peninsula in the last election, they attracted 1,204,340
of the 2,057,504 votes cast. The Alliance formula of uniting
essentially communal parties for electoral purposes has also
been applied in Sabah and Sarawak, where the party draws about

[24] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 200.

[25] In a handful of constituencies, a non-Malay candidate
was returned in a constituency with a Malay majority or vice-
versa. Ratnam reports for example that there were 15 constitu-
encies in which the candidates returned did not belong to the
community which formed the largest section of the electorate
in the 1959 peninsula elections. Ratnam, op. cit., p. 205.

85 per cent of the electorates.[26] On the peninsula in the
last elections, the Socialist Front attracted 330,898 voters;
the Pan Malayan Islamic Party, 301,000; the Peoples Progres-
sive Party, 69,898; Peoples' Action Party, 42,130; the United
Democratic Party, 88,233; Party Negara, 7,319; and indepen-
dents, 13,509.

Conclusions

In sum, the vast majority of Malaysia's population
remains on the periphery of political life, and, for most, par-
ticipant roles in the political process are intermittent and
minimal. Probably only about 60 per cent of the population
has the official status of citizen; less than 40 per cent are
registered voters; and under 30 per cent participate in national
and state elections. Of those who do participate in these
minimal roles in the Malaysian polity, Malays are preponderant,
accounting for over 60 per cent of the totals; most of these
Malays are attracted to the dominant political party in the
nation, the UMNO leg of the Alliance.

Because all organizations have a latent, if not manifest,
goal of survival, it is not surprising that the Malay domin-
ated leadership of Malaysia would like to see future citizens
recruited into the current political *status quo*. Malaysia is
somewhat unique in that it constitutionally sanctions Malay
dominance in recruitment to societal and political structures.

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[26]All of Sabah's parties are united in an Alliance, and
thus candidates stood only against independents and won 92 per
cent of the vote.

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As we have detailed elsewhere, Malays get special considera-
tion in educational scholarships, economic licenses, civil ser-
vice recruitment, and in land alienation.[27]

More informally, the Malay leadership has attempted to
convince itself and others of the anthropologic fiction, but
political expedient, that all indigenous peoples of Malaysia
are also Malays in order to swell "Malay" ranks.[28]

In the overtly political realm, the Alliance government
has attempted to channel all Malay party recruitment to UMNO,
all Chinese partisans into the MCA, all Indians into the MIC,
and all Borneo inhabitants into the similar communal-party-
Alliance in those states. For example, while less crass
motives were also involved, the Alliance government's expanded
policy of rural development can be seen as an attempt to under-
cut growing Pan-Malayan Islamic Party appeal in essentially
rural and conservative Malay districts of the peninsula's east
coast. The political detention of Socialist Front members can
be viewed in the same light, as can the more dramatic case of
Singapore's expulsion which, in one fell swoop, removed the
largest opposition party (PAP) from the framework of Malaysian
life. The Alliance national leadership attempts to perpetuate
itself by integrating non-Malay and Malay alike into an

[27]See Article 153, The Malaysian Constitution, op. cit.

[28]For a formal manifestation of this attitude, note the
federal constitution's provisions relating to Malay privileges,
to be applied to the natives of the Borneo States "as if they
were Malays." See Article 161A, Malaysian Constitution, op.
cit. Official population totals subsume Malays and indigenous
tribes under the heading "indigenous."

Alliance-dominated Malay political culture.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT
OF A MALAYSIAN ELITE GROUP SAMPLE

The purpose of this section is to analyze systematically and describe the background characteristics of a sample of major Malaysian political leaders in order to illustrate the socialization and recruitment processes in Malaysia. The data analysis is designed to produce a quantitative, mosaic profile of the sample, documenting such characteristics as social origins, training, homogeneity, continuity, representativeness, recruitment patterns, and experience.

Data was gathered by personal interviews with officials in the sample, by written questionnaires sent to each sample member, and, in order to cross-check and fill data gaps, by consultation of extant published materials such as newspaper files, biographies, and who's who-type volumes.[1]

The sample selected for study was the 159 members of the Malaysian House of Representatives (Dewan Ra'ayat) as constituted in September, 1964. Interviews were conducted, and

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[1] Field research was conducted in Malaysia during 1964-1965 under the auspices of a Fulbright grant. Unfortunately, Malaysia does not yet have a biographical directory of public officials listing key background data. The body of data presented here is thus unavailable elsewhere. Two who's who volumes exist, but they are both of limited scope and depth. Victor J. Morais (ed.), Who's Who in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Solai Press, 1965), and Felix L. Wu, Asia Who's Who (Hong Kong: Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance, 1957).

questionnaires were printed in both Malay and English; in this way, a background profile for each member in the sample was obtained. The questionnaire presenting the information categories is reproduced in Appendix A.[2]

General Characteristics

The 159 members of the Malaysian Dewan Ra'ayat are all elected. The 104 members from the 11 states of peninsula Malaysia, and the 15 members from the island state of Singapore[3] were returned from single member constituencies. The 24 members from Sarawak and the 16 members from Sabah were indirectly selected by their respective state legislative assemblies.[4] The racial and party composition of the sample is shown in Table 3, with a peninsula Malaysia, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah regional breakdown. The sample is overwhelmingly male. Three women have been elected to the Dewan Ra'ayat: two UMNO Malay housewives and an ex-teacher from Sarawak. The sample is for the most part composed of members of the same generation.

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[2]The categories are a considerably adapted version of those outlined in Harold D. Lasswell et al., The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

[3]The peninsula delegation was elected in general elections of April 1964. The separate Singapore election was held on September 21, 1963. While Singapore is no longer in the Federation, her delegation was kept in this sample for analysis as the data presented go far in explaining why the island state was expelled from Malaysia.

[4]This was a transitional solution to the problem of the Borneo states' political underdevelopment at the time of Malaysia's formation. Direct elections are to be held within five years.

Table 3

Dewan Ra'ayat Members by Race, Region, and Party (1964)

Region & Party	Malays	Malays and/or Indigenous	Chinese	Indian	Totals
Malaya					
Alliance					
UMNO	59	---	0	0	59
MCA	0	---	27	0	27
MIC	0	---	0	3	3
PMIP	9	---	0	0	9
Socialist Front	0	---	2	0	2
PPP	0	---	0	2	2
UDP	0	---	1	0	1
PAP	0	---	0	1	1
Singapore					
PAP	2	---	9	1	12
Barisan	0	---	3	0	3
Sarawak					
Alliance	--	15	6	0	21
SUPP	--	1	2	0	3
Sabah					
Alliance	==	10	6	0	16
Totals	70	26	56	7	159

Note: Unless self-explanatory, party abbreviations represent the following, moving from top to bottom; UMNO-United Malay National Organization, MCA-Malayan Chinese Association, MIC-Malayan Indian Congress, PMIP-Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, PPP-Peoples Progressive Party, UDP-United Democratic Party, PAP-Peoples Action Party, Barisan-Barisan Socialists, SUPP-Sarawak United Peoples' Party. Parties are discussed in detail in Chapter VIII below.

Average age is 43, with most of the sample falling into the category of 40-50 years of age. Ninety-five per cent are married and the vast majority have children.

We shall now look at key characteristics of the sample in closer detail.

Birthplace

While nearly all of the sample was born in areas now part of Malaysia, there are some interesting communal disparities that can be uncovered. With birthplace information on 122 of the total sample of 159, all but three[5] indicated that they were locally born. This is a surprising finding in view of the fact that over 80 per cent of the total Malaysian population is now locally born. Interesting results do emerge, however, when one probes a bit deeper, inquiring into the birthplace of the sample's parents. In the Malay community, 94 per cent had both parents born in Malaysia, with only three per cent with one parent locally born and three per cent with both parents foreign born. In the Chinese membership, 50 per cent reported both parents foreign, usually China-born; 38 per cent had one parent locally born; and only 22 per cent had both parents locally born. All Indians had both parents foreign born, and, of course, the indigenous representatives

[5]One PAP Indian, one UMNO Malay, and one Sarawak Alliance Chinese.

almost unanimously had two locally born parents.[6]

Place of Rearing

Most of the members of the Dewan Ra'ayat were born and raised in Malaysia's larger cities and villages; 59 per cent of the sample can be so classified. Here again, however, there are marked communal disparities as Table 4 indicates.

Table 4

Place of Rearing by Community

Ethnic Group	Larger Towns	Rural	Total N.
Malay	19 (34.5%)	36 (65.5%)	55
Chinese	32 (86.5%)	5 (13.5%)	37
Indian	5 (71.4%)	2 (28.6%)	7
Indigenous-Malay	12 (76.5%)	4 (23.5%)	17
Totals	69 (59.5%)	47 (40.5%)	116 (100%)

Note: Classification was based on whether towns were urban or rural 43 years ago, the average birthdate of the sample.

It can be seen at a glance that the Malay members of the sample are decidedly rural, while the Chinese, Indian, and indigenous-Malay sample members are markedly urban. There are thus important racial differences in the early socialization milieu.

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[6]These findings must be regarded as merely suggestive. Just over a third of the total sample reported information on parental origins. There was a decided tendency to skip this item on the questionnaire and to evade it in interviews, especially among the Chinese, with whom it is a very sensitive topic.

Educational Background

The educational level of members of the Dewan Ra'ayat is generally quite high and also correlates quite closely with ethnic community, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Educational Levels by Ethnic Communities:
Highest Level Attained

Ethnic Group	University Degree	University No Degree	Secondary	Primary	Total N.
Malay	18(35.3%)	12(23.5%)	13(25.5%)	8(15.7%)	51
Chinese	19(46.3%)	9(22.0%)	9(22.0%)	4 (9.7%)	41
Indian	3(50.0%)	0 (---)	3(50.0%)	0 (---)	6
Indigen-ous- Malay	1 (5.6%)	4(22.2%)	8(44.4%)	5(27.8%)	18
Totals	41(35.3%)	25(21.6%)	33(28.4%)	17(14.7%)	116(100%)

As can be seen, 56.9 per cent of the sample has been educated at the university level. The Malay delegation has 58.8 per cent of its members in this category, while the Chinese representatives have 68.3 per cent of their number of this educational attainment, and the Indian delegation have a full 50 per cent. The indigenous-Malay representatives of Sarawak and Sabah have only 27.8 per cent of their number in the ranks of the university educated.

The type of education received by the sample is indicated in Table 6. The vast majority of the members of the Dewan Ra'ayat, it is clear, are English educated. The high incidence of exclusively English educations among non-Malay groups

again illustrates the extent to which an English education is
a vehicle for political recruitment. An English education for
a non-Malay indeed seems to be an essential credential for
recruitment, as indicated by the almost total lack of exclus-
ively traditional/vernacular educational backgrounds.

Table 6

Educational Type by Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	English	Vernacular & English	Traditional/ Vernacular	Total N.
Malay	5 (10.0%)	37 (74.0%)	8 (16.0%)	50
Chinese	23 (59.5%)	17 (40.5%)	0 (---)	42
Indian	6 (85.7%)	1 (14.3%)	0 (---)	7
Indigenous -Malay	10 (55.5%)	6 (33.3%)	2 (11.2%)	18
Totals	46 (39.3%)	61 (52.1%)	10 (8.6%)	117 (100%)

Occupational Background

The occupations pursued by members of Malaysia's House of
Representatives are shown in Table 7, .While the sample is uni-
formly professionalized, with no disparities among communities
of any size, there are marked communal differences in the
extent to which business and civil service occupations are rep-
resented. Malays disproportionately represent civil service
backgrounds, while Chinese and Indians are skewed to almost an
equal extent toward business occupations instead.

Because members of the Dewan Ra'ayat are at the peak of
their careers, current occupation indexes tend to disguise
mobility and recruitment channels to some extent. To focus

more sharply on these factors, Table 8 presents data on the
first political or governmental position held in the careers
of members of the various communities. The communally dis-
tinctive access points or channels of political recruitment
show up here more clearly.

Table 7

Occupations by Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	Pro-fessions	Business	Civil Service	Other	Total N.
Malay	27(52.9%)	6(11.8%)	14(27.5%)	4 (7.8%)	51
Chinese	17(47.2%)	14(38.9%)	2 (5.6%)	3 (8.3%)	36
Indian	4(57.1%)	2(28.6%)	0 (---)	1(14.3%)	7
Indigenous -Malay	8(50.0%)	2(12.5%)	3(18.8%)	3(18.7%)	16
Totals	56(50.9%)	24(21.8%)	19(17.3%)	11(10.0%)	110(100%)

Note: The category, Professions, includes doctors, lawyers,
journalists, teachers, and C.P.A.'s. The category,
Others, includes planters, clerks, trade unionists, and
housewives. In the case of individuals who are now
full-time politicians, the occupation follwed immedi-
ately before reaching that status, or the one for which
the individual was trained, was counted.

Table 8

First Position in Government or Politics by Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	Civil Service	Party Office	Local Elec-tive Office	Total N.
Malay	32 (57.1%)	21 (37.5%)	3 (5.4%)	56
Chinese	9 (17.3%)	28 (53.8%)	15 (28.9%)	52
Indian	2 (28.6%)	1 (14.3%)	4 (57.1%)	7
Indigenous-Malay	5 (25.0%)	6 (30.0%)	9 (45.0%)	20
Totals	48 (35.5%)	56 (41.5%)	31 (23.0%)	135 (100%)

It is clear that the route to political life for most Malays has been through the civil service. On the other hand, for the vast majority of all non-Malay categories, the path of political recruitment has been through political party struc-tures and by direct election to local governmental authorities.

Experience

The legislative experience which the current members of the Dewan Ra'ayat have had at a federal level is quite limited and is confined to those members from the peninsula states of Malaysia. In the peninsula Malaya. federal elections of 1955, 52 men were elected. In the peninsula elections of 1959, 104 elected seats were filled, with only 18 members from the 1955 election being returned again. Of the 104 members returned in the peninsula federal elections to the current 1964 parliament, 52 had served previous terms in either the 1955 or 1959 Malayan legislature, with only 12 having been in both previous houses. Of the 52 experienced federal legislators, 35 are Malay, 12 are Chinese, and five are Indian. The 12 men with experience in both previous Malayan legislatures are, with one Chinese and one Indian exception, all Malay.

While the 55 members from the states of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak have no federal legislative experience, all of them have served on legislative assemblies in their respective states. It is clear, however, that the Malay community far outranks all other ethnic groups in federal legislative experi-ence.

Conclusions

Malaysian legislators come exclusively from upper socio-economic brackets, and most are urban born, English educated, and of the same generation. Despite these homogeneous characteristics, socialization and recruitment analysis indicates a very strong relationship to race, and distinctive ethnic political career patterns emerge.

The typical Malay legislator was born in one of the 11 states of peninsula Malaysia of locally-born Muslim parents. His birthplace and early socialization milieu were rural. His education began in a local vernacular primary school, continued in an English-medium secondary school, and culminated at a Western oriented English-medium university with professional training. Upon graduation he took a civil service job, became involved in the nationalist movement and joined the United Malay National Organization. The party subsequently tapped him as a legislative nominee, and his electoral victory led to his resignation from the civil service and placed him in the Legislature at the peak of his career when he had reached the age bracket of 40-50.

The typical Chinese legislator was born in one of Malaysia's coastal urban areas of parents who had immigrated from southern China. Early in his urban childhood he learned English and attended an English-medium private, most likely missionary-operated, primary school. He continued his exclusively English-medium education in secondary school and went on to an English-medium university for professional training. Upon

graduation he entered the family business or began practicing law or medicine. Observing the rising tide of Malay nationalism, he became concerned about his future and joined a political party dedicated to the protection of Chinese rights. Finally, at the peak of his career, he ran for public office as an officer of his party and became a national legislator.

The background of the typical Indian legislator is similar. He was born in an urbanized area of peninsula Malaysia of India born parents. He grew up in the city and went to English-medium schools, perhaps to the university level. He trained for one of the professions and, upon leaving school, entered private life to earn a living. The nationalist movement in India attracted his attention, and he became involved in local politics, joined the Malayan Indian Congress, and ran successfully for a local elective office. From this political base he contended for a national legislative role and was successfully elected to the Dewan Ra'ayat.

The typical indigenous-Malay legislator was born in either Sarawak or Sabah of one of the larger tribes long indigenous to Borneo. He was born and reared in one of the larger coastal towns and attended vernacular and English schools up to the secondary level. Upon graduation he entered perhaps the teaching or journalist profession or engaged in small business activities. He soon came to the attention of his peers and was elected as one of the chiefs of his tribe or perhaps to one of the local governmental authorities set up by the colonial regime. When it became evident that colonialism was on its way out in the early 1960's, he became involved as a

political party organizer in Borneo's inchoate political life and stood for election in the state legislative assembly. From this base he was selected by indirect election to serve as one of Sarawak or Sabah's first representatives in Malaysia's Federal Parliament in Kuala Lumpur.

CHAPTER VII

INTEREST ARTICULATION

All political systems contain dynamic structures that make claims or demands for political action. These interest articulating structures or pressure groups operate on the boundaries of the polity and to a crucial extent manage the ebb and flow of influence between the political system and the society. As Almond has noted, "the particular structures which perform the articulation function and the style of their performance determine the character of the boundary between the polity and the society."[1]

This chapter seeks to identify, describe, and classify major interest articulation structures in Malaysia. There is no pretense of comprehensiveness, and only major structures are included.[2] It is claimed, however, that on the basis of the interest group typology presented, all interest articulating structures in Malaysia can be classified and better understood.

The four-category typology adopted for this analysis is taken from Almond.[3] It differentiates the following four

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[1]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.

[2]Save for one nine-page general article, there is no literature on interest groups in Malaysia. See K. J. Ratnam, "Political Parties and Pressure Groups," Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 336-345.

[3]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.

types of interest articulating structures: 1. institutional,
2. non-associational, 3. associational, and 4. anomic. Insti-
tutional interest groups include such multi-functional tradi-
tional or modern structures as bureaucracies, churches, armies,
and legislatures, which make political demands despite the
fact that they are organized to perform other functions. Non-
associational interest structures are less formal and are typi-
cally activated only intermittently; examples are ethnic
groups, class groups, and religious cliques. Associational
interest structures are groups whose prime organizational
raison d'etre is the articulation of a particular interest;
examples of such functionally specific structures are trade
unions, business and industrial associations, and civic groups.
Anomic interest groups are those "more or less spontaneous
breakthroughs into the political system from the society, such
as riots and demonstrations."[4]

After identifying, classifying, and describing major
Malaysian interest articulating structures within this frame-
work, important assessments can be made. For example, from
this analytical base, tentative judgments can be made as to
the capacity of the Malaysian polity to receive demands from
the society and to transform them into aggreeable claims for
conversion to output in the form of public policy and regula-
tion. In addition, tentative answers can be presented to the
following questions. What types of structures most success-
fully articulate their interests in Malaysian society? Which

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[4]Loc. cit., p. 34.

do not succeed, or only partially attain their goals? What is the general nature and style of the operation of Malaysia's interest group system? What are the pressure points within the Malaysian polity toward which interests direct their efforts? These questions are dealt with in the concluding section of this chapter.

The Context of Interest Articulation

Pressure groups do not exist in a vacuum; they are significantly influenced by the cultural and political context in which they operate. As Richard Rose has pointed out, many claims upon governments are explicit or implicit in the political culture of a country, and this cultural norm-pressure group relationship defines the range, the intensity, and to a marked degree, the methods of interest structures. Rose notes six possibilities: harmony between demands and cultural norms, gradual acceptance within the polity of norms demanded by interest groups, periodic fluctuations of norms in support for the claims of particular groups, interest activity in the face of cultural indifference, activity in opposition to long-term cultural changes, and conflict between cultural values and pressure group goals.[5] In sum, interest groups differ in the extent to which they occupy strategic positions in relation to values in the social system.

In addition to the general cultural contest, pressure groups must operate within a particular political milieu of

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[5]Richard Rose, op. cit., pp. 128-135.

established political norms and institutions. In this respect
probably no two political systems are alike. Interest group
activity patterns that are effective in the United States
would not be effective in Great Britain or in Malaysia. Each
polity has different access points or places where interests
are aggregated,[6] which are related to the mix of norms and
extant political structures. For these reasons, the cultural
and political context of Malaysia's interest group system must
be considered. For each major interest discussed below, there-
fore, an assessment of the articulating structure's strategic
position *in re* the Malaysian political culture is included.

Before beginning detailed treatment of particular inter-
ests, it should be recalled that the Malaysian cultural set-
ting is in general extremely fragmented and heterogeneous.
By contrast, however, the _political_ culture is relatively homo-
geneous, because it has been cast in the framework of the domin-
ant Malay elite sub-culture's traditional values and institu-
tions.[7] This essential fact conditions the operation of inter-
est group activity in Malaysia decisively. As Tunku Abdul
Rahman recently again made clear, "It is understood by all
that this country, by its very name, its traditions, and

character, is Malay."[8]

Institutional Interest Groups

Certain traditional institutions have existed in Malaysia long prior to the formation of the modern Western state; as a consequence, some of these institutions occupy unique political positions and receive special consideration for their political claims upon the polity.

Perhaps the best illustration of this type of interest structure in Malaysia is the Islamic religion; no institution occupies a more strategic position in respect to the dominant Malay political culture. It is in fact one of the very linchpins of the ascendant culture of the polity.[9]

In the traditional pre-colonial Malay states, the Sultan was concomitantly paramount secular ruler and supreme head of the Muslim ecclesiastic hierarchy. As we have seen, the advent and evolution of British colonialism eroded the fact, if not the form of, secular power of the Sultans, but their religious authority was undisturbed both in theory and practice. Only in the post-war period did the British attempt in their 1948 Malayan Union proposals to reduce and largely revoke the traditional prerogatives and religious status of the Sultans by inaugurating a centralized secular state. The plan was

[8]Tunku Abdul Rahman in an interview printed in The Asia Magazine (a weekly supplement of the Sunday Times of Malaya), August 30, 1964, p. 6.

[9]Fred R. Von der Mehden, "Religion and Politics in Malaya," Asian Survey, III, No. 12, (December 1963), pp. 609-615.

aborted by unprecedented Malay agitational politics in which
the defense of the Islamic religion was perhaps the key cohes-
ive element; Malay nationalism was thus, to a large extent, born
of the Islamic faith. Islam became the official religion of
each official state under the Federation of Malaya agreement
in 1948, and the Sultans were restored to their status as para-
mount Malay spiritual leaders in their states. Religion became
and remained quiescent as a political issue until independence
for Malaya approached in 1957, and the framework of the new
federal constitution was negotiated. These discussions offer
revealing insights into the nature of Islam as a political
interest structure; one of the major issues was whether or not
Islam was to become the national religion of the new state.

On this issue, Islam's key clergy, the Malay Sultans took
a direct stand. Speaking as one through legal council, the
Sultans submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Commission
arguing that it would not be desirable to have Islam constitu-
tionally designated as the national religion. This seemingly
incongruous position was taken because the Sultans feared that
religion would thereby become a federal subject, perhaps to be
organized in a federal Ministry of Religious Affairs, thus
undermining their individual religious paramouncy in their
respective states.[10]

This position clashed with that of the emergent UMNO-
dominated Alliance party which submitted a separate memorandum

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[10]K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 120.

to the Commission, arguing for the establishment of Islam as the national faith. This position also seems incongruous at first sight, for the Malay leaders of UMNO were among the more secular-minded members of their community and left no doubt that they favored the separation of church and state in an essentially secular nation, guaranteeing freedom of worship to all. However, the Malay UMNO leaders knew the cohesive power of Islam among the Malay masses, and to have the credential of being responsible for an exalted symbolic recognition of their faith would be of great political value, allowing UMNO to stand upon a record as champion of Islam. Moreover, Islamic symbols and traditions were part and parcel of the framework of the Malay political culture to which the UMNO Malay leaders were committed to establish as the norm of the newly independent nation; this in their view required the official symbolic recognition of Islam as the national religion.

In the final draft of the constitution, it was the UMNO view that prevailed, and Islam was stipulated as Malaya's official faith. The Sultans reluctantly agreed to the decision after winning government assurance that no Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs would be established and the constitutional safeguard that the decision left "all rights, privileges, prerogatives, and powers enjoyed by him [the Sultans] as Head of that religion [Islam], ...unaffected and unimpaired."[11] This paradoxical confrontation of the leaders of

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[11]This is the precise language and basis under which Islam was made the national religion of the expanded Federation of Malaysia in 1963. See Constitution of Malaysia, op. cit., Article 3, Clause 2.

the Islamic faith and UMNO politicians thus produced a mutually satisfactory compromise; Islamic interests were safeguarded and the UMNO politicians were allowed their symbolic victory. But it is more important for an additional reason. The confrontation established the precedent of the dominance of political structures in the determination of the extent to which religion should intrude into the polity. The compromise was enshrined in the 1963 Malaysia Constitution, and the precedent has been followed ever since.

The UMNO Malay leaders were prepared to go even farther in setting up the framework for a Malay-Islamic political culture; indeed, they stopped just before permitting the Constitution to fall short of establishing the Federation as a secular state. It is true that all Malaysians are guaranteed the right to profess, practice, and propagate their own religions, but there are important qualifications. By the terms of the Constitution, "federal law or State law may provide for special financial aid for the establishment or maintenance of Muslim institutions or the instruction in the Muslim religion of persons professing that faith."[12] As we shall note in the next chapter, this clause is liberally used. Moreover, the Constitution permits state law to prohibit the propagation of non-Muslim faiths among those professing the Muslim religion (i.e. all Malays), and nearly all Malaysia's peninsula states have enacted such provisions. Similar restrictions prohibit the

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[12] Constitution of Malaysia, Article 12, Clause 2.

adoption of Malay children by non-Muslim foster parents in
many states. In addition, Muslim religious courts remain sepa-
rate from the secular judicial system of the Federation and
are beyond the administrative control of Malaysia's Chief Jus-
tice. These courts, manned by Muslim religious magistrates
called kathis, enforce religious observance and regulate the
domestic, especially matrimonial, affairs of Muslims.

Despite these important constitutional privileges which
have been granted to Islamic structures at the instigation,
insistence, and under the control of the Malay political elite,
it should be noted that actually very few of the ecclesiastic
hierarchy[13] are political activists, and the institutions of
Islam have little day to day influence upon the political sys-
tem in a particularistic manner. The few exceptions are the
rural Islamic "teachers" who actively use their influence in
support of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, localized in penin-
sula Malaysia's northeast; aside from these few cliques of
rural conservative clergymen, the institutions of Islam cannot
be considered politicalized in Malaysia. There is little need
for Islamic interests to be actively advanced, for the faith's
interests are strategically located within the dominant polit-
ical culture with implicitly pro-Islamic orientations. It is

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[13] The elected Yang di-Petuan Agong, or King of Malaysia,
is the supreme authority; he is elected to his five-year term
by and from the state Sultans who are next in line. In addi-
tion, each state has a number of kathis, or theocratic reli-
gious magistrates, led in each state by a chief kathi, called
the Mufti. In a strict sense, Islam has no clergy; however, a
number of religious "teachers," or preachers, are the func-
tional equivalent.

thus a force supporting the _status quo_ with its interests protected, because they are in part coterminous with the ruling elite's, providing UMNO with a unifying ideological framework.

Non-Islamic religious institutions in Malaysia are fragmented and are far less strategically located in the nation's culture; they have remained aloof from political pursuits and have no perceivable impact on Malaysian political life. As Gullick notes, "most leaders of religious congregations play no significant part in public life."[14] But to say that non-Islamic religious institutions and clergy are apolitical does not mean that religion is not an important factor in Malaysian politics. The contrary is true; religion remains one of the most sensitive issues in Malaysian public life. There is deep resentment among non-Malays concerning the special position of Islam, and charges and counter-charges are exchanged almost daily among rival politicians, claiming one communal group is using religion for political purposes against another, or that leaders of one religious group are prejudiced against the religion of another. For example, Dayak chieftain Tememggon Jugah of Sarawak, a Methodist and current Federal Minister for Sarawak Affairs recently felt compelled to declare: "Politics and religion should not mix."[15] Dato Donald Stevens, one of Sabah's key leaders and an Anglo-Kadazan Roman Catholic, recently called a new conference to defend himself against

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[14]Gullick, _op. cit._, p. 218.

[15]_Straits Times_ (Monday, June 15, 1965).

charges that he was anti-Muslim, during which he appealed,
"leave religion outside the scope of political bickering and
manoeuvring."[16] Alliance Government officials have gone
beyond mere articulation of the injunction to keep politics
separated from religion. Minister of Home Affairs Dato, Dr.
Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, recently warned "religious fana-
tics" who used religion for political purposes that they would
be arrested. Indeed, one Haji Omar bin Haji Daud was detained
in June of 1964 because he allegedly used religion to stir up
the Malays for political purposes. Explaining the arrest,
Dato Ismail declared:

> "The PMIP leaders accuse UMNO leaders of being infidels
> because they mix with other races. They even told
> the electorate that if they voted for UMNO they would
> go to hell. This is used to instil fear in the minds
> of the people, especially those in rural areas. We
> cannot allow such things to happen. Religion should
> be divorced from politics."[17]

In sum, save for Islam, religious institutions play a neg-
ligible role in articulating interests in Malaysia. Neverthe-
less, religious interests do intrude prominently in political
life; the structures that articulate them are non-associational,
however, and religious interests are subsumed within the undif-
ferentiated packages of demands diffusely advanced by communal
groups, as shall shortly be demonstrated below.

Among the other key institutional structures that articu-
late political demands in Malaysia, the Malaysian legislature

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[16] The Sabah Times (October 6, 1965).

[17] Straits Times (Monday, May 17, 1965).

itself is of considerable importance. It is interesting that
during the colonial period, the advisory "legislative" council
was designed primarily to function as an interest articulation
structure rather than a rule-making body. Malaya's Federal
Legislative Council had 50 "unofficial" members selected to
represent labor, plantation interests, mining, commerce, the
professions, and ethnic groups. [18]

To a decided extent Malaysia's current legislature is a
continuation of this heritage. The previous chapter's look at
the social backgrounds of members of the Dewan Ra'ayat demon-
strates the almost exclusive representation of ethnic elite
groups, the major business, industrial, and professional inter-
ests of the country; this both implicitly and explicitly biases
the legislative institution in favor of these interests. [19]
However, in the main it cannot be said that these interests
are overtly articulated within or by the legislative forum.
Nor for that matter do interest groups in general direct their
pressure activities toward the legislature; as we shall see in
the next chapter, the legislature does not play a crucial role
in the aggregation of interests. Strategicly placed interests
focus their activities upon the loci of decision making and
policy execution. To a large extent then, legislative observ-
ers do not see the by-play of the most powerful and strategic-
ally located Malaysian interest structures, save for an

[18] See Gullick, op. cit., p. 109.

[19] This argument will be developed more fully in considera-
tion of interest aggregation in the next chapter.

occasional glimpse in the rare cases when aspects of crucial interest confrontations spill over into the legislative forum. For example, the extent to which the battle between the interests represented by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and the central government appeared in the legislative forum in the pre-separation spring and summer of 1965 is analogous to the visible portion of an iceberg; while aspects of the conflict were occasionally apparent in the Dewan Ra'ayat, it is clear that the legislature was not the prime arena of battle.

Indeed it is here maintained that the extent to which interests structures use the legislature as the forum for articulation of their major demands is a good indication of the lack of genuine influence of those interests and a measure of blocked access to strategic decision-making centers.[20] In addition, it is a measure of the ruling Alliance Government's vision of tolerable and legitimate limits of political opposition, as the following examples will demonstrate.

The Dewan Ra'ayat member for Batu constituency, one of the two Chinese members of the Socialist Front party, Dr. Tan Chee Koon, is known as "a tireless and widely-respected one-man opposition in the Dewan Ra'ayat."[21] Dr. Tan vigorously articulates the socialist interests of his small faction-torn party and, in fact, dominates the question period at session

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[20]Generalizations in this section are based on the writer's regular attendance and observation of the Dewan Ra'ayat sessions during 1964-1965.

[21]Far Eastern Economic Review: 1965 Yearbook, op. cit., p. 205.

openings and provides most of the verbal pyrotechnics in adjournment speeches. He also fully utilises the limited time allowed him to speak against Alliance legislation. Nevertheless, he has very little influence on the policy-making process and, in the main, articulates his party's interests in reaction to Alliance decisions to which he has no access. It is interesting that Alliance Ministers respond to him perfunctorily and, in fact, treat him as a kind of showpiece of Alliance tolerance of non-communist parliamentary opposition. It costs them little; he has no perceivable effect on the policy-making or execution. Why does Dr. Tan persist in apparently futile efforts? If this analysis is sound, because he has no better alternative access point to articulate his party's interests. In the Dewan Ra'ayat the interests he represents get some attention within the toleration limits of the Alliance-dominated proceedings and some press coverage, although the latter stands a good chance of being distorted, unreported, or buried in the back pages. [22]

Other interest articulation in the Dewan Ra'ayat is of the same character, sporadic reaction to policy processes to which there is no access. The Peoples' Progessive Party's Indian Seenivasagam brothers present another example of interest advocates who lack strategic access and must make do with volatile attempts to thrust their interests into attention in the Dewan Ra'ayat. The elder of the two Ipoh attorneys, D. R.

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[22] Political domination of the communication media will be discussed in Chapter IX.

Seenivasagam, recently took part in a dispute which in an almost freakishly unique fashion succeeded in affecting the Alliance Government more immediately and directly than any opposition activity in recent memory. In attempting to expose corruption within and thus discredit the Alliance Government, Seenivasagam charged the Alliance Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman bin Haji Talib, with dishonesty and personal venality, speaking with legislative immunity from libel or slander suit on the floor of the Dewan Ra'ayat. The Minister challenged Seenivasagam to repeat the charges outside the House; Seenivasagam complied and Talib brought suit for libel. The lower court judgment, now under appeal, found for defendant Seenivasagam, and Talib was forced to resign his portfolio (but not his parliamentary seat). There can be little doubt of Seenivasagam's political motivations in attacking Talib; the point of emphasis here is that his minor cause celebre illustrates the extent to which non-Alliance interests advocates must go to achieve national attention for themselves and their aims. What is unique in this dispute is that an opposition party's activities had demonstrable, if only temporary and minor, political effect.

In sum, the legislature as an institution is of only minimal importance as an interest articulation structure. The Dewan Ra'ayat is utilized as an interest articulation forum only by minor interest advocates with little to no strategic access to crucial decision-making centers. Even this limited use is Alliance-controlled. No effective parliamentary opposition exists that has been allowed to challenge Alliance

interests seriously within the legislative forum. If and when
an opposition threatens to become an ascendant Alliance chal-
lenge, it can easily be stifled, or, as the fell swoop expul-
sion of Singapore's 15 PAP legislators in 1965 demonstrates,
eliminated.

The Malaysian bureaucracy[23] has in the immediate past
been an interest articulation institution of paramount impor-
tance. As we have seen, it was the key recruitment ground for
Malay nationalist politicians who, while still incumbent in
civil service posts, successfully demanded political indepen-
dence from the British on UMNO-Malay-set terms; it was a polit-
icalized structure with overt political demands. As soon as
independence was conceded in principle, these UMNO Malay civil
servants concentrated their demands upon speeding up the inde-
pendence time-table and upon "nationalizing" or "Malayanizing"
the civil service as rapidly as possible, replacing British
expatriots with Malay bureaucrats.[24] With independence in
Malaya in 1957 and for Malaysia in 1963, these phases are vir-
tually completed.[25]

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[23] The best single work on the Malaysian bureaucracy is
Robert O. Tilman, _Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya_ (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1964).

[24] See Robert O. Tilman, "The Nationalization of the Colon-
ial Services in Malaya," _South Atlantic Quarterly_, LXI (Spring
1962), pp. 183-196.

[25] It should be recalled that non-Malays were only per-
mitted to enter the Malayan Civil Service as late as 1953, and
then only at a ratio of one to every four Malays. These provi-
sions continue today, and the civil service is largely Malay.

One of the most astonishing factors of post-independence Malaysian politics is that the bureaucracy has been turned from its political heritage into an instrument that is in the main politically neutral today. Perhaps Britain's most notable political gift to Malaysia has been the bureaucratic norm of political neutrality and a trained, skilled, professionalized civil service. Today Malaysia has legislation forbidding overt partisan political activity by bureaucrats, and it is generally observed.[26]

This does not mean, of course, that the bureaucracy's functions today are confined to its specific mandate of rule-execution with no part in the political policy formation process. The bureaucracy's predominantly Malay composition gives it an inherent pro-Malay bias and a vested interest in the maintenance of the four-to-one recruitment ratio. The civil service still serves as recruitment channel for Malay politicians; although data on extent is lacking, it is known that "a number of persons have resigned from government or taken an early retirement in order to pursue a political career."[27]

As in all political systems, individual departments in the Malaysian bureaucracy vary in the extent of their political influence and political viability. All bureaucratic groups have a latent interest in their own survival. Some participate in the policy formation process merely by providing

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[26] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," Kahin (ed.), op. cit., p. 319.

[27] Loc. cit.

the expertise necessary for policy decisions. Still others are on the strategic cutting edge as the implementors of the more controversial Alliance government policies and are thus more exposed to social pressures to use what discretionary powers they possess in favor of particular interests; for example, the Ministry of Education. Other bureaucratic units have well known political claims which they protect by the cultivation of supporting interests within the society, thus giving them a degree of freedom from political control. An example of such a unit is the National Language and Literature Agency, or Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

The Agency Director is an ardent Malay nationalist, Syed Nasir bin Ismail, who represents and cultivates the more extremist Malay nationalist elements in the society, such as the UMNO Youth organization. Syed Nasir has not hesitated to criticize publicly the Government for not moving faster on Malay language implementation; he has, in fact, become a political advocate for his Agency's own political solutions. For example, he recently called for legislation to enable the national language to be used in the lower courts of Malaysia. At the same time he urged the recruitment of new government staff on the basis of more strict qualifications in the national language and vigorously castigated heads of government for failing to promote more vigorously the increased use of Malay within their units, noting "a lot of adjustments must be made in the administrative system itself."[28]

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[28]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Wednesday, June 16, 1965.

Such emotional advocacy of Malay usage by Syed Nasir and others has stimulated anomic activity, such as the daubing out of English words on the bi-lingual Malay-English street signs in Kuala Lumpur by Malay youths in 1964. Alarmed non-Malays became concerned and appealed to top Alliance leaders for moderation on the language issue; however, no specific condemnation of Syed Nasir has been forthcoming. Language is an explosive political issue and UMNO could not open itself to the charge of dragging its feet on the Malay language issue. In the main, moderates on the language issue, the UMNO-dominated Alliance leadership has to date confined its response to Syed Nasir to public condemnation of unnamed "language extremists" in carefully guarded and very general terms.

Examples such as these can readily be found, indicating that interest articulation by the bureaucracy warrants much more careful study than it has received. In the main, however, such cases do not seem to negate the generalization that the Malaysian bureaucracy is politically controlled and a partisan neutral.

It is notable that the Malaysian army is an institution that has a negligible influence on the Malaysian political process, unlike nearly all of the undeveloped world and most of Southeast Asia, as the Indonesian, Burmese, Thai, and Vietnamese cases illustrate. The reasons for this seem clear. Malaysia reached independence under the leadership of her aristocratic upper classes, groups that were ousted elsewhere in Southeast Asia because of their colonial affiliations, thereby creating a leadership vacuum. In Malaysia there was no war of

independence; Britain granted self-government in relative tranquility. Moreover, the Malaysian army is one of the youngest in Southeast Asia and, even during the height of Confrontation with Indonesia, remained one of the region's smallest. Its professional officer corps is British-trained and has no past history of, or currently evident interest in, involvement in political affairs. There is little prospect for a future shift from this position of political neutrality, especially now that confrontation has ended and national resources are again being diverted to non-military priorities.

Lucian Pye has commented that in nearly all of Southeast Asia authoritative institutional groups, such as armies, churches, and bureaucracies, dominate the political scene.[29] While the influence of such institutions upon the political process in Malaysia is undeniable, Pye's generalization does not seem to hold in the Malaysian case. There is strong evidence that in Malaysia non-institutional political structures dominate the polity's key functions. As will become clearer in the next chapter, political structures control, if not dominate, such Malaysian institutions as the legislature, the bureaucracy, religious institutions, and the army.

In any case, it seems safe to generalize that institutional structures do not play a decisive role in the performance of the interest articulation function in the Malaysian polity. Institutions rarely intrude their interests overtly

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[29]Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 115.

into the political process. Moreover, the extent to which
interest advocates use these structures as forums for the arti-
culation of their political claims seems a good measure of
their lack of access to more strategic aggregation centers of
the polity; their utilization of these institutional forums as
articulation centers is also limited and controlled in the
main by the dominant UMNO-Alliance Government.

Non-Associational Interest Groups

While there is no single key to understanding Malaysian
politics, it is clear that the single most important factor is
communalism. The paramount issues in the political arena are
racial ones, and these primordial concerns in the last analy-
sis override and overshadow all other kinds. Indeed, one
writer has characterized the entire Malaysian political pro-
cess as "an attempt to establish and maintain a viable equilib-
rium between the different communities."[30]

The interplay of ethnic interests is the heart and core
of Malaysian political bargaining.[31] How are the various eth-
nic communities organized? How do they articulate their inter-
ests? This section offers evidence that communal interests
are in the main articulated by non-associational interest

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[30]K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 3.

[31]A fact noted but in the main left unanalyzed by nearly
every commentator on Malaysian politics.

advocates, such as unorganized cliques or political personages
with high societal visibility. These agents claim to speak
for the entire spectrum of interests of their race and/or
class and typically operate in a diffuse, informal, and inter-
mittent style.

Before turning to the evidence supporting this general
hypothesis, a general note on major content themes within the
interest syndromes of each of Malaysia's ethnic communities is
in order.[32]

We have seen that the socialization pattern in Malaysia
is strongly related to race. While the spectrum of interests
is wide within each of the ethnic communities, general pervas-
ive themes can be isolated for each racial category. The key-
note of ethnic interest conflict is the tension between Malay
versus non-Malay, and more particularly between Malay and Chi-
nese, the groups that are numerically nearly equal.

Malays believe that they are the "indigenous" sons of the
soil with the natural right to control their country politic-
ally. Non-Malays are thus in the main "aliens" who reside in
Malaysia at the sufferance of the Malay community; they are
viewed with a mixture of fear, envy, and suspicion. Resent-
ment and hostility focuses upon the Chinese, aliens who collab-
orated with the British to seize control of the economy of
their country and have higher incomes and life-styles. Malay

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[32] There has been no systematic general analysis of atti-
tudes and opinions in Malaysia; as a consequence, any treat-
ment of this topic, however carefully documented, is in the
main impressionistic.

political power, held by inherent right, is thus viewed as a
defense against further Chinese incroachment and as a positive
instrument for advancing the economic position of the Malay
community. Chinese claims for political equality must, there-
fore, be resisted or, at the most, concessions of political
power to Chinese should be made only after appropriate Chinese
cessions of economic power to Malays.

The Chinese community, on the other hand, "firmly believes
that their wealth and Malay poverty are the natural cense-
quences of Chinese industry, thrift, and adaptability to mod-
ern ways and of Malay indolence, thriftlessness, and conserva-
tism."[33] They fear that Malay political domination will be
used to interfere with their economic and property rights.
Moreover, they fear that Malay power aims at destroying their
right to maintain their Chinese culture. In order to protect
these rights, the Chinese have reluctantly entered the politi-
cal arena, demanding an increasing share of political power,
if not as a matter of right, then by virtue of their economic
contribution to the nation's viability. While agreeing in the
main that the Malay economic position should be improved, the
Chinese have resisted permanent economic concessions to Malays
at the expense of Chinese; they insist that political rights
should not be purchased at the price of de-Sinification.

The smaller Indian community by virtue of its size has
been able to avoid the Malay-Chinese cross-fire to a large

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[33]Silcock and Fisk, op. cit., p. 5.

extent. However, many Indians resent and dislike both the Chinese and the Malays, and the feeling is largely reciprocated. The crucial distinction is that while "Indians are disliked, ...unlike the Chinese, they are not feared."[34] Sharing essentially the Chinese view of Malays, Indians have entered the political arena reluctantly to protect their culture and limited economic status from Malay domination, but their size dictates a subdued political role.

Save for an inarticulate few on the peninsula, the indigenous peoples of Malaysia are confined to the states of Sabah and Sarawak; they too fear Malay cultural and political domination, which they see as a historical heritage of the dominant position of the Malays under the Sultanate of Brunei and the Sarawak Brooke dynasty, and as a potential threat within the Malaysia framework, which must be resisted insofar as their limited numbers make possible.

While oversimplified, these are the main themes in the racial packets of interests in Malaysia.[35] Not all segments of Malaysia's ethnic communities have participated equally in the articulation of ethnic interests. As we shall soon see, the four racially distinct upper-class sub-cultures of Malaysia's four main racial groups have almost exclusively co-opted

[34]Bela C. Maday, et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 441.

[35]For a fuller treatment of this topic, see Bela C. Maday, et al., op. cit., pp. 435-445; for a systematic look at these themes within a Singapore-focused study, see Robert Gamer, op. cit.

the function of articulating political demands for the entire
body of their communal compartments. That is, none of the
lower echelon poles of each racial group have had the means or
the opportunity to participate significantly and legitimately
in the process of articulating their demands.[36]

Turning to the question of how and by whom these inter-
ests are advocated, one is immediately struck with the lack of
development of specific associational interest groups in Malay-
sia. This is paradoxical and often overlooked for Malaysia has
a rather large number of organizations for a transitional soci-
ety. There are, in fact, over 6,000 registered societies in
Malaysia that claim rather specific goals as their organiza-
tional raison d'etre.[37] While only 18 of these groups state
their purposes as political (in the main, political parties)
and most are religious, cultural, social, sports, benevolent,
guild, and clan organizations, such organizations, for example,
a Chinese Chamber of Commerce, would at first sight appear to
have strong potential as articulators of rather specific polit-
ical interests. In all but a very few cases, however, the
rather numerous registered societies of Malaysia do not func-
tion as structures advocating specialized aims in the political

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[36] The significance of class within racial compartments
has been previously noted in Chapter IV. See also Michael
Swift, "Malayan Politics: Race and Class," Civilizations, XII,
No. 2 (1962), 237-249.

[37] Federal law requires the registration and statement of
purpose of nearly every type of organization in the country.
These recent figures are taken from Malaysia Year Book: 1963-
64, op. cit., p. 297. Trade unions are registered separately
and are not included in the totals.

arena. Even the more politically active among these groups, despite the appearance of being functionally specific structures, are in fact "efficacious mainly because they operate within a communal framework and represent communally sensitive issues."[38] Thus, in essence these groups are not functionally viable associational interest structures but are in fact the communal agents for class and ethnic compartments of Malaysian society. As Pye notes, they "are not active pressure groups in the Western sense but rather communal associations which provide security and oversee the general well-being of their memberships."[39] They are only intermittently politically activated; even on these occasions, they function less as politicalized organizations than as forums for individual or clique advocation of broad communal demands. These points are clarified and illustrated by specific examples below.

Non-associational interest articulation within the Chinese community was recently illustrated in Kuala Lumpur on the occasion of a convocation of all major Chinese organizations on June 21, 1965.[40] The meeting was convened by prominent MCA politicians in order to marshall and declare Chinese support for Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and to explore methods of strengthening racial harmony. In attendance at the mass meeting were over 400 representatives from nearly 200

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[38] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, op. cit., p. vii.

[39] Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 147.

[40] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Monday, June 21, 1965).

Chinese commercial, agriculture, mining, industrial, and clan associations. Organizer Tun Henry Lee declared his pleasure with the turn-out in opening the meeting: "It can be said that you represent the Chinese community."[41] The following resolution was put before the assembled delegates for their approval:

"To urge all Chinese to strengthen further the existing harmony among all the races in Malaysia and to support unreservedly the Tengku in his efforts to resist Indonesian aggression."

No sooner was the motion put and seconded when several delegates were on their feet attempting to put amendment motions demanding that Chinese (Mandarin) be made an official Malaysian language, calling for assurances that Chinese education and citizenship rights would be reviewed by the Alliance Government, and raising other issues reflecting Chinese concern about Malay cultural dominance. Organizers of the meeting quickly but in vain tried to close the partially opened Pandora's box. "This meeting is called to discuss the problems of how to strengthen racial harmony and not to indulge in a debate on politics," declared the Chairman of the meeting.[42] But such appeals were of little avail; strident speeches followed, and the meeting threatened to break up when a large group of delegates walked out in protest to the entire proceedings. Those who remained, however, passed the resolution, and the Chairman closed the final session by appealing "to the

[41] Loc. cit.

[42] Loc. cit.

leaders of other races to call similar meetings so that the
entire population can unite to fight Indonesian confronta-
tion."[43]

This meeting illustrates several crucial points. This
was a communal meeting and, despite the Chairman's comments,
was representative of only the upper class Chinese business
elite; no one challenged the assumption that they represented
the entire Chinese community. In addition, despite the appar-
ently simple goal of passage of a unity resolution in support
of the Government, almost the entire spectrum of elite Chinese
communal interests intruded; the occasion opened a flood gate
of undifferentiated communal-class interests, and advocates
insisted that all of them should be dealt with as a package.
It is important to note that the advocates spoke not primarily
as representatives of the organizations they headed, but as
Chinese with demands for recognition of Chinese claims; their
claims spewed forth in frustration and anger from individual
Chinese in a sporadic, unstructured style.

Other communal groups also have compartmentalized and
poorly developed instrumentalities for articulating their
demands. As in the Chinese community, their associations tend
to be front organizations for diffuse primordial communal
interests. They too are voiced by individuals and cliques of
uncertain credentials who stridently and intermittently thrust
themselves into attention and claim to speak for their entire

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[43]Loc. cit.

community. The atmosphere of articulation is tense, often intolerant, and defensive. For example, at one recent meeting of Malays, the speaker centered attention on the Malay language, warning, "Malays too must study the national language, because there are now so many new words and terms being used. If they do not, they may be left behind by others."[44]

Malay concern and frustration over a static economic position in the face of Chinese gains in the political realm, is reflected in the numerous "study groups" that inquire into the reasons why Malays have not had greater business success. The frequency of the topic's isolation is a measure of the depth of Malay concern. No one says, "be more like the Chinese," yet the content of advice comes close. The Mentri Besar of Selangor recently told a meeting of Malay small-businessmen how to succeed in business: "be tolerant, tactful, and thrifty."[45]

Opposing interests are frequently not accepted as legitimate ones by other racial communities. Syed Nasir bin Ismail recently declared: "It is rather unfortunate that a few people are pressing the government to recognize another language as an official language. I look on these people as an ungrateful few who seek to confuse the minds of others."[46]

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[44]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Monday, June 7, 1965.

[45]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Thursday, June 17, 1965.

[46]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Friday, November 13, 1964.

The central theme seems always to be race. "The Alliance is threatened by people who are greedy for power. These people have raised issues which hurt the feelings of the Malays. The PAP leaders have stated that the Malays are not more native to this country than the other immigrant races," declared Datin Fatimah binte Haji Hashim to a Malay audience in 1965.[47]

The crisis in Singapore-Kuala Lumpur relations immediately prior to Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia allowed observers a glimpse of the clash of communal interests in their most blatant form. As Singapore's PAP-led Malaysian Malaysia program seemed to be gaining increasing support among non-Malays throughout Malaysia in the spring of 1965; a clique of ultra-conservative Malays arose as the self-appointed spokesmen for the Malay community. The conservative Malay clique was informally led by UMNO Secretary General Jaafar Albar, who began to soap-box the rural Malay countryside with virulent anti-Lee speeches; speaking to a Malay audience on May 25, 1965, he declared in Malay:

> "We have to face the present challenge...Wherever I am, I am a Malay...[crowd: "Ganyang Lee!"-Crush Lee!] Catch Lee and make pickles out of his intestines... Shout louder so the people can hear; let Dr. Ismail [Internal Security Minister] hear the anger of the masses." [crowd: Crush Lee! Crush Lee!][48]

By June of 1965, Lee Kuan Yew was being shouted down in

[47]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, May 15, 1965.

[48]Reported and translated in Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

parliament with cries of "traitor" and was described as the
"greatest disruptive force in the entire history of Malaysia
and Malaya."[49] The clash of interest grew progressively more
personal, bitter, and vindictive as Lee replied in kind,
charging that the federal Government was falling into the
hands of "ultras" and extremist UMNO "mad mullahs." The top
UMNO-Alliance leadership found itself increasingly pressured
to take action against Lee; finally, perceiving a threat to
his leadership both within and without the Alliance, and the
immediate imminence of violent racial conflict, the Tunku con-
cluded that it was his imperative duty to cut Singapore adrift
before Malaysia collapsed into civil chaos.[50] This incident
may represent the nadir of Malaysian communal interest confron-
tation and, in that sense, may be exceptional; however, it
again illustrates the primacy of communal interests in the
Malaysian polity and the lack of development of the country's
interest articulation system. It also illustrates the promin-
ent role that non-associational structures play in making
claims upon the polity for political action.

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[49] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Wednesday, June 2, 1965.

[50] It is interesting but academic to speculate whether the
Tunku accurately assessed the situation and whether his alter-
natives were actually as narrowly confined as he perceived
them to be. Of great importance in this context is the evi-
dence that the Tunku's inability to guage more accurately the
intensity of his nation's opinion is a direct consequence of
the country's poorly developed interest articulation system.

Associational Interest Groups

Voluntary organizations that are specifically committed to and organized for the performance of the function of articulating a particular political interest are very few in number in Malaysia. While an overstatement, there is much truth in one scholar's statement that "there are no true pressure groups in Malaysia in the conventional meaning of the word."[51] Associational interest group development is retarded in Malaysia in the main because "the communal problem of the Malays and Chinese has been of such an overriding factor as to inhibit the articulation of potentially more specific interest groups."[52] The pervasive ramifications of Malaysia's integrative crisis, for example, the ethnic specialization of economic roles, has made it potentially disruptive to organize to articulate specific demands. It has been far easier and safer to articulate only diffuse undifferentiated interests or, as Pye notes, "rather than to articulate the current interests of the various segments of the society, the general approach has been to stress the idea that all groups will be taken care of in the new world of the future."[53] Mutual ethnic group fears have even muted appeals for national unity. Unlike other Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia had great difficulty

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[51] Bela C. Maday, et al., op. cit., p. 388.

[52] Lucian Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 123.

[53] Ibid., p. 120.

developing a nationalist ideology, and, as her less than strident independence movement reveals, she never really developed one. Malaysia was denied the emotional appeal of one language, one people, one nation, that comprised such a large portion of the most vigorous nationalisms elsewhere in the region.

Singapore's astute Prime Minister understood this factor well and tried unsuccessfully to change it but was ejected from Malaysia for his efforts. Consider his following comment:

"The Chinese bus driver has more in common with the Malay bus driver than with the Chinese bus owner. This is the philosophy which I have sought to preach. My problem is that there are other political forces in the country that either don't accept this particular form of political division of loyalties, or who otherwise find it easier to make an appeal on the basis of primeval emotion--one people, one language, one culture."[54]

Nevertheless a few inchoate associational interest groups do exist in Malaysia's undeveloped interest articulation system that are worthy of attention. Of these, perhaps the most important and best illustration are the trade unions.[55]

While only about 15 per cent of peninsula Malaysia and only a fraction of east Malaysia's labor force is unionized,

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[54] Speech cited in The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur), November 15, 1964.

[55] For an early post-war history of the trade union movement in Malaysia, see Alex Josey, Trade Unionism in Malaya (2nd ed. rev.; Singapore: Donald Moore, 1958); see also J. Norman Farmer, "Trade Unions and Politics in Malaya," Far Eastern Survey, XXIV, No. 3 (March 1965), 33-39. For an excellent account of perhaps the most important union in Malaysia, see Charles Gamba, The National Union of Plantation Workers: The History of Plantation Workers of Malaya, 1946-1958 (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1962).

the trade union movement is relatively well established in comparison with other Southeast Asian nations. This is especially true among Indian plantation industry workers, the government departments, and the white-collar workers of European firms. The central workers' organization is the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC), a voluntary federation of some 79 affiliated unions, which is itself affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions centered in Brussels. The largest and most powerful unions are affiliated with the MTUC, accounting for about two-thirds of the total union membership; the majority of the unions, however, are not. In 1964 there were 281 employee unions in Malaysia, with a total membership of approximately 300,000 workers.[56]

Employers have their own organizational structures which are also registered as trade unions. Of the total of 15, the principal ones relate to the mining industry, the plantation industries, and road transport operators. The employers' counterpart to the workers' MTUC is the Malaysian Council of Employers' Organizations (MCEO).

Evolving from an inauspicious formative period of communist control, as a whole, Malaysia's current labor movement is non-political. The MTUC, the MCEO, and nearly all unaffiliated unions have strongly disavowed association with any political party and have vigorously avoided partisan political involvement. This fact marks Malaysia's trade union movement as

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[56] Bela C. Maday, op. cit., p. 542.

"almost unique among contemporary trade unions in Asia and Africa."[57] While this generalization is still true, since Malaya was broadened into Malaysia in 1963, the picture has been somewhat sullied, for much of the rather small labor movement in Sarawak and Sabah is under Chinese communist control; the almost exclusively Chinese wharf, communications, and transport workers have been a particular target. Malay and indigenous unions have shown little support for communism, and Malaysian authorities today have Chinese unions under tight police surveillance.[58]

Aside from this numerically minor and regionally confined illegal political influence, the union movement in Malaysia remains non-partisan and has "come to assert a substantial independent influence on government."[59] Especially in the mining and rubber industries, "because of the overwhelming importance of these industries to the well-being of the country, the Malayan government has had to be responsive to their wishes."[60] Labor and government relationships have at best been cool and sometimes have been sharply hostile. At the

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[57] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., pp. 319-320.

[58] Authorities in 1962 arrested several officials of Sarawak's almost exclusively Chinese building and transport unions in Sibu and Kucking. Borneo trade unionism seems to be in a phase comparable to the early communist-influenced union days of post-war peninsula Malaysia. See Bela C. Maday, et al., op. cit., pp. 551-553.

[59] Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 346.

[60] Ibid., p. 347.

height of Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, a revealing Malaysian government-labor confrontation took place that well illustrates this point.

From before the birth of Malaysia until 1965, trade union pressure for wage increases slowly built into a multi-union strike threat situation. The Government took the stand that wage increases were not possible in view of confrontation, and, as the tempo quickened, some officials began to attack the unions with hints of disloyalty and thinly veiled threats. For example, Alliance Minister Khaw Kai Boh publicly urged "not to abuse their power to hold the government, public utilities, commerce, and industry to ransom."[61] Alliance Minister of Education, Mohamed Khir Johari, accused the National Union of Teachers of malice and political interference: "These elements accuse the Government of wasting money on medals, air-conditioners for the Federal House and on African tours... [which]...could have been used for the benefit of teachers."[62] UMNO Dewan Ra'ayat member, Dr. Mahathir, declared:

"Leaders of trade unions should realize that the Alliance Government need not fear threats because the Government stands on the support of the masses in the rural areas who are not wage-earners and who constitute the backbone of the support of the Government."[63]

The unions counter-attacked with charges of unwarranted

[61] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Monday, June 28, 1965.

[62] The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 13, 1965.

[63] Reported in Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, op. cit., p. 21.

political pressure on the free trade union movement. One
union leader protested:

> "Trade unionists...were accused of being disloyal be-
> cause they had sought a reasonable living wage. The
> unions are aware of Indonesian confrontation, but is
> it so dangerous as to warrant the Government's sub-
> jugation of the workers by depriving them of their
> legitimate rights and privileges?"[64]

The crisis peaked when the unions began "go-slow" cam-
paigns in the post office and other key government agencies,
and the Government responded with a decree under the Emergency
(Essential Powers) Act of 1964, banning all strikes and other
forms of industrial action in public or other essential ser-
vices.

The MTUC vigorously protested the strike-ban, using the
occasion to reaffirm the labor movement's lack of commitment
to any particular political party. MTUC Secretary, S. H. H.
Zaidi, in a letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman said:

> "We should very much like to keep our movement free
> and independent from all influences--particularly
> from that of party politics...[we need]...an urgent
> re-appraisal of the whole situation so that the co-
> operation which had existed for 16 years between the
> Government and the MTUC can be re-established on
> feelings of mutual trust and confidence."[65]

This particular conflict was resolved behind the scenes
by compromise, the terms of which were a Government "freeze,"
but no recision, of the strike-ban and the beginning of wage
negotiations with the unions, which are still in progress.

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[64] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 28, 1965.

[65] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Thursday, May 27,
1965.

The dispute illustrates an associational interest group in action; union demands were articulated from an organized, professionally staffed base by relatively orderly, if heated, procedures. It is, nonetheless, evident that the dispute also showed signs of more traditional non-associational communal interest articulation as well. For example, at the height of the dispute, the President of the Amalgamated Union of Employees in the Government Clerical and Allied Services, Inche Mas Junid, declared in communal indignation: "those who put the pressure [on his union]...did not realize that they were also attacking their own 'kith and kin.'"[66] His union is predominately Malay in composition. While there are few ethnically exclusive unions, race is still a significant factor in the labor union movement. The racial breakdown of union members is: 50 per cent Indian, 28 per cent Chinese, and only 20 per cent Malay.[67] This racial fact has been the crucial impediment to the development of a united trade union movement. As it exists today, one must agree with Gullick that the trade union movement "is not a major political force."[68]

Other organizations that appear at first sight to be associational interest groups of relative autonomy, prove upon closer examination to be little more than fronts for the major race and class structures of the country, as will become

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[66]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Monday, June 28, 1965.

[67]Bela C. Maday, et al., op. cit., p. 254.

[68]Gullick, op. cit., p. 197.

clearer in the next chapter.[69]

Anomic Interest Articulation

Mass public demonstrations and riots are frequently symptomatic of the failure of political interests to find their way into efficacious channels of influence in the polity. As Pye notes:

"The latent characteristics of most special interests, and the prevalence of non-associational and essentially communal groupings with diffuse interests, contribute to the periodic appearance of anomic movements . . ."[70]

Malaysia's poorly developed interest articulation system gives the nation a high potential for anomic activity. While commentators sometimes marvel that in Malaysia's fragmented society so few of these sporadic outbreaks of relatively spontaneous anomic incidents have occurred, the fact cannot be obscured that Malaysia does have a relatively continuous heritage of political violence.

We have noted that the Second World War's end occasioned violent racial score-settling among Chinese guerrillas and Malays before the British Military Administration was able to restore public order. The year 1948 found the Malayan Communist Party blocked in its attempt to infiltrate the inchoate

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[69]To an important extent, political party structures themselves function in a role that resembles that of associational interest groups, as will become clear as the multiple functions performed by party structures are considered in detail in the next chapter.

[70]Lucian Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 116.

labor movement where they had attempted to foment strikes and
riots to ripen conditions for a Communist take-over; the party
consequently took to the jungle to articulate more violently
their political demands. As we have seen, this all-or-nothing
tactic to force acceptance of Communist aims was supported
almost entirely by alienated Chinese workers who were excluded
from the domestic framework of political legitimacy when their
party was made illegal in 1948. The 12-year Emergency that
followed can be viewed as the extreme end of the continuum of
possibilities of pressure group action; organized and sustained
political subversion as a means of gaining political ends.

Also violent, but less sustained, was the anomic spill-
over of tensions in Malay society known as the Maria Hertogh
riots of 1950. The issue here was religious--the challenging
of the validity of an Islamic marriage of a 13-year-old Dutch
girl to a Malay by the girl's parents, who had entrusted the
child to Malay foster parents before the Japanese occupation
and had relocated her in Malaya after the war. The marriage
was repudiated by court action instigated by the parents in
the Singapore High Court, and the child was removed to Holland.
In protest to what was described as a public insult to their
religion, Malay mobs violently demonstrated, attacking Europe-
ans and Chinese and killing 16.[71]

Also, in 1950, large numbers of Chinese students in Singa-
pore clashed with Malay police. Although the students were

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[71]Gullick, op. cit., p. 125.

without doubt Communist-influenced, their protest was in the main "against a system which made Chinese-educated young men misfits in the English-speaking world of government service and commerce."[72]

The most recent Malaysian communal violence occurred in Penang and Singapore in July and September of 1964. The Penang incident killed two persons.[73] The Singapore violence was more prolonged and more directly of political motivation. The racial setting was heated by inflammatory political speeches of Syed Ja'afar Albar, who was attempting to organize UMNO Malays in Singapore in the weeks just prior to the violence, urging them to unite against the pro-Chinese forces of Lee Kuan Yew.[74] In this charged atmosphere, on July 21, a Malay religious procession was held in honor of the anniversary of the prophet Mohammed's birth. Members of the Malay procession provoked Chinese onlookers into a riot that took days to quell. When it was over, 21 persons were dead, 450 injured, and over 500 were in jail for inciting to riot, including large numbers of Chinese secret society members.[75] The causal complexity of the riot is indicated by the following report:

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[72]Michael Leifer, "Communal Violence in Singapore," Asian Survey, IV, No. 10 (October, 1964), 17.

[73]"Communal Tragedy," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLV (July 30, 1964).

[74]See Leifer, op. cit.

[75]Arnold C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 235.

"While secret society thugs compounded the violence, while Indonesian agents undoubtedly helped to get trouble going, while newspapers and politicians did their part in giving genuine grievances a communal twist in arousing latent fears and frustrations, while all these factors were present, undoubtedly political rivalry was a prime mover in getting these tensions to spill over into violence in the first place."[76]

Of course, not all mob demonstrations are spontaneous outbreaks, as is well illustrated by the semi-authorized retaliatory attack on the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur by Malay youths at the beginning of Confrontation in September 1963.[77] Yet nearly all such action signifies the articulation of a political demand, in this case for a "get tough" policy with Indonesia. The previously mentioned 1964 daubing of English street signs with red paint to leave only the Malay portion of the signs showing is another anomic action that was less than spontaneous, but which had a clear political message.

An example of determination to articulate a political message in the face of blocked legitimate channels is well illustrated by the skirmishes between the Socialist Front party and the public authorities in Kuala Lumpur in early 1965. Having been denied a permit to hold an indoor rally and having also been denied a Government permit to hold a political procession, Socialist Front leaders decided to defy the authorities and to go ahead with their parade, despite warnings that it would be suppressed. In the police and Socialist Front member skirmishes that followed on the appointed day, hundreds of Chinese

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[76] Far Eastern Economic Review: 1965 Yearbook, op. cit., p. 209.

[77] Time Magazine, September 27, 1963.

youths stormed through the streets, waving banners protesting compulsory national military service, political arrests under the Internal Security Act, and other Alliance policies. The incident was quickly squelched with mass arrests and the imposition of a city-wide curfew.[78]

It is no coincidence that a common element in nearly all Malaysian anomic activity is the presence of alienated, usually young Chinese; more than any other single group in Malaysia, they are denied the means to articulate their political goals.

It is interesting that Malaysian students are generally not politically active forces in the body politic of Malaysia; in other developing nations, more than any other group, they provide the fodder for anomic activites. Aside from a small number of Chinese leftist students in now expelled Singapore,[79] the Malaysian student body is not politically activated; the reason is probably the fact that Chinese students outnumber Malays by far in a Malay dominated political culture. While political forums are well attended, there is almost no political activism. There is certainly no lack of issues. For example, a 1963 amendment to the Internal Security Act now requires every potential tertiary-level student to obtain a security clearance prior to university admission. Such an action would

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[78]Incident witnessed by the writer in Kuala Lumpur in early 1965.

[79]See S. Spector, "Students and Politics in Singapore," Far Eastern Survey, XXV (May 1956), 65-73.

probably have had students in the streets of any other Southeast Asian nation; in Malaysia it was implemented without organized student protest. The most active student issue during 1964 seemed to be a one-hour sit-down demonstration in front of the University library by some thousand students in protest against the suspension of five students accused of hazing freshmen.[80]

In sum, there are both a high incidence and a continuing high potential for anomic interest articulation in Malaysia. There is also a correlation between those who participate in such activities and those who have least access to the legitimate existing channels of interest articulation in the Malaysian polity. While all major ethnic groups have participated in anomic activity, the lower class and young Chinese seem to be involved much more frequently than other groups. It is a rough index of the alienation of non-Malays in modern Malaysia. This suggestion tends to be confirmed by other measures; for example, the crime rate for Indians and Chinese is higher than that of the Malays.[81]

Conclusions

This survey of major types of interest structure activity in Malaysia suggests the following conclusions.

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[80] This story received headline treatment in the *Mahasiswa Negara: Organ of the University of Malaya Students' Union*, III, No. 3 (July-August 1964).

[81] Bela C. Maday, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 648.

The interest articulation system of Malaysia is poorly developed. There are very few functionally specific interest groups and, except perhaps for the labor unions, associational interest structures have little to no influence on the political process. Interest articulation tends to be dominated by the primacy of what Geertz calls "primordial issues"[82] or basic racial concerns. This suggests that the boundaries between Malaysian society and the polity are poorly drawn. The kinds of issues are those that in developed countries are non-political. As Ratnam puts it, "the political domain is much wider and issues which in other countries may have little or no political significance do in fact have such significance to a point...of constituting the central area of political controversy."[83]

These primordial communal issues are diffusely and intermittently articulated in the main by non-associational communal cliques and often self-appointed individual advocates who claim to speak for their entire ethnic or class group's concerns.

Malaysia's interest articulation system is also marked by a high degree of latency. Many interests in the society are not heard from at all. For example, although the country is overwhelmingly agricultural, aside from the modern plantation

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[82]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa.(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157.

[83]K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, op. cit., p. viii.

interests, the "interests of agriculture are hardly to be heard."[84] The urban industrial worker's interests are likewise quiescent, aside from the minor portion of the labor force that is unionized.

Unlike most of Southeast Asia, in Malaysia institutional interest articulation structures such as the military, the bureaucracy, and organized religion do not dominate the political process; on the contrary, while their participation in the articulation process is undeniable and, in some cases, such as that of the Islamic faith, are in fact part of the dominant political culture, on the whole "all have little or no political power or influence,"[85] as continuous active interest advocates.

The articulation process is also jaggedly uneven with marked communal and class disparities. For example, the strategic location of the Malay community within Malaysian society and the political culture is unmatched by any of the non-Malay communities, and, as a consequence, the volume and visibility of Malay interests are transcendent. The importance of class is indicated by the fact that within each community interest advocates are disproportionately of the elite sub-cultures of their respective ethnic communities and advance the elite sub-cultures' perceptions of the interests of the community as a whole.

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[84]Pye notes that this is characteristic of the entire Southeast Asian region. "The Politics of Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 119.

[85]J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 319.

CHAPTER VIII
INTEREST AGGREGATION

Every political system has some way of combining and accommodating the claims and demands made upon it and of converting them into general policy alternatives.[1] The purpose of this chapter is to locate, describe, and analyze the key structures and the general process by which this combinatory function of political aggregation is performed within the Malaysian polity.

The discussion of this problem is divided into three parts. The first section presents a descriptive scrutiny of Malaysia's political party system. While, as section two makes clear, a multiplicity of agents share in the performance of interest accommodation, the primacy of the role of the party system makes an understanding of it prerequisite to comprehension of the aggregation function.

The chapter's second section is devoted to a descriptive analysis of the process of political aggregation, that is, the manner in which key combinatory agents perform. Arguments presented here are buttressed with a number of substantive examples of the process of accommodation in selected Malaysian interest-conflict crises. The chapter's third and final section presents the conclusions of the analysis and characterizes

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[1] Almond and Coleman, _op. cit._, pp. 38-45.

the features and style of the Malaysian political aggregation process.

Aggregation Structures: The Parties

The political party system of Malaysia is young, complex, unstudied, and extremely fluid. Parties are also quite numerous; more than a score contested the last elections. The system is a patch-work quilt of communal organizations which are extremely heterogeneous in size, political efficacy, organization, and ideological coloration. For analytical convenience they are here divided into two groups. The first consists of the 13-party affiliates of the Alliance, an organization which is registered as a single political party, but which is in fact a coalition of communal sub-parties; affiliates are the clearly dominant United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), and the ten minor Borneo party members. Malaysia's remaining parties are here considered in the single category of opposition parties, although they are in fact extremely diverse and have little in common except a general lack of electoral success in the face of overwhelming Alliance strength.

The Alliance. Aside from the illegal and now underground Malayan Communist Party,[2] party activity in Malaysia is a post-war development. The first on the peninsula scene was UMNO,

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[2] Founded between 1927 and 1930 as a consequence of the Kuomintang-Communist split in China.

founded in early 1946 by Malay aristocrat Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, who remained the organization's president until 1951. The MIC appeared in August 1946, drawing its organizational inspiration from India's independence movement. The mid-wife of the MCA was the Malayan Emergency; in order to represent the non-Communist and heretofore mainly apolitical Chinese community, in 1949 the MCA was formed under the leadership of wealthy Straits Chinese Sir Cheng-Lock Tan (Tan Cheng-Lock), who continued as MCA president until 1958.

These three ethnic organizations were overtly communal in their memberships, aims, interests, and appeals. Separately, they "dedicated themselves to influencing [British] official policy without actually thinking in terms of participation in government."[3] With the British decision to allow Malaya's first local elections in 1952, however, they interacted to form a decisive pattern of tri-party cooperation, and, almost fortuitously, the Alliance Party was born.

The birthdate of the Alliance was early 1952; the specific occasion was the important Kuala Lumpur municipal elections. The background to the contest was as follows. UMNO president Dato Onn, believing that a non-communal party was prerequisite to Malayan independence, attempted in 1951 to establish a representative non-communal party known as the Independence of Malay Party (IMP), which he hoped would attract members both from UMNO and from the MCA, both of whom were

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[3]K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, op. cit., p. 142.

narrowly communal in membership and program. Onn failed to attract either support or members from UMNO, and he angrily resigned his UMNO presidency to devote his efforts to IMP activity.

The first test of strength between IMP, UMNO (led by Onn's successor, Tunku Abdul Rahman), and the MCA came with the Kuala Lumpur elections. UMNO and MCA local leaders, in fear that a decisive IMP victory would lead to mass membership-defections from their respective groups, formed an ad hoc pre-election Alliance. The coalition won nine of the 11 contested seats. As a winning communal party entente, the Alliance formula caught the attention of the UMNO and MCA leadership and was extended to all subsequent local elections. To the surprise of its detractors, the Alliance not only held together under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, but it emerged from Malaysia's first series of state elections in 1954 as Malaya's most effective political organization; the IMP was thereafter stifled. The MIC was added to the coalition just before the peninsula's first general elections in July 1955, and the party tripod won a land-slide victory. It has been the major political force in the polity ever since, showing increasingly overwhelming strength in the peninsula elections of 1959 and 1964.[4]

Although it contests elections as a single body, the

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[4] There have been no pan-Malaysian elections since the enlarged Federation's formation in 1963, and none are envisaged before 1969.

since 1955, and UMNO Deputy President Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister since 1955, who are annually elected by the UMNO General Assembly. The General Assembly meets biannually; it is composed of representatives of each of UMNO state units and local leaders from each of the peninsula's 104 electoral district UMNO organizations. The Assembly participates in the selection of the powerful Executive Committee, electing 20 of its 30 members. The remaining ten are UMNO presidential appointees. The Executive Committee is the power center of UMNO; it makes the key policy, patronage, and disciplinary decisions of the party and makes the final choice of UMNO candidates to stand for election. The party also has a special UMNO Youth Section, a Women's Section (Kaum Ibu), and a Religious Leaders' Section (Ulama). Organization is tight and centrally controlled. The party is financed by dues and contributions; it makes a dubious membership claim of over 350,000 members. It publishes a party journal from UMNO Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and has a large professional Headquarters staff and information officers in every state.

The MCA's position in the Alliance is clearly that of a junior partner. Its organization is dictated by the urban concentration of the peninsula's Chinese population; it is not nearly as tight or as extensive as is UMNO's organization, although there are local branches in every peninsula state. The party, however, is the best financed one in Malaysia; funds are obtained from membership dues, contributions from the wealthy Chinese community, and income from party investments. There are no reliable membership figures but

indications are that the active "membership of the MCA could outnumber that of the UMNO."[6] The MCA, however, cannot command the same degree of support from the Chinese community as can UMNO from the Malays, a fact indicated by the almost totally Chinese opposition party memberships. As will be seen, Alliance membership has meant concessions to UMNO demands, and, as a consequence, the MCA has been wracked with leadership and membership defections.

The MCA has been led since 1961 by President Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian Minister of Finance, the son of the party's founder, Sir Tan Cheng-Lock. The party was led by the interim presidency of Penang physician, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, during the period 1958-1961. In the aftermath of the 1959 general elections, the MCA was torn in two with Dr. Lim's resignation in protest to MCA concessions to UMNO which he could not prevent. Tan Siew Sin has attempted to re-organize and re-vitalize the party since 1961 in order to keep down defections and disruptive internal disputes with only limited success, as we shall shortly see. The power center of the MCA is its central Working Committee, the parallel to UMNO's executive committee.

The minor partner of the Alliance is the MIC. It has been led since 1954 by MIC President (Alliance Minister of Works) Dato V. T. Sambanthan, the man who brought the party into the Alliance in 1955. Its support among Malaysian Indians is even less than that of the MCA within the Chinese

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[6] K. J. Ratnam, _Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya_, op. cit., p. 165.

Borneo states; before 1959 there were none at all. This
retarded development was due to a combination of official
British discouragement, popular apathy, and the fear of the
non-Chinese population that the economically and educationally
more advanced Chinese community would dominate any emergent
party system. When a prominent group of Kuching Chinese sug-
gested the organization of a party in 1956 "to promote national
unity," Dayak leaders strongly opposed the move, Malay leaders
proved indifferent, and general public apathy killed the
effort.[9]

With the exception of one anti-Alliance, anti-Malaysia
Sarawak party formed in 1959, all other parties in Sarawak and
Sabah were created by the catalyst of the 1961 Malaysia pro-
posal. Robert Tilman notes, "...political parties in Malay-
sian Borneo owe their births to the emergence of the federa-
tion scheme, and in almost all cases these parties came to
stand for the acceptance of the Malaysia idea."[10] The two
exceptions to this generalization are both in Sarawak:
Borneo's first-born Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP) and
the Machinda Party created after 1963.[11] Every other major
party in Sarawak and all parties in Sabah have been brought

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[9]Liang Lim Bang and Edwin Lee, Sarawak, 1941-1957 and
Sarawak in the Early Sixties (Singapore: University of Singa-
pore, 1964), pp. 36-37.

[10]Robert O. Tilman, "The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian
Politics: Borneo Variations on a Theme," South Atlantic Quar-
terly, LXIII (January 1964), 63.

[11]To be discussed under opposition parties below.

under the Alliance umbrella. Most are de facto communal par-
ties, although almost all insist that they are multi-racial;
in fact communalism in Borneo is probably more intense than
it is in peninsula Malaysia because ethnic groups are more
heavily concentrated in specific locations rather than scat-
tered about as major groups are in the peninsula. The Borneo
party scene is ephemeral, and in apparently constant crisis
with new groups forming and old ones folding-up very fre-
quently; in mid-1966 the situation was still unstable.

Aside from Machinda and the SUPP, the five remaining par-
ties in Sarawak have joined together in a fragile entente in
direct emulation of, and with constant prodding by the penin-
sula Alliance. Nominally the Sarawak Alliance remained organi-
zationally distinct from the mainland UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance
until 1965, but informal association has always been intimate.[12]

The Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) was originally formed as
a multi-racial opposition to the almost exclusively Chinese
anti-Malaysia SUPP, but shortly after formation it splintered
apart with the wholesale defection of non-Malays to such an
extent that it is today predominantly Malay in membership. It
has served as a seed-bed for most of Sarawak's other parties,
for PANAS defectors have formed numerous parties of their own.
PANAS was an original member of the Sarawak Alliance but broke
away just before the state's first district council elections

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[12]Both Sarawak and Sabah's Alliance organizations remained
separate and distinct from each other and from the mainland
model until 1965, although in the federal parliament they were
seated with and considered part of the Alliance Government.

in the spring of 1963, capturing 28,242 of the 185,616 votes cast. After a two-year separation, PANAS rejoined the Alliance in late 1965 and is today almost purely Malay in orientation and membership.

The Barian Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (BARJASA) party was formed by prominent Malays who defected from PANAS; it too is a Malay communal party in membership and orientation. Like its parent PANAS, BARJASA has suffered serious internal conflicts; in 1963 one of its key leaders, Datu Bandar, returned to PANAS ranks and took many Malay members with him. Today the party is led by attorney Abdul Rahman Yacub, who has been appointed Malaysian Assistant Minister of National and Rural Development in Kuala Lumpur and holds high office in the Sarawak Alliance organization.

The Sarawak National Party (SNAP) is a regional Sarawak party composed mostly of native Ibans, with its support concentrated in Sarawak's Second Division. Its key leader, Iban (Land Dayak) Stephen Kalong Ningkan, is Sarawak's Chief Minister. It too is internally unstable, devoting much of its attention to conflict with the other Iban party, the Sarawak Conservative Party (PAPAS).

The Sarawak Conservative Party (PAPAS) was formed by Sea Dyak (Iban) defectors from PANAS. Their paramount leader is Sea Dyak chieftain Temenggong Jugah anak Barieng, perhaps the best known individual in the state and leader of the largest ethnic group in Sarawak. Temenggong Jugah is Malaysia's Minister for Sarawak Affairs and Chairman of the Sarawak Alliance

entente. PAPAS is probably the strongest pro-Malaysia party
in the state's Alliance.

The complex Sarawak Alliance party picture is complete
with mention of the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA), also
founded by PANAS defectors, and led by Ling Berig Siew, who
has attempted to undercut the strength of the main Chinese
party, the opposition SUPP, but with very little success,
despite the overt help and assistance from the peninsula's MCA.
It is composed primarily of wealthy, conservative Chinese busi-
nessmen.

The Sarawak Alliance originated with the joining of the
two Iban parties, SNAP and PAPAS; the Chinese SCA followed
suit in 1963, as did the two Malay parties, PANAS and BARJASA,
prior to the 1963 elections; as noted, PANAS dropped out just
before the election date. After a squabble over the Chairman-
ship between the two Iban parties was resolved with PAPAS's
Temenggong Jugah being selected, the Sarawak Alliance faced
its first local test at the polls. While polling more votes
than any other group, the results were an Alliance disappoint-
ment. The Sarawak Alliance (PAPAS-BARJASA-SCA-SNAP) got
56,896 votes, independents got a huge 55,061, SUPP ran third
with 45,493, and PANAS attracted 28,243.[13] The Alliance had
succeeded in attracting Malay and Iban support, but the elec-
tion demonstrated that the Chinese voters were far more attrac-
ted to the SUPP than to the Alliance's SCA; with no majority

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[13]Robert O. Tilman, "Elections in Sarawak," *Asian Survey*,
III, No. 10 (October 1963), 507-18.

the Alliance was forced to form a coalition state government
with the independents. To the problem of attracting Chinese
support was added the more immediate problem of keeping the
Alliance together. It has been almost constantly on the verge
of fragmentation from its inception in 1963 through 1966. The
latest track being taken to increase internal cohesion has
been to encourage the affiliated parties to be run on a
strictly racial basis, as they do on the mainland. This means,
said Alliance Chairman Temenggong Jugah on July 6, 1966:

"...that all Chinese should join the Sarawak Chinese
Association, the Malays either the Barisan Ra'ayat
Berjasa or Party Negara, and Dayaks either Party
Pesaka or the Sarawak National Party. Then we can
have a strong Alliance without fighting each other."[14]

The inchoate party system of the state of Sabah is also
complex and extremely fluid. The United Sabah National Organi-
zation (USNO) is a predominantly Muslim-Malay group led by the
current Sabah Head of State, Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, a
Kadazan-Muslim; it has been strongly influenced by the penin-
sula's UMNO and is probably the state's strongest single party;
Datu Harun's brother is Sabah's Chief Minister.

The United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) led by
Anglo-Kadazan Datu Donald Stevens, is multi-racial in form but
in fact primarily a Kadazan or Dusun party in membership.
Stevens is probably the best known and most popular personal-
ity in Sabah, and his party was the first to declare support
for the Malaysia proposals, and the first to propose a Sabah

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[14] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Wednesday, July 6,
1966.

Alliance in November 1962. His party is primarily Christian in membership, however, and this factor has contributed to tensions with the mostly Muslim USNO; the leaders of the two parties, USNO's Datu Harun and UNKO's Datu Stevens, locked in a power clash in 1965 that took Kuala Lumpur intervention by the Tunku to resolve. The compromise reached was Stevens' resignation as Sabah's Chief Minister to take a Federal Cabinet post as Minister of Sabah Affairs, allowing USNO to fill the Chief Minister's position. When Stevens seemed to be sympathetic to Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, he was increasingly isolated by the Kuala Lumpur leadership; finally, in the aftermath of Singapore's separation, he resigned his ministry in protest to Kuala Lumpur's lack of consultation in the Singapore decision on August 21, 1965.[15]

The Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP) is itself an amalgamation of two Chinese parties with only regional strength. The first component is the United Party with strength concentrated in the Sandakan area; the second is the Democratic Party led by Peter Chin with key strength localized in the Jesselton region.

An additional and, by comparison, minor Sabah party is the United National Pasok Momogun (UNPM) led by G. S. Sundang, a key Murut leader; it has regional strength only among the Murut and Dusun peoples of the Sabah interior. The final Sabah party is the almost insignificant Sabah Indian Congress

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[15] The New York Times, Saturday, August 21, 1965.

(SIC) led by Kehar Singh; it is of minor significance and has
little potential, for there are just a little over 3,000
Indians in all of Sabah.

With only independents to oppose them, the affiliated
parties of the Sabah Alliance won a resounding victory in the
state's first local elections in 1963, capturing 95 per cent
of the total vote and winning 131 of 137 wards, in many of
which the Alliance candidate went unopposed. As in Sarawak,
however, the Sabah Alliance is in constant flux and seems
always on the verge of disintegration.

How to integrate the diverse complexity of Sabah and
Sarawak party politics into a coherent national, rather than
regional, Malaysian Alliance Party plagued UMNO-MCA-MIC penin-
sula Alliance leaders throughout 1963 and 1964. Finally, in
the spring of 1965 a make-shift plan was formulated to inte-
grate officially the Borneo parties into the peninsula Alli-
ance fold.[16]

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[16] Plans to integrate Singapore's pro-Alliance parties
were also formulated and produced an interesting and relevant
experiment in direct Alliance party membership for the Singa-
pore Alliance, composed of Singapore's UMNO, MCA, MIC branches,
and the small Peoples Party. It was a direct emulation of
Singapore's strongly entrenched Peoples Action Party of Lee
Kuan Yew. "This will be our first step in our re-organization
to turn the Singapore Alliance into an effective integrated
and non-communal party—a body which the PAP claims to be,"
said Khir Johari to the Straits Times, Wednesday, March 24,
1965, in announcing the reorganization plan, adding that, "If
the plan works out well, it will inevitably apply to the par-
ent body in Malaya and the Borneo States." It soon proved evi-
dent that the experiment had failed, and the direct membership
issue is probably now mute for the foreseeable future. Singa-
pore's independence has isolated the minor parties of the
Singapore Alliance, and their future seems quite bleak.

The occasion for public announcement was the third Malaysian Alliance Convention held in Kuala Lumpur on April 17, 1965.[17] The Convention was attended by 28 delegates, 16 from Malaya, four each from Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Seventy official observers and over 400 supporters also attended and were greeted by an honor guard of UMNO, MCA, MIC, Kaum Ibu, and UMNO youth.

The major item on the agenda was the pro forma consideration[18] of a new 11-page Malaysian Alliance Party Constitution; with little discussion, it received the delegates' unanimous approval.

The new Constitution called for the reorganization of the Alliance National Council, expanding its membership from 38 to 40; of these, 27 were allotted to Malaya (11 to UMNO, 11 to the MCA, and five to the MIC), five to Sarawak, and four each to Singapore and Sabah. The National Council would meet at least once a year. One of the most fascinating aspects of the old National Council was the Constitutional provision that the Council held no voting powers and that all decisions were to be "by agreement." This provision was also an expressed part of the new Constitution and will be discussed further in this chapter's next section.

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[17] Convention attended by this writer. Details also were reported extensively in The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur), April 18, 1965.

[18] The new Constitution has been deliberated behind the scenes for several months before the official announcement of its existence and had cleared UMNO, MIC, and MCA consideration.

The Executive Committee was also reorganized and sharply reduced in membership from 14 to eight; five seats were allotted to Malaya, and one each for the States of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. This streamlined Executive Committee was to be headed by a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and a Secretary-General, to be selected, like the eight members, by the National Council. This nearly all-powerful body was again entrusted with the ability to issue directives to member parties "which the member parties must carry out," to select Alliance candidates for national and state elections, to maintain discipline among members, and to settle disputes among member parties. Meetings of the Executive Council were to be held at least once every three months.

The new Constitution for the Malaysian Alliance Party produced few surprises. It was closely patterned after the provisions of the peninsula Alliance, and the formula for representation was based upon the Malaysia Agreement for states' representation in the federal Parliament. Aside from the streamlining of the Executive Committee and the provision of direct organizational membership for all the parties in a single pan-Malaysian Alliance Party, the key characteristics of the old peninsula Alliance Party remained unchanged. It is a nationally focused structure with strong central powers; the delicate balance of forces between the peninsula's UMNO, MCA, and MIC remains essentially unchanged; these forces, furthermore, will dominate the entire Malaysian Alliance Party organization.

Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 has resulted in the muting of the above provisions regarding that State, although formal amendment of the Alliance Constitution has not been forthcoming. In section two of this chapter, the actual operation of this adapted Alliance machinery will be scrutinized in greater detail.

Opposition Parties. Neither Malaya nor Malaysia has ever had a responsible and viable opposition to the Alliance Party political condominium. All opposition parties are young, faction-torn, regional, ineffectual, and communal in fact, if not in form. Most tend to be viewed as being outside the context of legitimacy by the conservative Alliance powerholders, especially the socialist opposition parties of the left which make economic class appeals. The general failure of the opposition's economic appeal again supports the Malaysian truism that communalism overrides economic interests.

Efforts to join forces among the opposition ranks have been infrequent and short-lived. This has been in part due to the diverse and incompatible objectives of the various parties, but even those with ideological affinities seem to be at constant war with one another. For example, Socialist Front leader, Dr. Tan Che Koon, and Devan Nair, a fellow socialist but a member of the Peoples Action Party, frequently use their time in the federal Parliament to attack one another as well as the Alliance Government.[19] The Singapore-based Peoples

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[19]See, for example, The Straits Times, Saturday, June 5, 1965.

Action Party (PAP) has made the most recent, the boldest, and the most nearly successful attempt at the creation of a united opposition. In May of 1965, its leader, Lee Kuan Yew, called together five anti-Alliance parties and organized the Malaysian Solidarity Convention.[20] Just as the movement seemed to be gaining headway, Singapore was abruptly ejected from the framework of Malaysian political life, taking the PAP heart from the joint opposition movement and causing its remnants to flounder into quiescence.[21]

The removal of the PAP from the Malaysian arena has left the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) as the strongest opposition party in Malaysia. It makes the dubious claim to a membership of 40,000 and espouses a narrow Malay nationalism and a program demanding a Muslim theocracy. It vigorously opposes UMNO for compromising with non-Malays and opposed the formation of Malaysia, calling for closer ties with Indonesia. The party was founded in the early post-war period by a group of rural religious teachers led by Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, who inaugurated the party with a call for a realization of "the aspirations of Islam." Its support comes almost exclusively

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[20] Composed of the Peoples Action Party (PAP), the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), the United Democratic Party (UDP), Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP), and Sarawak's Machinda Party. For details see The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Tuesday, May 25, 1965.

[21] Singapore's ejection left Devan Nair, the sole PAP member of Parliament from a peninsula constituency, as a man without a party. He has since retained his seat and has organized a new party called the Democratic Action Party. See The Mirror: A Weekly Almanac of Current Affairs (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, July 11, 1966), 3.

from the rural and conservatively pious Malay population concentrations on the peninsula's northeast coasts, particularly in the States of Kelantan and Trengganu. The PMIP captured only one seat in the first national elections of 1955, but reached what seems to have been the peak of its power in the state and national elections of 1959 when the PMIP won control of the Kelantan and Trengganu state governments and sent 13 members to the Dewan Ra'ayat. The party seems to be in a marked decline today; in the 1964 peninsula elections it lost control of Trengganu and sent only nine men to the Dewan Ra'ayat. In mid-1955 nearly all of the party's top leadership was arrested for conspiring with Indonesia to set up a pro-Indonesian Malayan [note: not Malaysian] Government in exile in Pakistan. The party's pro-Indonesian stance in the midst of Confrontation led to defections of the party to UMNO, and the PMIP is today at its lowest ebb in popularity.[22] While in evident decline, the PMIP will probably continue to serve as a haven for UMNO defectors who are disillusioned by UMNO's compromises with non-Malays; this is especially true now that Confrontation has terminated. Puan Katijah Sidek, current head of the PMIP's women's section, recently revealed a typical attitude of the UMNO defector. "Because of my loyalty to the cause of Muslims and Malays, I left UMNO when I found its

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[22]For example, in October 1964 the PMIP withdrew its candidate (a religious school principal) from an important parliamentary by-election in the heartland of their past strength, saying that it had banked on the Alliance putting up a non-Malay candidate. The Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), Sunday, October 4, 1964.

policy was no longer in line with its original aims," she recently declared.[23]

The peninsula strength of the Socialist Front ranks second only to the PMIP among opposition parties in Malaysia. It is an uncertain coalition of two separate party organizations which joined in a united Front in 1957. The two components have little in common; they are Party Ra'ayat, a predominantly rural Malay party, and the Labour Party, a predominantly urban Chinese party. The Labour Party is probably the stronger of the two; its Chairman, ex-journalist Enche Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, espouses a democratic socialist program, and the party is ably represented by its two Dewan Ra'ayat members, Penang attorney Lim Kean Siew and Kuala Lumpur physician Dr. Tan Che Koon. It draws its main strength from the non-Malay urban workers, especially the Chinese, in the largest cities of the peninsula, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Ipoh. The Party Ra'ayat was founded by a radical leftist ex-journalist, Enche Ahmad Boestaman. The Party Ra'ayat has vacillated between chauvinistic appeals to Malay rural residents and moderate multi-racial socialism. Together, the two parties have taken an anti-Malaysia stand and attack the Alliance on all communally sensitive issues, such as Malay privileges and the Alliance language and educational policies. The Socialist Front's power peak was probably in 1959 when the party sent eight men to Parliament and won control of the Penang City Council; in 1964,

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however, the party was badly mauled in the local, state, and national elections and was reduced to two members in the Dewan Ra'ayat. A more direct sign of weakness is the fact that nearly all of the Socialist Front leadership and the constituent parties' top men are in jail as political detainees for alleged pro-Communist or pro-Indonesian activities. The authorities clamped down on the party in mid-1965, arresting Labour Party chief Enche Ishak and Enche Boestaman of the Party Ra'ayat, among others, and shut down many of the party's local branches.[24]

The Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) is also a regionally based and de facto communal party. Its base is in the state of Perak, particularly in the city of Ipoh, the home of the party's key leaders, the Seenivasagam brothers, prominent Ipoh attorneys. It is left-wing in orientation and advocates a moderate non-Communist brand of democratic socialism; the party opposed the formation of Malaysia and concentrates its attacks upon the Alliance's language, Malay privileges, and educational policy, issues that are sensitive among its predominantly non-Malay supporters. The PPP also seems to be presently in decline after a 1959 election high point; in that year the party sent eight men to Kuala Lumpur and won control of the Ipoh City Council. Like the Socialist Front, however, the PAP was badly beaten in the 1964 elections, losing control of Ipoh

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[24] For example, on June 18, 1964, the authorities raided and "dissolved" four local Labour party branches in central Malaya, The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Friday, June 18, 1965.

and maintaining only two Dewan Ra'ayat seats. The PPP was an
early supporter of Lee Kuan Yew's Malaysian Malaysia program.
Unlike other left-wing opposition parties, the PPP's activities
have not resulted in police suppression or arrests; aside from
its anti-Malaysia stance, the party's concentration on domestic
rather than foreign affairs issues probably accounts for this
as much as its puny size and strength.

In 1962 a new peninsula political party appeared with the
formation of the United Democratic Party with headquarters in
Penang, the seat of its strength and the home of its founder,
Dr. Lim Chong Eu, a former president of the MCA who broke with
the party in disagreement with UMNO demanded concessions from
MCA. Although Lim was able to take some defectors with him
and his party has continued to serve as a haven for MCA defec-
tors, the party is today quite minor, with only one seat in
Parliament and a conservative policy that differs in very few
respects from that of the MCA.

In Sarawak the only significant opposition party is the
Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP); it is mainly Chinese in
membership, leadership, and support. Party leaders such as
Ong Kee Hui and Chinese attorney, Stephen Yong, are moderate
non-Communist socialists; however, the party has been infil-
trated by the Clandestine Communist Organization of Sarawak,
and the leadership has been either unable and/or unwilling to
discontinue radical leftist cooperation. The SUPP is the old-
est, best organized, and strongest single party in Sarawak,
commanding the support of most of the Chinese population; as
noted above, the SUPP alone polled almost as many votes as all

of the Sarawak Alliance Parties put together in 1963. The
party has been anti-Malaysia since the federation proposal was
made in 1961; many of the party's members have been arrested
for pro-Communist activities. The SUPP has no strength out-
side of Sarawak.

A new Sarawak opposition party appeared on the state
scene in 1963, the Machinda Party (Malays-Chinese-Indian).
Its founders, Machinda Chairman M. Burma and Vice-Chairman
Leong Ho Yuen, claim that their party is the only truly multi-
racial party in Sarawak, although to date the party has been
unable to attract significant Malay or indigenous tribal sup-
port or membership.

While illegal, the Malayan Communist Party should not be
excluded from an account of Malaysia's opposition parties.
There appear to be two unintegrated wings of the Communist
Party in Malaysia, one in Borneo and the other in mainland
Malaysia. The Malayan wing is led by the illusive Ching Peng,
notorious leader of the guerilla forces of the 1948-1960 penin-
sula Emergency, who is reported to be in hiding with about 500
Chinese supporters in the jungles of the Thai-Malayan border,
from which he is reportedly directing the party's efforts to
infiltrate legal organizations throughout mainland Malaysia
and Singapore. The Borneo wing of the Communist Party has been
dependent upon Indonesian support for its activities and, now
that Confrontation has ended presumably, will lapse in strength.
While the party made considerable initial inroads into the
inchoate Chinese and Indian segments of the Sarawak and Sabah
trade union movement, today police suppression frustrates most

of their activities. As Frances Starner notes, in Malaysia today "communists appear to be tied down on the peninsula and in Singapore. In Sarawak they constitute a major threat only so long as they receive assistance from Indonesia."[25]

The Aggregation Process

There is no clear empirical dividing line between the processes of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and interest-conflict resolution or rule-making; indeed, the functions overlap to such an extent that the distinctions are nearly impossible to draw except in rather gross analytical terms.[26]

The focus of this study is upon the aggregation of the most fundamental and potentially disruptive conflicting interests in the Malaysian polity: major communal issues. As the foregoing look at the interest articulation process suggests, the paramount claims demanding accommodation in the Malaysian political system are diffusely articulated within communal compartments. The concern of this chapter is centered upon the process by which these raw claims are combined and converted into policy alternatives.

The components of the party system of Malaysia are multi-

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[25]Frances L. Starner, "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle," Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 251.

[26]This conceptual problem is discussed more fully in this chapter's concluding section.

functional structures. In one sense, they can be functionally viewed as major associational interest articulation structures. They are more or less permanent organizations with professional staffs, and they devote a great deal of their resources and energies to the promotion of their perceptions of the entire spectrum of interests of the racial community or economic class which they each claim to represent exclusively. This is especially cogent in respect to the non-Alliance opposition parties, which, as shall be seen, have little to no access or participatory role in the ultimate or "peak" issue aggregation centers of the Malaysian polity. Are the Malaysian parties mainly structures of interest articulation? Despite their manifest role as agents of interest advocation, it is here argued that the pre-eminent role of Malaysian parties is their function as aggregators, rather than articulators, of interests.

For conceptual clarity it is necessary to introduce the notion of levels of aggregation. It is hypothesized that there are two principal aggregation levels operating today in the Malaysian polity. The first level is restricted to Malaysia's ethnic communal compartments. The aggregation of the interests of each of Malaysia's four ethnic compartments takes place in the communal party structures of each community. Thus, all of Malaysia's parties, Alliance sub-parties, and opposition parties alike function as combinatory agents for the raw claims articulated within the respective ethnic communities. Not all are equally viable, of course, and parties such as the major Alliance affiliates, UMNO and the MCA, have nearly monopolized the function within their respective

communities. Others, such as almost all of the opposition parties, have not been successful in aggregating more than a segment of the interests of their communities. The PMIP, for example, has specialized in the combining of the religious aspirations of the Malay community in largely unsuccessful competition with UMNO's abilities to accommodate Malay religious demands. It is to this communal level of aggregation that Bone refers when he says:

> "It would seem that pressure groups tend to function within their communal sphere, so that the aggregation and the presentation of interests take place within each of the components (Malayan, Chinese, and Indian) of the governing Alliance rather than through lobbying in the legislative or executive branches."[27]

The second hypothesized level of aggregation in Malaysia is much broader and more inclusive than the communally confined scope of aggregation at the first tier; it might be termed the ultimate or peak aggregation level. Here, reference is to the over-all integration of the diverse interests of Malaysian society into a relatively coherent blend. The search for the locus of aggregation at this level takes the investigator to the very heart of the Malaysian political system, to the structures and processes by which the most fundamental national issues are accommodated and resolved.[28]

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[27] Robert C. Bone, Contemporary Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 108.

[28] Indeed, it might be claimed that the heart of any political system is the competition among diverse structures for the temporary or permanent monopolization of the right and/or power to play the role of ultimate aggregator of the nation's interests.

Although other parties and political structures participate in
the process, in Malaysia interest aggregation at this ultimate
level is virtually monopolized by the Malaysian Alliance Party.
As Clifford Geertz has noted:

> "In Malaya the striking thing is the degree to which
> the over-all integration of the diverse groups in a
> rigidly multiracial society is taking place, not so
> much in terms of state structures as such, but of
> that much more recent political invention, party or-
> ganization. It is the Alliance...within which primor-
> dial conflicts are being informally, realistically ad-
> justed, and where the strong centrifugal tendencies,
> as intense as perhaps any state...has ever faced, so
> far, being effectively absorbed, deflected and con-
> tained."[29]

The focus of attention in this inquiry is upon the Malaysian
combinatory processes at this more inclusive level. The analy-
sis begins with a more careful look at the nature and opera-
tion of the Alliance Party and moves to illustrative examples
of the Malaysian aggregation machinery in action.

The Malaysian Alliance Party, which has ruled the country
since independence, is a unique and paradoxical structure. As
Tilman observes, it is based:

> "...on the candid recognition that traditional loyal-
> ties would continue to influence the voting behavior
> of the majority of the electorate...[and yet provides
> a way to] absorb the various communal organizations
> into a larger entity, while at the same time each of
> the communal groups would not lose the individual
> identity on which its popular support depends."[30]

During the late 1940's, the leaders of UMNO, the MCA, and the

[29]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," Old Soci-
eties and New States, op. cit., p. 134.

[30]Robert O. Tilman, "The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian
Politics: Bornean Variations on a Theme," South Atlantic Quar-
terly, LXIII (January 1964), p. 61.

MIC realized that the plural society in which they operated could not be eradicated within the foreseeable future; they also reluctantly were forced to concede that necessity dictated some sort of inter-communal cooperation. As Ratnam notes:

"...political and economic power are not both concentrated in the hands of any single community; political power is largely with the Malays and economic power with the Chinese. This feature together with the fact that no community is numerically dominant, has helped to make communal bargaining a very prominent feature of Malayan politics, by emphasizing interdependence."[31]

The immediate impetus for inter-communal cooperation was the Malayan independence movement; a minimal threshold of national unity had to be crossed to create some sort of national program to hold the movement together and to preclude the use of violence as a means of accommodating inter-communal rivalries. The actual Alliance mechanism, as we have noted, was discovered largely by accident and immediately inspired by "a common distrust and fear (among UMNO and MCA leaders) of the IMP, a non-communal party which set itself the task of serving national and not communal ends."[32] It was essentially an ad hoc and pragmatic modus vivendi forged informally both in necessity and political expediency. The Malaysian Alliance

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[31] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, op. cit., p. 2.

[32] Ibid., p. 215. The IMP's successor was to turn into a narrowly Malay chauvinist party in the face of electoral defeats; known as Party Negara, it has today faded from the Malaysian scene.

Party of today still exhibits these birthmark characteristics.

It is crucial to understand the leadership pattern of the Alliance, for it imparts to the performance of the aggregation function several of its key characteristics, personalism, informality, and cliquishness.

The personalism of the aggregation process derives from the decisive role played by the Malay patrician Tunku (Prince) Abdul Rahman. This Sultan's son has been the leader of UMNO and the Alliance since independence; he is known as "Baba Malaysia" (The Father of Malaysia) and is one of Malaysia's very few truly national figures.[33] The Tunku's strength is his image as a moderate inter-communal consensus-builder, who remains aloof from the pettiness of dispute to serve a conciliatory role and as a paternalistic symbol of the bridge between races and factions. This is both a popular and a self-image that is cherished by the Tunku; recently he declared:

"I want to be the elder statesman and help resolve issues worrying one party or another. I have to play that part instead of being the aggressive leader of the Alliance."[34]

Even the political opposition concedes that the Tunku is honest, impartial, and fair. For example, at the height of the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore crisis, Lee Kuan Yew chided the UMNO

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[33] See Harry Miller, Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, First Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya (London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., 1959).

[34] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, June 12, 1965.

"hatchet men" and "slogan-shouting communal extremists" with
their "rough talk and strong, abrasive words." But he added,
"to these people I make this plea. Be like the Tengku [alter-
nate spelling of Tunku]; talk nicely, politely and calmly and
win the hearts of the Singapore people."[35]

The Tunku is both formally and informally the most power-
ful single figure in Malaysian political life. He is trusted
by nearly all factions of the UMNO rank-and-file, and just as
important, by most key factions of the communal Alliance sub-
parties. He also has the prescience to recognize the base of
his strength and to cultivate it. For example, he recently
stated:

> "The Chinese...feel that while I am alive and stay on
> as executive head and leader in this country, every-
> thing will be all right. ...[some] argue that the ul-
> tras in UMNO are ever looking for domination. While
> I am alive I can deal with these elements."[36]

No better example of the Tunku's power can be found than his
decisive role in the recent Singapore expulsion from Malaysia.
It is an outstanding example of the independent force of a
single personality upon the course of human and especially
political affairs. The surgical solution of separation was
devised independently by the Tunku on a London sick-bed on

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[35] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Monday, June 15,
1965.

[36] The Mirror: A Weekly Almanac of Current Affairs (Singa-
pore), August 8, 1966, p. 2.

June 29, 1965.[37] Even his closest confident and named successor, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, did not know of the Tunku's decision until weeks later. Razak has recently revealed that in July Lee Kuan Yew approached him with a plan to take Lee's PAP into a coalition government; he reports that he was prepared to take responsibility of having some PAP Ministers in the Federal Cabinet but stated to Lee "if the Tunku was not ready for it, then the matter would have to rest."[38]

The Tunku decisive role in the Singapore crisis was not atypical; indeed, as shall later be detailed, the incident was the most severe test of his leadership he has yet faced. On most key issues, the ultimate decision-making power has rested with the Tunku. As Parmer has noted, in many major matters he "makes decisions after discussing the matter with only three or four ministers in whom he places great trust. Such decisions are subsequently communicated to his other cabinet

[37] The Tunku was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference where he was hospitalized after an attack of shingles. He subsequently confided his decision to about a half dozen of his Alliance "inner circle" members, who kept the secret even from Lee Kuan Yew until the eve of announcement on August 9, 1965, to a startled world. One can only wonder why observers (especially the unconsulted British) did not pay more attention when the Tunku, as early as June 12, 1965, publicly declared: "I am prepared to spend hours listening to him [Lee Kuan Yew]. I wish I had not listened to all that persuasive talk before. Then Malaya [note: not Malaysia] would still be a very happy Malaya—no confrontation, nothing." The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, June 12, 1965.

[38] The Razak account of events leading to Singapore's expulsion appeared in the recently published UMNO Twentieth Anniversary Booklet; it was quoted in The Mirror, op. cit., August 8, 1966, p. 3.

members.[39]

Like the Tunku, the other Alliance leaders simultaneously play three roles in the Malaysian polity. The same personalities who lead the Alliance, also comprise the top leadership of the constituent Alliance sub-parties and, concomitantly, these same men occupy the key executive positions in the Alliance Government's Cabinet.[40] Within this small group of men, numbered at 38 by Tilman, a coterie of about a half dozen men have evolved into an "inner circle" of top decision-makers. Most, but not all, of those within this group have continuously been the incumbents of key sub-party and Alliance positions since 1955.[41] With one or two exceptions such as MCA leader Tan Siew Sin, all of the inner circle is composed of UMNO Malays. They owe their positions to their long-standing friendship with the Tunku; as Daniel Moore has noted, to a very large degree, "friendships with the Tunku determine the party role."[42] As previously detailed, these national leaders

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[39] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 333.

[40] Robert O. Tilman has empirically documented the high degree of interlocking of cabinet-party roles in his exploratory article, "Policy Formulation, Policy Execution and the Political Elite Structure of Contemporary Malaya," Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia: A Survey, op. cit., pp. 346-355.

[41] Some who have are the Tunku himself, V. T. Sambanthan, Khir Johari, and Dato Dr. Ismail; two of the most important who have not are MCA leader, Tan Siew Sin, and Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak.

[42] Daniel E. Moore, "The UMNO and the 1959 Elections: A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent Plural Society," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California (Berkeley), 1960, p. 105.

have a great deal in common. They are of the same generation, the same educational level and type (English), and of the same conservative ideological orientation. Led by the Tunku, this coterie or clique, as shall be illustrated, informally operates as the key interest aggregator in the Malaysian polity.

This leadership's simultaneous incumbency of these three political roles gives the Alliance the luxury and, in terms of internal Alliance cohesion, the problem of posturing in schizoid stances, playing the inconsistent roles of communal party leaders and inter-communal Alliance statesmen. For example, consider the following statements by two of the very highest UMNO-Alliance-Government leaders. Inche Senu bin Abdul Rahman, Alliance Minister of Information and Broadcasting and UMNO leader, recently spoke as a Malay chauvinist to his UMNO Youth audience in June of 1963:

"We know the PAP wants to partition this country.
Does it want to set up a republic? Does it want to
get rid of our Rulers, our so-called privileges?
The PAP leaders accuse us of being feudalistic.
What they mean is that our Rulers are symbols of feu-
dalism...The PAP should note that there is a limit
to our patience, there is a borderline...Push us,
corner us...then the PAP will be responsible for the
consequences. Let them be warned...Do they not real-
ize that due to the gentle, humble character of the
Malays, they have been able to gain prosperity and
comfort in this country? Or do they regard the gen-[43]
tle character of the Malays as a mark of weakness?"

The stance, tone, and emphasis are altogether different in the remarks of Inche Khir Johari, UMNO-Alliance inner-circle member and Minister of Education. Speaking to an

43The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Friday, June 12, 1965.

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Alliance inter-racial audience, Inche Johari directed his
attention to UMNO members who were present and said:

"If there are any of you here who joined the party
solely to promote your own interests, my advice to
you is: leave the party at once...UMNO is the one
and only party that is truly representative of the
Malays...but that should not make it a racial party
following a racial policy. Malays should,..live in
harmony and unity with the other races."[44]

On this type of inconsistency Pye has commented, "appar-
ently in the Malaysian environment people prefer to denounce
the pernicious qualities of communalism from a secure position
within a communal party."[45] Pye is quite right, but the incon-
sistency is probably more the result of severe role-conflict
than of deliberate political chicanery, although examples of
this can also be found. Whatever the cause, it cannot be
obscured that the Alliance is "a federated non-communal party
of sub-parties themselves frankly, explicitly, and on occasion
enthusiastically communal in appeal, set in a context of pri-
mordial suspicion and hostility."[46] This fact makes aggrega-
tion of interests by the Alliance Party structures extremely
difficult.

How has the Alliance Party remained a viable and intern-
ally cohesive political organization with such fissiparous

[44] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, October 10,
1964.

[45] Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," op.
cit., p. 111.

[46] Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," op. cit.,
p. 134.

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communal tendencies and such Janus-faced inconsistency among
its component members? This is clearly the Alliance's most
pressing and constant problem. It has not been finally solved
with a formula solution. Problems of cohesion have been
resolved in an ad hoc and pragmatic series of inter-communal
bargains and compromises in the face of immediate issues of
disruptive centrifugal potential. Inter-communal agreements
have been hammered out by Alliance leaders issue by issue,
seeking in each case a pragmatic compromise that would keep
concessions from each component within the toleration limits
of its respective supporters and rank-and-file memberships.
The resolution of each major issue has meant the re-balancing
of an already delicate inter-racial equilibrium. To remain
viable, Alliance leaders have had to ensure that concessions
would not sufficiently damage the sub-parties' images as cham-
pions of their respective communal claims to such an extent
as to destroy their support-base and, thereby, erode the foun-
dations of the entire Alliance. In such a dilemma, strains
have been inevitable. As Ratnam notes:

> "Each had to concede a certain amount to the other if
> a common policy were to be evolved...With each new
> problem, new concessions had to be made...As was in-
> evitable sections of the Malay and Chinese communi-
> ties became dissatisfied with the manner in which
> these two parties [UMNO-MCA] were representing their
> interests."[47]

Communal sub-party dissatisfaction has on frequent occa-
sions affected both the rank-and-file and the leadership of

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[47] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 215.

the Alliance components since the very inception of the entente. As Parmer has noted, "the occasions for the most difficult bargaining and hence the periods of greatest stress have been just prior to major elections when Alliance leaders have sought to reach common agreement on issues, candidates, and campaign tactics."[48]

In the pre-Independence communal bargaining before the 1955 elections, Sino (MCA) versus Malay (UMNO) disagreement crystallized over the racial allocation of Alliance candidates to contest the 52 elected seats in the Federal Legislative Council.[49] The MCA, as previously noted, entered politics late and reluctantly; the Chinese community had remained on the side-lines as UMNO defeated the Malayan Union proposals and entrenched a Malay political culture in the Federation of Malaya agreement in 1948. When the British decided to allow national elections in 1955, the MCA politically awakened to find that the Chinese community, with nearly 40 per cent of the population, comprised only 11.2 per cent of the electorate which was arranged in constituencies drawn so that in only two

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[48] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 335.

[49] The Council was to have a total of 98 seats; the 46 non-elected members were to be nominated by the British to represent the "scheduled interests" such as mining, agriculture, planting, trade unions, commerce, and the Ceylonese, Eurasian, and Aborigine minorities.

was there a non-Malay majority.[50] The MCA realized that it
was too late to alter the electoral framework and concentrated
its energies upon securing some redressing of the imbalance by
demanding more Chinese Alliance nominations and upon securing
the promise of a future liberalization of policy affecting
Chinese political participation, especially citizenship require-
ments.

In the first round of heated negotiations among UMNO and
MCA leaders, UMNO leaders promised to ease Chinese citizenship
requirements,[51] but they resisted immediate redress by accord-
ing the MCA only 12 nominations, claiming that to grant more
would risk defeat by overtly Malay communal opposition from
Dato Onn's Party Negara (his successor party to the IMP) and
the Muslim PMIP. MCA-UMNO lines hardened as each party was
goaded by its membership; UMNO rank-and-file criticized its
leaders for unnecessarily and undesirably liberal concessions
to non-Malays, and MCA members reviled their leaders for undue
submissiveness to UMNO, threatening to withdraw from the Alli-
ance. Ultimately, a compromise was reached at the center,
shaped by the top leadership of the Alliance Executive Commit-
tee in informal, behind-the-scenes negotiations; the final

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[50] Oddly enough, the constituencies do not seem to have
been gerrymandered to produce the Malay advantage; the British
Constituency Delineation Commission reported that it simply
"wholly ignored racial considerations." For details, see
Ratnam, op. cit., pp. 175-199.

[51] UMNO leaders with British advice agreed that the Chi-
nese community would have to be given a greater part in the
envisaged independent Malaya to obtain Chinese support in the
raging Emergency.

Alliance slate comprised 35 Malays, 15 Chinese, and two Indians.[52] It was a compromise pattern that would continue; as Parmer has noted:

"The hard fact that brings compromise, at least by MCA and MIC leaders, is that outside the Alliance or without UMNO they would probably have little chance of winning any of their goals except at the price of communal conflict, which they are unwilling to contemplate. UMNO leaders make some accommodation to the MCA and MIC because they are aware that they must have non-Malay support for the general progress and welfare of the nation."[53]

The informality of the aggregation process in Malaysia is well illustrated in the prologue to the 1959 Malayan elections. As a result of UMNO concessions in 1955, by 1959 the non-Malays now were in a firmer position; Chinese now comprised 35 per cent of the electorate; Indians, 7.8 per cent; and Malays, only 56 per cent. And about one-third of the constituencies now had non-Malay majorities.[54] On this basis the MCA demanded 40 seats for their candidates, pressing in addition for a review of Alliance policy on Chinese schools. After informal discussions, UMNO obtained the submission of the MCA leadership on both of these points; there would be no review

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[52] The MCA reluctantly agreed to this after it was arranged that they would also get 11 of the nominated seats. As noted previously, in the election that followed, Merdeka (independence) was the only real issue upon which the Alliance ran, and it won all but one of the 52 seats, one UMNO Malay losing to a PMIP Malay.

[53] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 335.

[54] The 52 constituencies of 1955 were simply cut in two to form 104, again without regard for racial proportions. Ratnam, op. cit., p. 201.

ef educational policy, and the MCA would be allotted only 28 seats. When the MCA rank-and-file heard of this, they pressured their leadership to such an extent that MCA President Lim Chong Eu wrote in confidence to the Tunku that, unless concessions were made, the MCA would have to consider withdrawing from the Alliance. An unknown party leaked the letter to the press.

The Tunku was furious at what now seemed to be a public ultimatum; he had been devoting nearly his entire attention to persuading selected UMNO branches to accept Chinese Alliance candidates throughout the early part of 1959. With UMNO support, he demanded that the MCA publicly retract the letter. The MCA's central committee voted 89 votes to 60 to submit in order to remain in the Alliance. With this decision, almost the entire MCA leadership and many prominent dissident members resigned from the party.[55]

The crucial point of this episode is that UMNO would not publicly be pressured. In fact, after the crisis cooled, the Tunku raised the MCA seat allocation to 32 and promised to review the educational policy; these were terms that the original MCA leadership would have almost certainly accepted. As Gullick has noted:

"The Malay and Chinese national leaders, meeting behind closed doors, can generally agree on a workable compromise to settle points in dispute between their

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[55] The MCA Secretary-General and publicity chief resigned immediately. MCA President Lim Chong Eu was persuaded to remain on until after the election, when he resigned for "reasons of health" and shortly thereafter organized a new political party, the UDP, composed of MCA defectors.

communities. Their difficulty is to convince their more militant followers that compromise is inevitable and that the agreed terms are the best obtainable. It is most difficult of all to prevent the parties from adopting postures of mutual defiance if tempers are allowed to rise."[56]

The 1959 election bargaining illustrates a persistent characteristic of the Alliance aggregation process. It takes place at the center or national level, behind closed doors, through informal discussions by key Alliance national leaders. The incident also illustrates the fact that, while compromise involves concessions on both sides, the non-Malay community is at a clear disadvantage and must formally submit and yield to UMNO Alliance supremacy. The informality of the process is highlighted by the fact that decisions reached in the Alliance National Council are not made by voting but by "agreement."[57]

The results of the 1959 election gave the Alliance an easy working majority of 74 of 104 seats, but it was not the overwhelming Alliance sweep that the Alliance expected.[58] UMNO was unexpectedly undercut by the PMIP in the northeast states of Trengganu and Kelantan; the MCA was hardest hit by the Socialist Front and the PPP which undercut them in the

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[56]J. M. Gullick, Malaya, op. cit., p. 137.

[57]A Rousseau-like concept of the emergence of a consensus or "general will" is common to several Southeast Asian countries; President Sukarno, for example, used the same device in his large "cabinet," continuing discussions until a consensus was reached.

[58]The Alliance won 74 seats; the PMIP, 13; the Socialist Front, eight; the PPP, four; independents, three; and the Party Negara and the Malayan Party each got one.

large towns of the peninsula's central west coast. What is interesting in this discussion's context is not so much that the leadership of the respective Alliance sub-parties properly viewed the results as threatening, but rather the steps which they subsequently took to better accommodate those interests which the election suggested were alienated from the Alliance.

UMNO attacked the PMIP specifically on the issue of their championship of Islam for the Malays. With threats and actual arrests of "religious fanatics" who used religion for political ends on the one hand, and a positive wooing of Muslim religious elements on the other, UMNO attempted to take the wind from the PMIP's sails. Just after the 1959 elections, UMNO announced the formation of a special Ulama (Religious Leaders') Section within the UMNO structure. This innovation was in the main a symbolic aggregation of conservative religious interests. It is obvious that the Ulama Section's formation was not designed as an articulation forum for Islamic theocratic interest, but was formed as an instrument for the mobilization of religious support for UMNO. Very few of the interests articulated by Ulama Section have been turned into policy, and those that have probably would have been without the Ulama Section's advocacy. For example, since its formation, the Section has called for: a change in the Red Cross Symbol (a Christian symbol), a ban on all pork and lard, a ban on all intoxicating liquors, the closing of all government offices on the Muslim Sabbath, the withdrawal of recognition from Israel, and cancellation of the national lottery. None of these

demands have been met. The general tone of UMNO's position has been that "Islam is a flexible religion which...[must] adjust to the modern world and...cannot be dogmatic in religious affairs."[59] Still the Alliance can be charged with competing with the PMIP on their terms. Six million Malaysian dollars were spent for Muslim education in 1962, and the Government ensures that it is well publicized. "No other Muslim country in the world has spent as much as Malaysia on this project," boasted Inche Khir Johari, Alliance Minister for Education, in opening a two and a half million dollar Muslim College in Petaling Jaya in 1966.[60] The majestic National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur, built at Government cost of over eight and a half million dollars, was opened in late 1965. The opening of local Government-financed mosques in PMIP territory seldom fails to attract a UMNO dignitary for its official opening.

One of the guiding themes of aggregation of Sino-Malay interests within the Alliance has been an attempt to effect an informal quid pro quo exchange of Chinese cooperation in improving the retarded Malay economic position in return for Malay cooperation in improving the Chinese political position. Despite the good intentions of Sino-Malay Alliance leadership, the plan has not worked smoothly; as Farmer notes, "political power--even allowing for Chinese reluctance to engage openly

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[59] Fred Von der Mehden, "Religion and Politics in Malaya," Asian Survey, III, No. 12, (December 1963), p. 614.

[60] Reported in The Mirror: A Weekly Almanac of Current Affairs (Singapore), March 14, 1966.

in politics--is much easier to transfer than is economic power."[61] In fact, while the Chinese and other non-Malay groups' political position has vastly increased in strength, the Malays' economic position has remained static.[62]

For this reason, the UMNO-dominated Alliance has been particularly sensitive about and responsive to Malay demands for Government intervention to improve their economic position. The rural Malay kampong-dweller has participated least in Malaysia's economic prosperity, and he forms the backbone of UMNO support; when the PMIP began to capitalize on Malay rural discontent in the 1959 elections and demonstrated the ability to siphon off UMNO support, UMNO became deeply concerned.

To reverse what was perceived as a possible anti-UMNO trend, the Alliance Government established a Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA); but, despite vigorous efforts under the dynamic leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, by all accounts the program was an admitted failure by 1965.[63] RIDA activities were accompanied by relentless official pressure upon Chinese businesses to open their doors to Malays. To mention but one example, of mainland Malaysia's 16 bus

[61] J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 351.

[62] For example, the Chinese proportion of the electorate has increased from 11.2 per cent in 1955 to 35.9 per cent in 1959, to 38.2 per cent in 1964. As Silcock documents, there has been no relative improvement in the economic position of the Malay community. Silcock and Fisk (eds.), The Political Economy of Independent Malaya, op. cit., p. 6.

[63] For an exploration of the reasons why, see the editorial of The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Thursday, June 17, 1965.

companies, ten are owned by the Chinese. Minister of Transport, Dato Sardon bin Haji Jubir, recently told a meeting of transport operators to increase Malay participation in their businesses:

"I would like to see more Sino-Malay participation in the transport business. This is what the Alliance is working for--a Malaysian Malaysia which politicians are harping on. This does not mean that other races will be denied their rights or that the Government is overlooking them. They should try to understand that the Government is helping those who are lagging far behind in this field."[64]

This type of effort too had little general effect, aside from well publicized show-piece and token appointments of Malays to "prominent" positions in Chinese firms.

In mid-1965, RIDA was thoroughly reorganized and given a new name and, hopefully, a new image. The manner in which this was done provides another example of the aggregation process in action. In June of 1965 after much advance publicity, the Alliance Government convened a Congress of Indigenous Peoples in Kuala Lumpur to discuss ways and means of improving the economic lot of the Malays. It was an all Malay proceeding; non-Malays were conspicuously absent, and UMNO-Alliance-Government leaders presided. During the week that filled the news media almost exclusively with news of the Congress, only one gesture was made in direction of multi-racialism. Inche Khir Johari, Chairman of the organizing committee of the Congress, declared on opening day, "I hope no one will interpret

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[64] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Thursday, June 17, 1965.

this Congress as an attempt by the indigenous people to dominate the nation's commerce and industry." He then produced a letter from Senator Chan Kong Hon, President of the United Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Malaysia, pointedly welcoming "our other Malaysian brothers to participate in commerce and industry," which Inche Johari remarked was "a good gesture never expected."[65]

After the Congress was officially opened by the Tunku, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak declared, "This congress is another proof of the closeness of the Alliance Government to the people."[66] The purpose of the Congress was declared to be "to generate an interest among indigenous people to participate in commerce and industry and to provide facilities for training those interested in the two fields." Major resolutions, unanimously adopted, called for the setting up of a Bank of the Indigenous People (Bank Bumiputra) with initial capital from the Government but with ownership ultimately to be sold to indigenous (i.e., Malay) people through shares and, also, a national corporation to exploit indigenous resources plus a national investment company wholly owned by indigenous people. The Government immediately declared that it "would prepare the machinery and plans to put into effect these

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[65] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, June 5, 1965.

[66] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Tuesday, June 8, 1965.

resolutions."[67] The new program was to be known as MARA, a
Malay acrostic meaning "advance" taken from the initial let-
ters of the Malay for The Council of Trust for the Indigenous
People.[68] The Chinese community, as represented by the MCA,
has signified its acquiescence to these Malay economic endeav-
ors with official silence; as Farmer notes, so far "no serious
effort has been made to try to legislate existing properties
and resources into Malay hands."[69] The MCA leadership and
most of the MCA membership has accepted and even unofficially
encouraged the sharing of new economic opportunities with   .
Malays as part of the bargain struck for what political power
they have gained. To endorse officially and participate
directly in such activities would cost them too much in terms
of rank-and-file support. Already the Chinese dominated oppo-
sition parties have made political capital out of MCA "sub-
missiveness" to UMNO. In fact, Lee Kuan Yew's Malaysian Malay-
sia program became such a threat to the MCA on just this point
that MCA leaders vigorously supported the Tunku's separation
decision in late 1965.[70] MCA leaders say as little as possible

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[67]Tun Razak, speaking for the Government. The Straits
Times (Kuala Lumpur), Tuesday, June 8, 1965.

[68]Majilis Amanah Ra'ayat Bumiputra.

[69]J. Norman Farmer, "Malaysia," op. cit., p. 351.

[70]"They [UMNO] want to eat up their own MCA," cried Lee
in 1965. See Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malay-
sia, op. cit., p. 33.

possible about such matters and concentrate their efforts on holding and building their political strength. For example, MCA President and Alliance Finance Minister, Tan Siew Sin, recently declared in Kuching:

"The Chinese on the whole are more prosperous than other communities. This means they also have more responsibilities to the country. They must give back to the country what they get out of it. ... concentrate on political action, Chinese associations tend to spend more time on welfare work. While this is useful, politics is more important."[71]

The Singapore-Kuala Lumpur crisis and its independence for Singapore resolution was not merely an accommodation of MCA interests, but of more important UMNO interests as well. As the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore conflict broadened and intensified in the spring of 1965, the Tunku found himself increasingly pressured for remedial action, especially by ultra-conservative UMNO Malays who were haunted and incited by the historic Malay hantu (ghost) of Chinese domination. These UMNO elements were increasingly becoming a threat to the moderate UMNO leadership exemplified by the Tunku. In fact, some of the most ardent representatives of this clique of "ultras" had worked their way into leadership positions of UMNO. For example, Syed Ja'afar Albar, informal leader of the ardent Malay chauvinist faction, was elected to the post of Secretary-General of UMNO, and the leadership of the UMNO Youth Section was his ardent supporter.

The Tunku and his moderate "inner circle" of leadership

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[71] The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Wednesday, June 16, 1965.

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found it more and more difficult to control their party. For
example, at the Eighteenth General Assembly meeting of UMNO in
May of 1965, the Tunku declared: "There have been a lot of
exchanges between leaders of the Alliance and the People's
Action Party. This is a matter which I would like you to play
down."[72] But the delegates had not intention of keeping calm;
no sooner had the Tunku finished his address when resolutions
were put, demanding the arrest and detention of Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Dato Dr. Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, Min-
ister of Internal Security and confident to the Tunku, tried
to stop the resolution's passage:

"This is not the way we do things in Malaysia. We
must act constitutionally. Mr. Lee has confined his
attacks to speeches, and we should reply in like man-
ner. The only weapon we can use in this matter is to
fight constitutionally and to persuade the Chinese
and Indians not to believe the PAP and its leaders."[73]

But the best that the moderate leadership could do was to
water the resolution down to a statement that "strong action"
should be taken against Lee Kuan Yew for his "remarks against
the Malays." It was passed unanimously.[74]

By late June the UMNO Youth Section's central committee
demanded that the Tunku not hold settlement talks with Lee
"until he apologizes in public for what he has said and done

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[72]The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur), May 16, 1965.

[73]Loc. cit.

[74]Loc. cit.

against the Malays."[75] Perceiving a threat to his leadership both from within UMNO and by Lee from without and the immediate imminence of violent racial conflict leading to a possible civil war, the Tunku concluded that Singapore had to be cut adrift before the Alliance and Malaysia collapsed into chaos. In a letter to Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister in regard to the August 9th Singapore expulsion, the Tunku wrote, "If I were strong enough and able to exert complete control, I might perhaps have delayed action, but I am not."[76] In the aftermath of Singapore's departure from the Malaysia framework, the moderate UMNO leadership has been able to re-assert its control; Syed Ja'afar Albar quietly resigned from his post as UMNO Secretary-General and was replaced by a moderate Tunku supporter. Here is an extreme example of the aggregation of interests under stress. Once again the personalism, informality, low visibility, and delicacy of the Malaysian aggregation process is highlighted.

Conclusions

This chapter's scrutiny of the interest aggregation function[77] in Malaysia suggests that the performance of the

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[75] The Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 27, 1965.

[76] This widely quoted letter was cited in The Mirror: A Weekly Almanac of Current Affairs, August 9, 1965.

[77] The inquiry was of necessity impressionistic as a consequence of lack of data and the lack of scholarly literature on the topic; conclusions are, therefore, tentative and suggestive.

function is informal, irregular, erratic, and poorly developed. It is no coincidence that these same features were found to be characteristic of the interest articulation function investigated in the previous chapter; the two functions are directly related. For example, Alliance Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, recently found it necessary to publicly implore Chinese businessmen to formalize their positions and to submit them through the proper channels, declaring in exasperation, "it is difficult for me to act on information given to me at cocktail parties."[78] Another more serious example of the consequences of an undeveloped articulation system is to be found in the difficulty encountered by the Tunku in accurately gauging the strength of the factions within his party and the strength of Lee Kuan Yew's threat from outside of UMNO. The Tunku's perception that the country was on the verge of racial civil war is at best dubious; yet, by his own admission, it was the main reason that Singapore was cut adrift from Malaysia. Without a well-developed system of interest articulation, the always tedious task of the interest aggregator is made doubly difficult.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Malaysian aggregation process is the extent to which it is monopolized by the Malaysian Alliance Party and its sub-party affiliates. The process seems to center upon Alliance intra-party and inter-party claims almost exclusively; the role played by opposition

parties and other structures is only indirect, and the role played by autonomous interests with support and strength that is independent from the Alliance communal parties themselves seems negligible.

Intra-party claims are tentatively accommodated at the first of the two prime aggregation levels in Malaysia in the communal parties of the Alliance. It is here that each community decides which of the diffuse claims of its ethnic group will be pressed and upon the acceptable toleration limits of compromise with other Alliance affiliates. It is here, also, that the diffusely articulated anxieties of each ethnic group are given concrete form and specificity as, for example, in a MCA decision to press for 40 Alliance candidacies and to accept no less than 30. The general lack of development of autonomous interest structures gives the leadership of each party a great deal of latitude and, in the last analysis, a decisive role in aggregation at this level. This is because the claims from within the party are typically subordinate to the party structure and, hence, to its leadership.

For example, within UMNO, the claims of the Ulama Section or of the Kaum Ibu Section are articulated by structures that are more instruments for support mobilization than independent interest articulators. Sometimes these party sub-structures can become agitation centers for particular interests. For example, the UMNO Kaum Ibu Section, with the dubious claim of a 50,000 membership and the belief that "it is undeniable that it is due to the Kaum Ibu that we won the general election last year," was able to win a promise from the Tunku to

appoint a woman to a cabinet rank position.[79] Another possi-
bility, as evolved during the Singapore crisis, is that party
sub-structures may become intra-party power bases for factions
that want to supercede the extant party leadership. But these
incidents are exceptional; in the main, the parties are well-
disciplined structures and are controlled tightly by the party
leadership who are, except in the most exceptional instances,
able to select the incumbents of key positions of their party's
infrastructure.

Despite the primacy of the role of the communal party
leadership over the sub-structures of the parties, neverthe-
less, we find interests being aggregated that have no organ-
ized champions as their advocates within the society. For
example, the vast new UMNO-inspired MARA program is not the
result of powerful interest groups calling for rural develop-
ment and land reform, for no such specialized groups are to be
found, either in the society at large or in the party rank-and-
file. The program is the result of the perception, largely
intuitive, of the communal party elite of what it believes are
the legitimate interests of the rural Malays. Each of the con-
stituent parties of the Alliance makes the claim of being the
only party that is truly representative of the entire spectrum
of the interests of their respective communities. The inter-
ests of the rural Malay are largely latent; one of the only
manifest cues of their alientation from UMNO was their support

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[79]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Saturday, May 15,
1965.

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for the PMIP in the elections of 1959 and to a lesser extent in 1964. While other motives are involved, MARA's inauguration can be viewed as an attempt to keep rural Malay support with UMNO and away from rival Malay political groups such as the PMIP. MARA, in the words of UMNO leader, Tun Abdul Razak, "is another proof of the closeness of the Alliance Government to the people."[80]

Interests that have been aggregated in these ways at the first or communal sub-party level are brought by the party leaders to the second Malaysian aggregation level, to the elite members of the Alliance Executive Committee. Here ultimate or peak aggregation takes place, and the communal interests of the sub-parties are accommodated and blended into an Alliance national program.

In a sense, the Alliance Party symbolically aggregates multi-racial interests by its very existence. Organizationally, it can claim, and functionally it does claim, to represent all the legitimate interests of Malaysian society. The Alliance approximates the Almond model of a "dominant non-authoritarian party" in which:

"The cohesion of the party is difficult to maintain. In order to avoid divisive issues, decisions are postponed and policy proposals take the form of diffuse programs selected more for their unifying symbolish than for their effective coping with demands emanating from the society or the various political elites."[81]

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[80]The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), Tuesday, June 8, 1965.

[81]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 41.

In Malaysia the impetus for aggregation is perceived
necessity and obvious communal interdependence. The Alliance
is "a modus vivendi, whereby traditional irreconcilable coop-
erate to sustain a political environment they may dislike but
which they support because there is no other alternative."[82]
While aggregation is a continuous process, the accommodation
of fundamental conflicts on major issues tends to be postponed
until election time or until the eruption of a crisis forces
issue resolution. Aggregation takes place at the national
level; there seems to be an informal consensus that fundamen-
tal issues cannot be resolved regionally, for, if they were,
the race with regional numerical superiority would rule. This
is unacceptable to the scattered non-Malay communities and
"even the Malays with strong regional sentiments realize that
the 'communal problem' will have to be solved at the centre."[83]

The key structure that performs the aggregation function
is the Alliance Executive Committee, composed of the top lead-
ership of the constituent Alliance sub-parties. Some crucial
interest conflicts, however, seem to be accommodated by the
Tunku alone, acting perhaps with the advice of one or two of
his closest confidants. The process is highly informal and
takes place behind closed doors. Behind closed doors, as
Tilman notes, "communal views can be aired openly, and a

[82]Bela C. Haday, et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia and
Singapore, op. cit., p. 371.

[83]K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 3.

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compromise policy can then be presented to the electorate with
the barbs produced by communal differences carefully filed
away."[84] The low visibility of communal bargaining is care-
fully maintained, for activated primordial rank-and-file senti-
ments could harden communal positions and rupture the entire
fragile Alliance entente.

In this elite bargaining forum, the dominant role of UMNO
is apparent at every turn, and the pattern is well illustrated
in the MCA and MIC concessions in the 1955 and 1959 pre-elec-
tion fights for Alliance candidacies. While real concessions
are made to the MCA, MIC, and other Alliance affiliates
because of UMNO recognition that non-Malay support is essen-
tial for the effective governance of the nation, the price is
acceptance of UMNO-led Malay political paramouncy and a Malay
political culture; in the present Malaysian setting these lat-
ter issues are non-negotiable.

It is perhaps too early to predict how the Sarawak and
Sabah Alliance affiliates will affect the mainland Malaysia
Alliance pattern of bargaining. As noted, the party systems
in each of these states is extremely fluid. As Lee Kuan Yew
has remarked, Sabah and Sarawak represent "yet unknown politi-
cal styles and tempers...It will be several years, perhaps
more than a decade, before the new pattern of ideological and
party loyalties of the communities can be discerned and

[84]Robert O. Tilman, "The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian
Politics," op. cit., p. 61.

ascertained."[85] However, during 1964 and 1965, a pattern of
mainland Alliance hegemony over the political forces of both
Borneo states has been clearly established. The Alliance has
a peninsula majority of 89 of the 159 Dewan Ra'ayat seats. As
the above mentioned resignation of Sabah Alliance Leader,
Donald Stevens, from the Alliance Cabinet suggests, the condi-
tions of entry for Borneo Alliance affiliates include accept-
ance of the Alliance pattern of the mainland as the status quo.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Gabriel Almond has observed, "All the functions in the political system...are performed by means of communication."[1] Obviously an understanding of the process through which political messages are communicated is essential to understanding the operation of any political system. Lucian Pye underscores this point, noting:

"Few people can observe at first hand the sequence of acts which constitute even a small segment of the political process; men must depend instead upon a communications system to provide them with a comprehension of the substance of politics at any particular time."[2]

In recent years the political ramifications of the communication process have received increased attention and theoretical systemization.[3] The growing political communication literature serves as a guide to the present exploratory analysis of this key process in Malaysia.

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[1]Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 45.

[2]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 153.

[3]For example, Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communications (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963); Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). For a more general and controversial study, see Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.)

Before proceeding further, a theoretical dilemma that has plagued previous communication inquiries must be confronted and resolved. Clearly the communication media of major relevance to the operation of the Malaysian political system are not merely the formal specialized structures such as the press, radio, television, etc.; obviously one's definition of media must include "mass media," but it should be broad enough to include such crucial informal communication networks as face-to-face information exchanges as well. On the other hand, to broaden the definition too widely is to fall into what Richard Fagen calls "the 'everything in politics is communication' trap," with almost no limits as to the subjects that might be investigated.[4]

How can limitation be imposed and theoretically justified? Fagen argues that the problem can be resolved by confining initial interest only to macro-communication patterns with gross consequences for the functioning of the national political system. He writes:

"...the initial analytical net must not catch and hold all communication activity, even though that activity may have functional relevance. Much must be allowed to slip through, thus sharply curtailing the empirical materials of immediate interest."[5]

The gross features of Malaysia's political communication process are analyzed with these caveats and limited goals in mind. The chapter's first section presents a descriptive

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[4] Fagen, op. cit., p. 23.

[5] Loc. cit.

identification of the major formal and informal political com-
munication structures of Malaysia. The second section of the
chapter is an analysis of the process of Malaysian political
communication or the manner in which the communication struc-
tures perform. A final section concludes the inquiry with a
characterization of the style of the performance of the commun-
ication function in the Malaysian polity.

The Communication Media

Despite the fact that Malaysia has one of the best devel-
oped communication systems in all of Asia, by Western standards
the country's modern mass communication media are still in
their infancy, as the following description reveals.

The Press. The approximately 900 million Asians living outside
of China have a total daily newspaper circulation of only
about 50 million copies.[6] By contrast, Malaysia's eight and a
half million people have 34 daily newspapers with a combined
daily circulation total of over 700,000.[7] With about eight
daily newspapers per hundred inhabitants, Malaysia seems well
developed by general area standards; still the country falls
short of the minimal "adequate" standard set by the United
Nations at no less than ten daily newspaper copies per 100
people.

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[6]E. J. B. Rose, "The Asian Press," Guy Wint (ed.), Asia:
A Handbook (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 638.

[7]Bela C. Maday et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia and
Singapore, op. cit., p. 394.

Malaysia's newspapers are privately owned and are published in each of her major languages (English, Chinese, Malay, Tamil, Punjabi). No aboriginal language dailies are published, but Borneo newspapers regularly carry indigenous language (e.g., Kadazan, Iban, or Dyak, etc.) columns. Although all Chinese dialects use the same script, special columns using expressions of particular dialect groups are carried in nearly all the Chinese papers.

Large British and Chinese-owned communication chains dominate the private sector of Malaysia's publishing industry. The largest and most influential of these is the British-owned Straits Times Press, Limited, which publishes the two most important English dailies, the morning Straits Times and the evening Malay Mail, in addition to one of the leading Malay papers, Berita Harian. Editorial policy expressed in all the chain's publications is consistent; it is conservative, pro-Malaysian, and uncritical of the ruling Alliance Party. The Chinese-owned Straits Echo Press, Limited, publishes the Penang centered regional English dailies, the morning Straits Echo and the evening Pinang Gazette; its editorial policy is also conservative, pro-West, pro-Malaysia, and uncritical of the ruling party. Another large chain is Sin Poh Amalgamated, the Singapore-based "Star" chain; also Chinese-owned, this chain publishes the morning Sing Pin Jih Pao, a politically neutral Penang regional paper, and Singapore's Sin Chew Jit Poh, one of the island's leading pro-Chinese, pro-Federation, and pro-PAP Party papers. The publication sites for these chains and the principal publishing centers for the entire country are

Table 9

MALAYSIA'S DAILY NEWSPAPERS BY REGION

Name and Language	Publication Site and Date Founded	Approximate Circulation
Malaya:		
Berita Harian........Malay	Kuala Lumpur, 1957	17,000
Chung Kuo Pao........Chinese	Kuala Lumpur, 1946	16,000
Kin Kwok Daily News..Chinese	Ipoh, 1940	19,000
Kwong Wah Yit Poh....Chinese	Georgetown, 1910	13,640
Malay Mail...........English	Kuala Lumpur, 1896	11,000
Malaya Samachar......Punjabi	Kuala Lumpur, n.a.	n.a.
Malayan Thung Pau....Chinese	Kuala Lumpur, n.a.	n.a.
Malayan Times........English	Petaling Jaya, 1962	n.a.
New Life Daily News..Chinese	Johore Bahru, n.a.	5,000
Pardesi Khalsa Sewak.Punjabi	Kuala Lumpur, 1936	9,375
Pinang Gazette.......English	Georgetown, 1833	3,000
Sing Pin Jih Pao.....Chinese	Georgetown, 1939	10,000
Straits Echo.........English	Georgetown, 1903	11,000
Straits Times........English	Kuala Lumpur, 1845	105,000
Tamil Nesan..........Tamil	Kuala Lumpur, 1924	7,500
Times of Malaya......English	Ipoh, n.a.	n.a.
Utusan Melayu........Malay	Kuala Lumpur, 1939	30,000
Warta Negara.........Malay	Georgetown, 1945	n.a.
Sarawak:		
Borneo Daily News....Chinese	Sibu, n.a.	n.a.
Brilliant Lamp News..Chinese	Sibu, 1963	n.a.
Chinese Daily News...Chinese	Kuching, 1945	2,000
Miri Daily News......Chinese	Miri, 1957	3,000
Sarawak Tribune......English	Kuching, 1945	2,300
Sarawak Vanguard.....Chinese	Kuching, 1952	5,700
See Hua Daily News...Chinese	Sibu, 1945	3,000
Ta Chung Daily News..Chinese	Kuching, 1962	4,000
Sabah:		
Api Siang Pau........Chinese	Jesselton, 1954	n.a.
Borneo Times.........Chinese	Sandakan, 1956	4,850
Borneo Times.........English	Sandakan, 1962	2,000
Daily Express........English	Jesselton, 1963	7,000
Kinabalu Daily News..Chinese	Sandakan, n.a.	n.a.
Overseas Chinese News ....Chinese	Jesselton, 1936	7,500
Sabah Times..........Chinese	Jesselton, 1963	2,000
Sabah Times..........English	Jesselton, 1947	10,000

Source: Adapted from Maday, op. cit., pp. 396-398.

Singapore,[8] Kuala Lumpur, and Georgetown.

Ten of Malaysia's 34 papers are published in the English language, and they account for about half of the total daily newspaper circulation of the country. They are read by the "educated class of all ethnic groups."[9]

The Chinese-language dailies dominate the Malaysian vernacular press, accounting for 18 of the nation's 34 newspapers and just less than half of Malaysia's total daily circulation. This is a consequence of the high literacy rate and urban concentration of Malaysia's Chinese.

There are only three Malay or National Language daily papers in Malaysia, and they circulate less than 70,000 daily copies. Of these, the Utusan Melayu is the most influential; it is published in Jawi, the Arabic script, rather than Rumi, the Romanized National Language standard; it is strongly pro-Malay nationalism and is believed to be an outlet for the United Kalay National Organization.[10] Warta Negara (Jawi) and Berita Harian (Rumi) are also pro-Malay and are geared for the predominantly rural Malay population, but, in comparison to Urusan Melayu, their pro-Malay bias is subdued.

The small Indian-language dailies circulate less than 40,000 copies a day; of these, the Tamil Nesan in Tamil and

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[8]Despite Singapore's separation from the Federation, Malaysia's newspapers continue to be read widely in Singapore, and vice versa.

[9]Maday, et al., op. cit., p. 393.

[10]Ibid., p. 399.

the <u>Pardesi</u> <u>Khalsa</u> <u>Sewak</u> in Punjabi are probably the most influential.

Besides Malaysia's 34 daily newspapers, a very wide assortment of weekly, fortnightly, monthly, and quarterly publications appear. In this segment of the publishing industry the Government clearly is the major producer; private periodicals probably circulate less than 100,000 copies a month.[11] By contrast, the Government's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting mails more than ten million copies of various publications to Malaysian addresses each year.[12] The Ministry's Press and Public Relations Division issues more than 300 press statements and over 3,500 photographs to the press per month. The Publications Division issues four monthly vernacular illustrated magazines and distributes hundreds of thousands of ad hoc posters, booklets, pamphlets, wall charts, and reference papers per month.[13] As might be expected, "in all government periodicals, the emphasis is on information, education and indoctrination—to the near exclusion of entertainment."[14]

<u>Radio</u>. Radio broadcasting in Malaysia before World War II was on an amateur basis; the Department of Radio, or "Radio Malaya",

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[11] There are no accurate figures on periodical circulation; this estimate is based on figures given in Maday, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 400-401.

[12] <u>Malaysia</u>: <u>Official Year Book</u> <u>1963</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 375.

[13] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 376.

[14] Maday, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 402.

was formed only in 1946. Although services were greatly improved and expanded under the impetus of the Communist Emergency, national broadcasting in Malaysia is still in its infancy.

Today Radio Malaysia, operated by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, broadcasts in all languages of the country over eight shortwave and 20 medium-wave transmitter centers in various parts of the country; these centers are linked by Very High Frequency and Micro-wave circuits, and reception is possible, though of uneven quality, throughout the country. Following the British BBC model, commercial broadcasting was inaugurated in Malaysia in 1962; sponsors may support complete programs or pay for spot advertisements. A ratio of 60 per cent Commercial Service to 40 per cent National Service is maintained.

Weekly broadcast time totals about 340 hours a week of which 104 hours are in Malay, 59 hours in various Chinese dialects, 87 in English, 60 in Indian languages, and the remainder in aboriginal languages. Content analysis of programs reveals that about eight per cent of daily broadcasts are devoted to news; the News Service produces over 30 new bulletins and summaries per day in addition to regular news commentaries. About 30 per cent of daily time is utilized for national programs; here political topics are given high priority, both directly through the discussion of political issues, and indirectly by coverage of national cultural, educational, and sporting events. About 53 per cent of the time is taken by commercial programs,

most of which is used for music, drama, and variety shows;
here too, the emphasis is upon Malaysian unity. Another eight
per cent of daily broadcast time is used for national educa-
tional broadcasts to primary and secondary schools; these pro-
grams are produced in cooperation with educational authorities
and, again, the emphasis is upon Malaysian unity. The small
remainder of daily time is reserved for aboriginal language
broadcasts.[15]

Radio receiver sets are licensed in Malaysia for revenue
purposes at a cost of M\$12 annually per set; in 1962 the total
number of licensed issued totaled 324,962.[16]

In the urban areas of Kuala Lumpur and Penang, the Govern-
ment radio service is supplemented by Rediffusion, Limited, a
private wired broadcasting company operating under Government
charter. The British-owned company rents wired speakers to
individual subscribers for M\$5 per month and broadcasts a two-
network program in the four main languages. Program emphasis
is upon entertainment (music takes up over 60 per cent of its
time) and news, and many are commercially sponsored. In 1962
over 13,000 subscribers were claimed.[17]

Malaysia is also within easy range of foreign propaganda
broadcasts; the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio

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[15]Data in the above paragraph is taken from Malaysia Year
Book: 1963-1964, op. cit., pp. 183-185.

[16]Loc. cit., p. 185.

[17]The company also operates in Singapore where there were
over 50,000 subscribers in 1962.

Australia, the Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, Radio Indonesia, and broadcasts from Hanoi and North Korea, all relay strong signals to Malaysia in her major languages. The Malaysian Government maintains a Central Monitoring Service to audit these messages and, since 1963, has been able to compete with them with the "Voice of Malaysia," transmitting with signals powerful enough to pervade the immediate South-east Asian area.

Television. Malaysia's Department of Television (Talivishon Malaysia) is Government owned and operated within the portfolio of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The service was only begun in 1963 and is still in its pilot stage, available only to residents within a 10-to-15 mile radius of the peninsula's major cities. Only about 25 hours a week are being transmitted presently, and as of May 1964, just over 6,000 licensed sets were in operation.[18] Programs are produced in English, Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil, with about 50 per cent of the total air time produced "live" in Malaysian studios. The remaining transmission time is filled with films, usually British and American. Television is very popular in Malaysia, and vast expansion plans aiming at the eventual establishment of a national, pan-Malaysian television network are under way.

Films. Films are extremely popular in Malaysia among all ethnic groups; there are over 300 commercial theaters in Malaya

[18] Malaysia Year Book: 1963-4, op. cit., p. 188.

alone, and movie attendance in 1960 totaled 62 million per-
sons.[19] Nearly every town in Malaysia has at least one thea-
ter, and those that do not are served by frequent visits of
mobile film units, save for the most remote areas.

Malaysia's commercial cinema industry is largely Chinese-
owned, with a large majority of the first-run theaters in the
hands of one of the two huge Hong-Kong-based companies, Cathay-
Keris Organization, or Shaw's Malay Productions; both companies
have large branches in Singapore--a major center for film dis-
tribution for all Southeast Asia. Although Singapore does
some feature production, most commercial movies are imported.

The Malaysian Film Unit of the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, founded in 1946, produces an average of 60 films
a year, mostly cinemagazines and short documentaries. The man-
date of the Film Unit, according to a Government publication,
is to promote "nation-building, and films are designed to pro-
mote common loyalty and understanding among the various races,
as well as to explain the Government policy and to combat
illiteracy."[20] The Film Unit's newsreels and documentaries
are distributed widely to private organizations as well as to
commercial movie theaters for screening in conjunction with
regular feature presentations. In addition, the Film Unit
operates more than 100 mobile units (ten per cent of which
travel by boat), each of which makes an average of 20

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[19]Naday, et al., op. cit., p. 414.

[20]Malaysia: Official Year Book, 1963, op. cit., p. 374.

presentations per month in remote rural areas. On the peninsula alone these mobile units reach an annual audience estimated at over ten million persons. In Sarawak and Sabah permanent or mobile film units owned by the Government and private interests reach annual audiences estimated at nearly 12 million and one million, respectively.[21] In the Borneo states the Chinese dominate commercial movie operations as in Malaya, and here too they are the most enthusiastic movie-goers.

Other Communication Media. In previous chapters, the political socialization, political recruitment, interest articulation, and interest aggregation functions have been analyzed; all of these functions are performed by means of communication. Consequently, the structures isolated as performing major roles in the carrying out of these functions must also be considered structures of political communication. While it would be redundant and repetitious to reiterate the analysis of these structures here, it would be a serious error to fail to recognize their salience in the political communication process.[22] In a recent work, Almond distinguishes five types of communication structures: informal face-to-face contact; traditional societal structures (e.g., family, religious groups, etc.); political output structures (e.g., legislatures, bureaucracies, etc.); political input structures (e.g., trade unions,

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[21] Maday, et al., op. cit., pp. 414-415.

[22] See infra, Chapters IV-VIII.

political parties, etc.); and the formal mass media.[23] As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, a large number of each of these major types of structures participate in the performance of the functions under scrutiny in this study. It was also seen that informal and traditional societal structures tended to be more important to the performance of each function considered than were the formal and specialized structures. While data is lacking, the same pattern of dominance of informal and traditional structures seems to characterize the Malaysian communication function, despite the existence of specialized mass media.

Recent Western research has suggested that there is a two-step flow of communication even in developed societies, with opinion leaders interposed between the media and the masses who serve to select, shade, and interpret media content.[24] As in all transitional polities, in polyglot Malaysia with high levels of illiteracy, informal communication channels are extremely important. Among rural Malays, for example, there is a custom that provides a model two-step communication flow situation; in the kampongs it is conventional for newspapers to be read aloud to the village; undoubtedly, information thus gained is spread further by word-of-mouth.

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[23] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), p. 167.

[24] Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communications: An Up-to-Date Report on the Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly, 21 (Spring 1957), pp. 61-78.

Who are these opinion leaders? In Western societies they are persons with social status and/or gregariousness.[25] The same seems to hold true in Malaysia. For example, Lucian Pye, in his study of surrendered Communist guerrillas in Malaya, found that his sample had little faith in impersonal sources of information and tended to regard as reliable information gained from local notables in face-to-face situations.[26]

Since status is culturally defined, in multi-cultural Malaysia, the various communities have different types of opinion leaders. Among the Malays, especially rural dwellers, the religious leader, the pervasive Malay nobility, and the itinerant merchant are probably the major information-carriers; among the more secular urban Malays, holders of political position probably serve major roles. For the Chinese community, the clan, the successful businessman, and the learned are probably among the major transmitters. Maday notes that, "In other ethnic communities the bazaars are probably most important in the informal transmissions of information," with bilingual persons linking the various races.[27]

Although almost completely unstudied, traditional and informal communication mechanisms such as these still constiture the dominant mode of passing information in Malaysia.

[25]Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 167.

[26]Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning, op. cit.

[27]Maday, et al., Area Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore, op. cit., p. 416.

The Communication Process

It is useful to distinguish five major sets of factors or variables that have influenced the macro-communication pattern of Malaysia's communication networks: geographic, historical, economic, sociocultural, and political.[28]

The communication implications of Malaysia's geography[29] are obvious. Malaysia is a polity divided into two by over 400 miles of the South China Sea. While a geographically small nation, over two-thirds of Malaysia's land area is covered by thick jungle which presents an immense impediment to communication. Even broadcasting is limited by difficult atmospheric conditions requiring strong transmitters to overcome. The lack of natural harbors on the peninsula's east coast has repressed marine traffic to an area already made remote to land travel from the east coast by the peninsula's central mountains and jungle.

Historically, the development of Malaysia's modern communication media is the product of the British colonial presence; the elephant, the runner, and the river were the traditional communication channels of the land--although all are still used, only the latter remains important, especially in the undeveloped peninsula east and in the Borneo states. As

[28] Richard Fagan uses a four-class typology (excluding geography) of variables, calling them "determinants of communication patterns and use;" see his Chapter IV, _Politics_ and _Communication_, op. cit., pp. 53-69.

[29] See infra, Chapter II for detailed discussion.

Michael Brecher notes, colonialism brought:

"...economic unification and the introduction of mod-
ern communications and transport [which] made it pos-
sible for people from distant parts of the realm to
come together and kindle an awareness of common in-
terests. The infusion of a Western language pro-
vided a medium of direct communication among the new
elite of colonial society. ...administrative inte-
gration and communication systems...united the terri-
tory, often for the first time...and secular educa-
tion broke down age-old barriers and facilitated com-
mon modes of thought and action."[30]

The colonial pattern was in turn conditioned by the economic
and geographic configuration of the Malaysian territories.
For example, Dobby notes, "...railways paid for by tin, pre-
ceded roads in Malaya,"[31] roads which were in turn paid for by
rubber planted on the accessible western coast of the Malay
peninsula. As a result, by far the best developed link in
Malaysia's communication chain today is the tin and rubber-
rich peninsula west coast. Other economic factors obviously
relate to communication; for example, the Government's finan-
cial capacity to expand existing communication facilities.

Geographic, historic, and economic factors such as these
combined to produce Malaysia's socio-cultural character, which
is today the nation's most serious communication impediment.
Colonialism brought the conditions for mass immigration that
produced Malaysia's plural society, and throughout the British
period, "Malays and Chinese or Indians...lived side by side in

[30]Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 21-22.

[31]E. G. H. Dobby, Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 131.

a non-intercommunicating 'plural society'."[32] Under British

rule there was little impetus for extensive interaction.

Silcock notes:

"In many spheres of activity the different races were
more concerned with their relations with the British,
who coordinated the whole system, than with relations
with one another. ....In the absence of self-govern-
ment there was no political need to communicate with
one another beyond the casual needs of daily life.
Most cultural and social life, outside the English-
educated group, followed communal lines, not so much
because of exclusiveness as for convenience."[33]

As previously noted, even the English-educated elite had only

limited interaction; many of these are moreover limited by the

very factor of their English-education common denominator from

communicating effectively with the illiterate sub-segments of

their own ethnic communities. Lee Kuan Yew and Tan Siew Sin,

for example, are unable to communicate easily in Chinese,

their ethnic "mother tongue."

The political variables that affect communication in

Malaysia are of central concern here. As Fagen notes: "The

patterning of political communication in a society depends

directly on the political 'rules of the game' which character-

ize the system."[34] The pattern of political communication is

directly attributable to differences in the organization and

ideology of different polities. Basically, the question being

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[32] Victor Purcell, The Revolution in Southeast Asia
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1962), p. 97.

[33] Silcock and Fisk, op. cit., p. 4.

[34] Fagen, op. cit., p. 66.

raised is: Who can say what, in which channels, to whom, and for what purposes in the Malaysian polity?[35]

Malaysia is usually listed among the four Asian countries (with India, Japan, and the Philippines) where the communication process enjoys the greatest freedom from government control.[36] As a parliamentary democracy, Malaysia guarantees freedom of expression in her 1963 Constitution, just as Malaya did in her 1957 basic law.

However compelling by area standards, the general judgment that Malaysian expression is politically unfettered needs to be severely qualified. As Maday notes, "the government, which influences either directly, or indirectly, all forms of the mass media, contends that the various channels of public communication must serve as vehicles of persuasion for its policies..."[37] During a State of National Emergency, freedom of expression may be legally curtailed; this is no moot point in Malaysia, for, with the Communist Emergency (1948-1960) and the Indonesian Confrontation Emergency (1964-1966), Malaysia has enjoyed less than five Emergency-free years during the entire post-war period. During both Emergency periods newspapers with Communist or anti-government leanings were closed; government radio broadcasting forbade expression of any anti-government

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[35]This is a paraphrase of Fagen's query raised, op. cit., p. 65.

[36]See, for example, David H. Bayley, Public Liberties in the New States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), p. 58.

[37]Maday, et al., op. cit., p. 391.

sentiment; the government Board of Film Censors barred the showing of movies that might "incite towards violence."

With the end of Indonesian Confrontation, some of these restrictions were relaxed, but most remain in force. The press and broadcasting stations still require a government permit to operate, film censorship is still practiced, and the Government remains extremely sensitive to criticism. Although it is probably unfair to characterize Malaysia's privately operated media as government-kept, it is also no accident that media that have had long-tenured existences are those which usually are uncritical of government policies. Rose's comment about the press in Malaysia is equally true for all her privately-run mass media; he notes: "In Malaysia...the press finds it prudent not to be too critical...[and]...operates a form of self-censorship."[38]

The political conflict that resulted in Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965 provides fascinating insights into the nature and problems of political communication in the country, as well as into the Government's efforts to control the communication process. As previously noted,[39] the Federation of Malaysia was at birth cast almost totally in, and symbolically embellished with, traditional Malay political culture. Lee Kuan Yew's "Malaysian Malaysia" movement was in large part an attack on this Malay symbolic monopoly on the

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[38] E. J. B. Rose, "The Asian Press," op. cit., p. 642.

[39] See infra, pp. 120-130.

framework of political communication. The language medium of
communication was a major aspect of the dispute; while accept-
ing Malay as a National Language, Lee's PAP Government had a
multi-lingual policy of four official languages of equal sta-
tus, a position that clashed with the Malay-only policy of
Kuala Lumpur.

It is significant that one of the early forms of this dis-
pute was the charge and counter-charge that the mass media
were being "misused." Singapore's Ministry of Culture,
Information, and Broadcasting was never administratively inte-
grated with the Federal Ministry of Information in Kuala
Lumpur and maintained considerable autonomy. To Kuala Lumpur
it seemed effrontery when Lee, a mere constituent-state prime
minister, attempted to use Singapore's media autonomy to influ-
ence the general affairs of the nation, and the Government
responded heatedly.[40] As Pye has noted:

"The communications process also performs an amplify-
ing function by magnifying some of the actions of in-
dividuals to the point that they can be felt through-
out the society, in a sense transforming mere 'man-
sized' acts into 'society-sized' acts."[41]

The Federal Government condemned Lee's efforts, charging that
he "projects a wrong dimension to the people..."[42]

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[40]See, for example, Syed Kechik, political secretary to
the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, in a press
release, "Radio, T.V. Reminder to Premier Lee," Sunday Times
(June 13, 1965).

[41]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op.
cit., p. 154.

[42]"The Alliance Accuses PAP of 'Misusing' Radio and TV,"
Straits Times (Thursday, June 10, 1965).

Lee in turn counter-charged that the Alliance Government
was only giving lip-service to the idea of equality of all
Malaysian races to multi-racial audiences:

"To understand these going-ons it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between what they say publicly to a multi-
racial audience and what they say on their own VHF
in the Jawi script. As you know, non-Malays are not
expected to learn Jawi because Rumi is the official
script and so we do not learn Jawi. So they use
Jawi in Utusan, meant only for their own VHF, their
private circuit. So it does not matter what they
say...intended for a multi-racial audience. ...the
real message is transmitted through Utusan Melayu,
described as 'the voice of the Malays' by Tunku [sic]
and in Melaya Merdeka, organ of United Malays Na-
tional Organization in the Jawi script."[43]

Lee challenged the Federal Minister of Broadcasting:

"Would he state categorically over radio and televi-
sion that he rejects the concept of a Malay Malaysia
in favour of a Malaysian Malaysia? Would he ensure
that his statement be given the widest publicity in
all languages,and in particular in the Utusan Melayu?
Inche Senu, who reads Jawi, cannot be unaware of the
fact that Utusan's policy is to black out speeches
by prominent UMNO leaders advocating a multi-racial
approach."[44]

Their communication style is to lie, misquote, distort, and to
pillory, Lee continued, and, "if they are bluffing the Malays
in the kampongs, then it is our duty to pass the message to

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[43]Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, op.
cit., p. 8. It is interesting to note that this booklet's pub-
lication was the result of the closure of a communication cir-
cuit to Lee by his Kuala Lumpur enemies. In a motion of cen-
sure to the King's speech to Parliament, Lee hoped for the
opportunity to state his case for a Malaysian Malaysia on the
house floor. In a procedural finesse by Government Ministers,
he was denied the opportunity.

[44]"PAP Challenge to Senu," Sunday Times (June 27, 1965).

them."[45] To Lee, the Malay Jawi script is "a secret short-hand;" clearly to a significant degree, for Lee, "the medium is the message."[46]

Evicting Singapore from Malaysia effectively cut Lee Kuan Yew out of Malaysia's formal communication network. As has been previously noted, the decision to evict Singapore was made by the Tunku on June 29, 1965; probably less than 30 people knew of the impending separation before its public announcement on August 9th. Lee himself was closed from this informal elite communication circuit; he learned of the decision just two days before its public announcement.

Conclusions

Gabriel Almond has suggested that the political communication function can be assessed in four meaningful respects: according to the volume of political information processed, the homogeneity of political information transmitted, the mobility of political information, and the direction of the flow of political information.[47]

Although the direct penetration of the mass media is clearly shallow and uneven within the Malaysian population,

[45]"Utusan is a Danger to Malaysia, Says Lee," Sunday Times (June 20, 1965).

[46]The phrase is Marshall McLuhan's, Understanding Media, op. cit.

[47]Almond and Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, op. cit., p. 50.

very little is known about the volume of political messages transmitted in political communication networks. Standard indicators of mass media penetration such as circulation figures, radio licenses, and television licenses are likely to gross misleading. For example, E. J. B. Rose estimates that the average Asian newspaper may be read by at least seven people; he adds that in Singapore:

"readership may be as high as 30 a paper, as the teashops rent out newspapers to their customers. In the shops where there is little work to do, the paper is passed from the owner down through the employees and, when it has been read fully by the apprentice, it is exchanged for another newspaper with the neighbouring shop."[48]

Likewise, the custom of group radio listening in rural Malay kampongs, Dayak longhouses, residences, community centers, and shops greatly increases the size of the radio audience. For these reasons, some scholars estimate that as much as 85 per cent of the population may be directly reached by radio, despite the fact that just over 300,000 receivers are licensed in the country.[49] But even if the direct access of the Malaysian people to mass media were more accurately known, it would probably be a grossly inaccurate measure of communication; such an estimate would fail to account for the communication function of informal communication transmitters, and the communication role played by non-specialized societal structures. Aside from the literate few residing in urban centers, most

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[48] E. J. B. Rose, "The Asian Press," op. cit., p. 639.

[49] Maday, et al., op. cit., p. 410.

Malaysians are exposed to a very limited volume of political messages which are processed at uneven rates of speed. The "jungle grape-vine" may rapidly transmit some factual news, for example, but with inadequate volume of information to provide understanding of the event; Malaysians must still rely upon opinion leaders to provide, perhaps partially by fabrication, a complete picture.[50]

Save perhaps for the Government operated radio and television networks, Malaysia communication media are very low in homogeneity of content; on the contrary, political messages are markedly heterogeneous, uneven, inconsistent, and often inaccurate. Lee Kuan Yew's charges of grossly disparate and tendentious reporting of the same event in different media were well-documented with textual citations for comparison.[51] To the knowledge of this writer, the Malaysian Government has never effectively rebutted Lee's arguments. In fact, Malaysian Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin as much as conceded Lee's basic point when he recently remarked that the Malaysian press continues to operate in different and mutually exclusive communal worlds.[52] In Chapter IV eight Malaysian socialization patterns were isolated; the Malay urban elite, the Malay

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[50]Pye discusses these factors in his Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., p. 161.

[51]See Lee's The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, op. cit., p. 8.

[52]Tan Siew Sin quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review: 1965 Yearbook, op. cit., p. 208.

peasant, the Chinese business elite, the Chinese worker, the
Indian elite, the Indian laborer, the urban aboriginal elite,
and the rural aborigine. Each of these political sub-cultures
has a different exposure to political information. These
communal-class networks are still largely mutually exclusive;
there is no unifying Malaysian communication network of per-
vasive penetration to provide a reliable common standard for
the evaluation of political messages.

The mobility of the flow of political information in
Malaysia is also low. The structures specialized for perva-
sive, neutral, accurate, and rapid information transmission in
modern societies are the mass media; as we have seen, these
specialized structures are still in their infancy in Malaysia.
What Jean Grossholtz discovered about communication in the
Philippines is true also of Malaysia:

"Personal and ritual face-to-face communication is
the traditional, and still dominant mode of passing
information, but the key communicators of the tradi-
tional society have contact with the mass media and
become interpreters of and mediators between the two
structures, seriously affecting the impact of the
mass media, but ensuring that traditional social be-
havior and structure will influence the messages
transmitted."[53]

In Malaysia far more political messages flow from the
polity to the society than the other way around. As seen in
Chapter VII's discussion of the interest articulation func-
tion, the channels for information flow from the society to
the polity are underdeveloped, and are characterized by low

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[53] Jean Grossholtz, The Philippines (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 203.

volume, high latency, diffuse expression, and intermittency. It was also noted that the flow of messages from society tended to be jaggedly uneven and marked by communal and class disparities. For example, while also low in volume, the strategic location of the Malay community within Malaysian society gives greater visibility to messages communicated from Malays than from other ethnic groups. Almond has noted that these findings are typical of most transitional polities where "the output of messages from the authoritative governmental structures...tend to be far larger than the input of messages from the society."[54]

In sum, Malaysia's communication process is marked by heterogeneity, unevenness, informality, inconsistency, and fragmentation. Perhaps the dominant characteristic of the communication pattern is the communally compartmentalized nature of the process. It is further characterized by the transmission of a low volume of political messages with constricted mobility. The Malaysian Government is highly sensitive to the content of its infant mass media and jealously guards its right to determine the symbols, and framework of political communication.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

What general conclusions can be drawn concerning the Malaysian polity's performance of the political functions of socialization, recruitment, articulation, aggregation, and communication? What are the broad ramifications of these conclusions about Malaysin's political input functions in respect to the political system as a whole? What are the prospects and likely directions for change in the performance of these political functions? These broad questions are explored in this final chapter.

The main points that emerged from the analytically separated topics of this study can be concisely stated in summary form. Attention was first focused upon the environment or ecology in which Malaysia's political input functions are performed, in order to set the stage in a manner that would direct attention to the close interdependency of the polity and its physical, social, and economic milieu. Sea-divided Malaysia is a small country situated on the rimland of Asia between two giant nations and two great oceans. The plural social configuration of the land's eight and a half million people has four heterogeneous ethno-cultural components, each of these ethno-cultural categories themselves comprising further entangled diversity. The economic setting mirrors and exacerbates Malaysia's communal compartmentalization. Despite segmented export

wealth based on tin and rubber, Malaysia remains a basically
non-commercial, modified-subsistence, agrarian society. Occu-
pational specialization by race is pronounced and extant com-
munal hostility is aggravated, and in part caused, by an
ethno-economic division of labor in which the enterprising
Chinese predominate.

In current form Malaysia's political history extends back
only to 1963. Forged under British guidance from anacronistic
political fragments that were in the main politically quies-
cent before World War II, this "new" polity, in less than a
score of momentous post-bellum years, underwent the catalytic
experiences of British Military Government, the terrorist Emer-
gency, the trouble task of constitutionally feeling its way
from colonialism to independence, the expulsion of one of its
states, and a major Confrontation with its neighbor Indonesia.
The Malay-dominated Alliance Party Government has been in
power since Malaysia achieved independent control of her des-
tiny.

Immersed in such diversity and discontinuity, the Malay-
sian polity performs its political socialization function in a
fragmented and inconsistent manner. A typology of eight major
political socialization patterns can be distinguished; these
eight political sub-cultures have distinctive background char-
acteristics which produce different cognitive maps and orienta-
tions toward political objects. These patterns of socializa-
tion, that of the Westernized, frequently aristocratic Malay
political elite, the impoverished rural Malay peasant-proletar-
iate, the Westernized Chinese business elite, the alienated

Chinese worker-peasant, the Westernized and professional
Indian elite, the Indian worker, the partially-Westernized
aboriginal urban elite, and the primitive rural aborigine, cor-
relate directly with the degree and level to which these sub-
culture members are recruited to political roles.

National leadership roles are virtually monopolized by
members of the Malay political elite, but are in part shared
with members of the Chinese, Indian, and indigenous elite sub-
cultures on Malay-set terms. The main structures for recruit-
ment of the Malay elite have been the civil service and the
UMNO party. Non-Malay recruitment to the level of national
leadership roles has been in the main directly from private
life in business or the professions, and by elections to local
Government authorities. Malaysia's current national leader-
ship shares a common secular English education and a Western-
ized background, but it does not constitute a homogeneous
group; its ethnic communities remain among its key reference
groups. Recruitment to the level of political auxiliary roles
follows a similar pattern of dominance of elite sub-cultures,
but role incumbents tend to be younger, less experienced, and
impatient because their mobility is blocked by seniors; they
come disproportionately from the lower socio-economic and edu-
cational ranks of their respective elite sub-cultures. Politi-
cal roles at the local activist level are manned by representa-
tives of nearly all of Malaysia's political sub-cultures, but
here too there is dominance by the ethnic-power configuration
that exists at the national level. The vast majority of Malay-
sia's population remains at the level of the periphery of

political life performing participant political roles that are
minimal and intermittent. For example, just over 60 per cent
are citizens, 40 per cent are registered in the electorate,
and under 30 per cent participate as voters in elections. The
Malays perform these minimal roles far more than do the non-
Malay communities, and most are recruited by the dominant UMNO
component of the Alliance Party. The Alliance Government has
pursued policies that attempt to deflect the socialization and
recruitment processes in the direction of the desired goals of
the Malay elite, goals which demand integration of non-Malays
into an essentially Malay political culture, despite their
rationalization in the name of creation of a distinct Malaysian
identity by fusing all Malaysian cultures.

Malaysia's interest articulation function is character-
ized by its underdevelopment; the flow of demands and supports
from the society to the polity is intimately linked to com-
munal and class disparities. Because of the strategic loca-
tion of the Malay community within the society and the politi-
cal culture, the volume, efficacy, and visibility of Malay
demands and supports are unmatched by any of the non-Malay com-
munities. The demand channels are flooded with communal
issues; because specialized associational interest structures
are in their infancy, most demands flow from informal non-
associational structures such as ethnic, religious, and class
groups, or through anomic structures such as riots. Because
the elite segments of Malaysia's societies claim to speak for
their entire communities and monopolize the input of political
demands, there is a high anomic articulation potential among

the less privileged sections of each non-elite sub-culture who have little opportunity to speak for themselves. This is especially true of the numerous alienated urban Chinese workers, as demonstrated by their major role in Malaysia's Emergency and more recent political disorders.

Political aggregation in Malaysia is characterized by personalism, informality, low visibility, and delicacy; the paramount claims demanding accommodation in the Malaysian political system are communal issues, which are diffusely articulated from non-associational communal structures. It was hypothesized that two principal aggregation levels operate in Malaysia today. The first level is the aggregation of demands within the communal party structures of each community; the party structures were found to be key combinatory agents for the raw claims articulated within the respective ethnic communities. The ethnic legs of the Alliance Party dominate aggregation at this level. The over-all integration of these diverse interests are aggregated into a relatively coherent blend at a broader peak aggregation level. The key structure that performs the aggregation function at this level is the Alliance Executive Committee, composed of the top leadership of the constituent Alliance sub-parties; here, in the virtual heart of the Malaysian polity, intense, informal elite communal bargaining takes place behind closed doors. While real concessions are made to the MCA, MIC, and other Alliance affiliates, because of UMNO recognition that non-Malay support is essential for the effective governance of the nation, the price is acceptance of UMNO-led Malay political paramouncy and a Malay

political culture; in the present Malaysian setting these issues are non-negotiable.

Political communication in Malaysia is in a broad sense the means by which all of the input functions of the polity are performed; as a consequence of previous findings, it is not startling to discover that political messages have a restricted mobility, a low volume, a low homogeneity of content, an uneven penetration into society, and a predominately polity-to-society direction of flow. Mainly communally compartmentalized, informal structures are the dominate transmitters of political messages; the specialized mass communication media are still in their infancy. While the Alliance Government does not exercise a rigid restraint on freedom of expression, it does maintain strong pressure on directly or indirectly controlled channels of political information in matters concerning the framework, the symbols, and the very language of political communication, in order to communicate its essentially Malay perception of the legitimate goals and images of Malaysian political life.

Ramifications for the Polity

It has been suggested that all societies must successfully cope with certain fundamental political crises as a requisite to becoming a modern nation-state. Among these are: a national identity crisis, a political legitimacy crisis, a political participation crisis, and a political integration

crisis.[1] Relating this study's analytically separated conclusions to the framework of these four political crises provides a convenient means for assessing the general ramifications of this inquiry for the Malaysian polity as a whole.

The crisis of achieving a common sense of national identity is a paramount contemporary problem in most developing nations;[2] it is one of Malaysia's most fundamental and acute problems.

"What appears as a process of nation-building from the point of view of governments...appears as a matter of nation-choosing by the individual."[3] Defined in this manner, the problem of national identity becomes essentially a subjective matter of personal choice made in terms of the personality needs of the individual; personal identity and national identity must be interlinked. All of the political input

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[1] These overlapping political crises are among the six conceptualized by members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The penetration and distribution crises are omitted here, because they in the main involve the performance of the polity's output functions and are thus beyond the scope of this input-focused inquiry. All are discussed in Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., pp. 62-67.

[2] See Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), and Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), for examples of research into this problem.

[3] Karl W. Deutsch, "Some Problems in Nation-Building," Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 10. In the same volume see Hermann Weilemann, "The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure," ibid., pp. 33-55.

functions of Malaysia's polity are intimately related to this problem.

The brevity of Malaysia's independent existence is an important factor in the identity crisis. The inhabitants of the land have had insufficient time to accept fully their new political structure and to become accustomed to perceiving themselves as Malaysians; Malaysian consciousness has penetrated only to a shallow level in the political socialization and political communication processes of the land. Recall that at the outbreak of World War II Malaysia was fragmented into 12 separate governments with five varieties of colonial administration.

A strong sense of national identity requires a homogeneous socialization pattern with consistent re-enforcement of the agreed-upon elements that constitute a national identity. As we have seen, only a veneer of commonality has marked the basically disparate socialization experiences of Malaysia's current generation. What Malaysian identity should mean is still ambiguous and a topic of political controversy.

As detailed above, the symbolism and framework of Malaysian national identity that is currently the dominant model held up for emulation, has been created by the Malay-dominated Alliance Government. This image of the model Malaysian citizen is that of a racially egalitarian individual who accepts without question much of the substance and nearly all the paraphernalia of a Malay political culture.

The problem is compounded not only by the fact that this image of national identity is challenged by many non-Malays,

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but by the identity crisis of the dominant national elite as
well. Throughout most of Asia nationalist movements overthrew
the indigenous aristocratic/elites that were associated with
colonial regimes. Not only were Malaysian nationalists
deprived of the psychological satisfaction of throwing the
British out, but they were left with the disconcerting heri-
tage of admiration for the ex-colonial master, mixed with hos-
tility toward him for destroying much of the basis of tradi-
tional power. Social pluralism stole much of the cohesive
power of nationalism; it was impossible to unite one nation,
one language, and one culture into a fight against the British.
Moreover, the elite had a Westernized education that made them
more at home in a European environment than in their native
land, in addition to a secular culture and an English-speaking
tongue that separated them from the masses of their ethnic com-
munities. Because the elite simultaneously occupies three
roles in the Malaysian polity today (leadership of ethnic Alli-
ance sub-parties, leaders of the multi-racial Alliance, and
leadership of the Alliance Government), with three different
reference bases, the Malaysian national elite suffers severe
role-conflict that inhibits its ability to project a consis-
tent image of the model Malaysian national identity.

Despite these problems, the force of major events in
Malaysia, such as the Japanese Occupation, the Emergency, the
formation of Malaysia, and Indonesian Confrontation, has miti-
gated the ambiguity of Malaysian national identity. These com-
mon traumatic political learning experiences had a cohesive
effect, all giving, albeit to different degrees in the

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different communities, stimulation to the projection of a
united Malaysian feeling of "we" against "them." From the
point of view of the fledgling Alliance Government, these
events necessitated the vigorous promotion of a common
national identity and the mitigation of internal divisions to
meet these threats to Malaysia's existence. Thus, as Ratnam
notes:

"Ever since the beginning of the Emergency, all the
means of mass-communication have been extensively
used, both by the Government as well as by certain
political parties, to propagate the concept of a
Malaysian nation embracing all the communities."[4]

The cumulative effect of these experiences and the effect of
the Alliance Government's successful efforts to cope with them
has been to alter the performance of the polity's political
input functions in a manner that has sharpened the focus and
deepened the penetration of the idea of Malaysian national
identity.

Goaded by necessity perhaps as much as by desire, the
Malaysian Government, with periodic lapses and inconsistency,
has injected a strong emphasis on the multi-racial dimension
of national identity within the still essentially Malay model
of political culture. This can be seen in the liberalized
recruitment policies applied to non-Malays, in the substance
of many of the demands and supports articulated by key struc-
tures in the polity, in the increased accommodation of non-
Malay interests in the aggregation process, and in the added
emphasis upon multi-racial themes in the Government-influenced

[4] K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, op. cit., p. 20.

communication processes.

What are the prospects for the future of Malaysian national identity? Much obviously depends upon how Malaysia tackles the legitimacy, participation, and integration crises to be discussed below. Evidence already presented gives grounds for cautious optimism. Despite the continuation of a primarily ethnic socialization in the more potent primary structures such as the family, members of the current school-age generation in Malaysia will have far more in common than did their parents. Despite evidence of reluctance, the Malaysian political elite as a whole basically accepts the concept of a multi-racial Malaysian Malaysia. The quarrel with Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew was not so much one of goals as it was of pace in the promotion of a Malaysian Malaysia.[5] In the matter of national identity, time seems to be on Malaysia's side; with the acceptance and agreement to broaden gradually the elements of the current model of national identity among members of the political elite, a major battle has been won. Wide popular acceptance of this identity will require more time, in addition to good will and effective promotion by the Malaysian Government.

Malaysia's crisis of legitimacy is closely related to the problem of national identity. Legitimacy requires popular acceptance and effective implementation of national goals, with basic consensus about the proper nature of authority. These

[5]R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 247.

conditions do not prevail pervasively in Malaysia today.

It has been concluded in this study that Malaysia's political input functions are quite generally underdeveloped. Pye notes that this is characteristic of most developing societies, where priority was given to the establishment of the legal and administrative structures of the polity:

"...every effort was made to isolate the operations of government from any contact with what might be considered potential political forces, and little attention was given to building up political groups that might assume responsibility for determining the appropriate goals of administration while at the same time respecting the integrity of the administrative system."[6]

As this study has detailed, the UMNO-dominated Alliance Government's definition of the goals of the nation and the nature of authority is sharply challenged. The elite's response to the contention of their legitimacy has been to inhibit the expression of anti-Alliance sentiments. The Malaysian case neatly fits Pye's general observation:

"...the constant effort of most dominant political elements is to deny the legitimacy of all competing political forces and to claim a position which is above, and not of, politics."[7]

The political condominium of the Alliance does not face a responsible and viable opposition, nor does it aggregate anti-Alliance political demands. All opposition parties are faction-torn, regional, ineffectual, and communal in fact if not in

[6] Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., p. 19.

[7] Ibid., p. 29.

form; likewise specialized interest group structures are under-developed and have too little autonomy to challenge Alliance-favored demands. Both tend to be viewed as being outside the context of legitimacy by the conservative Alliance, the sole party in power since Malaysia's birth. The Alliance has attempted to elevate itself to a position above politics to the status of a national institution, making the party, and the structure of the Malaysian polity, an undifferentiated non-partisan package.

What does the future augur for Malaysia's legitimacy crisis? It would be overly optimistic to expect an early resolution of the crisis, and in all likelihood the present problems will continue for at least a generation. Much depends upon the manner in which the other political crises facing Malaysia are confronted. The pattern of development in Western nations has been for non-partisan structures of the political system to emerge with the aura of legitimacy in a socialization process that rather clearly separates partisan from non-partisan elements.[3] Such a sorting of elements will be difficult in a dominant non-authoritarian, single party polity such as Malaysia. In the short run, the Alliance is likely to increase the strength of its claim for a legitimacy that is undifferentiated from the polity at large. This itself will probably require the socialization of a new generation to consolidate.

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[3] For example, the myth of an independent press, a non-political bureaucracy, an independent court system, etc., versus a partisan interest group and party system. See Pye, ibid., pp. 27-28.

The differentiation of the Alliance from the polity will probably take much longer. What of the interim? Barring unforeseen events, Malaysia will face no breakdown as a consequence of her present legitimacy crisis, because of the relationship of governmental performance to legitimacy. While outside the scope of the present study, the output performance or effectiveness of the Malaysian polity is regarded by scholars as high. In his study of the Malaysian polity's governmental functions, R. S. Milne in fact argues that governmental effectiveness will probably pull Malaysia through her crisis of legitimacy. His judgment is based upon Seymour M. Lipset's hypothesis that effectiveness may be a substitute for legitimacy.[9]

Political participation is another problem of crisis proportions that Malaysia faces in common with most transitional polities.[10] The level and intensity of political participation in Malaysia correlates directly with race, class, and place of residence, and the vast majority of Malaysians remain on the periphery of political life. While there is nothing peculiar about socio-economic correlates to participation or a

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[9]R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 244-247; see also Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 510-529.

[10]For one of the best theoretical treatments of the problem of participation, together with a scheme for its measurement, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 205-226.

large periphery,[11] when such features are held in common with crises of national identity, low legitimacy, and low integrative levels, as they are in Malaysia, they can become a virtual threat to national survival. This point became obvious during the Communist Emergency when the non-Malay community, especially the Chinese, showed little initial enthusiasm for participating in the Government's campaign to suppress the insurgents. At the time British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney noted:

"A feeling of resentment is growing among all the other communities at the apparent reluctance of the Chinese to help. These people live comfortably and devote themselves wholly to making money...Leading Chinese have contented themselves with living in luxury in Singapore and criticising the Police and security forces for causing injustices."[12]

It is interesting to note that the main inducement offered to the non-Malay communities to cultivate their participation took the form of a cautious opening of non-Malay recruitment channels to national life. Citizenship concessions were made, and the ideal of intercommunal cooperation in the managing of the polity was injected vigorously into Malaysian life for the first time.

The political status of the non-Malay today remains a key element in the Malaysian participation crisis. The Malay

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[11] These are characteristics of the most highly developed polities as well; see, for example, Richard Rose, "Participation in Politics," Politics in England, op. cit., pp. 83-103.

[12] Private letter of Sir Henry Gurney, cited in K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malay, op. cit., p. 21.

community outranks all non-Malay communities in number and efficacy at each level of the Malaysian polity and upon every index of political recruitment. In fact, all of Malaysia's input processes are today marked in varying degrees by the ascendency of the Malay community. Nevertheless, if one compares the extent of non-Malay participation today with the participation levels of a decade ago, remarkable and steady progress is clearly evident. Citizenship and voting requirements are, for example, today dead issues; just over a decade ago they were topics of violent political controversy. The right of the non-Malay to participate as a citizen in the Malaysian polity has been formally established; today the terms and pace of implementation of that participation right are the bones of controversy.

Much attention today focuses upon the potentially explosive issue of the presence and duration of constitutionally-sanctioned special Malay privileges. While the present leadership of Malaysia shows no sign of erasing Article 153, thus arousing the fear of non-Malays that the Malay community will have a possibly permanent, unfair advantage in political participation, it should be noted that these advantages have been exploited with moderation by the Malaysian elite and, while they specify no time limit, the political elite concedes that the privileges should be temporary.[13]

This study has highlighted the additional fact that

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[13]For a full discussion, see R. S. Milne, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

political participation is not merely a problem for the non-Malays of Malaysia, but for the non-elite members of each ethnic community as well. Politics remains in the main the affair of the urban-based elite of a pre-war generation. Despite the undeniable evidence of marked progress on this front, broad participation gaps remain between the elite and the masses, the urban-resident and the isolated rural-resident, the generation of the current elite and the impatient younger post-war generation.

These participation gaps and inequities are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The Government has made great strides in rural development benefiting all ethnic rural residents, but the task has just begun. A special problem is presented by the urban and alienated Chinese worker; he is the forgotten man of Malaysia today and illustrates it dramatically with periodic anomic activity. In the long run, Malaysia will face a virtual participation revolution. The internal and external pressures of equalitarianism are likely to erode Malay privileges; non-Malay political strength is already gathering momentum that will be difficult, if not impossible, to stop. A more cohesive and racially-balanced generation is emerging to replace the privileged aristocratic elite of the pre-war generation. Such changes will fundamentally alter the nature of the Malaysian polity.

While overlapping with the crises of identity, legitimacy,

and participation, an integration crisis[14] can be distinguished to refer to "the extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interacting relationships,"[15] or "the generalized problem of holding a system together."[16] Political integration is clearly Malaysia's most complex and most pressing political problem.

The most salient feature of the Malaysian polity is the fact that it is racked by ethnic, cultural, economic, and political pluralism of a severity that constantly threatens to rend and shatter its fragile unity. Basically, it can be argued that three factors have kept Malaysia glued together: perceived necessity, intercommunal fear, and an informal communal bargain.

The pattern of Malaysia's societal pluralism has made inter-racial cooperation a necessity for national survival. No single group in Malaysia can command a numerical majority alone; the two major races, the Malay and Chinese, are nearly of equal size, and partition is obviated by the fairly even

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[14] See Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building, op. cit.; Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, op. cit., pp. 551-562; and Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States," Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, op. cit.

[15] Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., p. 65.

[16] Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 553.

territorial dispersion of both major groups. However reluctantly, Malaysia's leadership has had to accept this fundamental fact of national existence.

Inter-communal fear has also served as a basic national cement. Clifford Geertz notes:

"...one of the more effective binding forces that has ...held Chinese and Malays together in a single state, despite the tremendous centrifugal tendencies the racial and cultural difference generates, is the fear on the part of either group that, should the Federation dissolve, they may become a clearly submerged minority in some other political framework; the Malays through the turn of the Chinese to Singapore and China; the Chinese through the turn of the Malays to Indonesia."[17]

The Alliance Government has not institutionalized a formula solution for governing in the face of fissiparous communal tendencies. To date, problems of cohesion have been resolved in an ad hoc and pragmatic series of inter-communal bargains or compromises in the face of immediate issues of disruptive potential. Inter-communal agreements have been hammered out by Alliance leaders issue by issue, seeking in each case a pragmatic compromise that would keep concessions from each component within the toleration limits of its respective supporters and rank-and-file memberships. The resolution of each major issue has meant the re-balancing of an already delicate inter-racial equilibrium.

The guiding theme of the inter-communal bargain struck by the Alliance has been based upon the fact that the two major

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[17]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," op. cit., p. 115.

races are ascendant in different spheres; Malays are dominant in the political realm, while the Chinese are dominant in the economic realm. The Alliance has attempted to effect an informal guid pro quo exchange of Chinese cooperation in improving the retarded Malay economic position, in return for Malay cooperation in improving the Chinese political position.

Leading commentators on the non-Western political process have frequently observed that developing areas operate without benefit of political "brokers" who explain problems to the public in a manner related to their specific interests. Pye, for example, notes that "there exists no institutionalized role for ...engaging in the bargaining operation necessary to accommodate and maximize the satisfaction of...demands."[18] This generalization needs qualification in respect to Malaysia. While it is true that the role is largely informal and not institutionalized, the Alliance national leadership does perform a "broker" function. Their elite position derives in the main from the trust and faith of the rank-and-file in their skill as communal champions and as the leader-negotiators of the Alliance sub-parties. As demonstrated in the text above, the Alliance forum is a tough bargaining center, requiring astute political skills of the participants. While the process is in camera, unregularized, and dependent upon an irregular personal relationships web, rather than upon a set of formal

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[18] Lucian W. Pye, "The Nature of Transitional Politics," Finkle and Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, op. cit., p. 529.

procedures, it is difficult to deny that a "broker" function is being performed by the leadership of the constituent Alliance sub-parties. The role of the pragmatic politician has emerged in Malaysia. Forged by necessity, the inter-communal bargaining process has helped to insure Malaysia's national survival.

What are the prospects for the future of Malaysian integration? In the short run, the modus vivendi and basic terms of the inter-communal bargain will continue to be the basis of operation. Tunku Abdul Rahman recently declared: "The political trends we follow are those suitable to this country and are good for the people...we do not see anything which suggests we should change our policy."[19] The Tunku's point is in part well taken; translated to academic language, he is arguing, as does Karl Deutsch, that national survival is one of the simplest ways to check the performance of the integrative function.[20]

On the other hand, it should be recalled that the Sino-Malay bargain has not yet produced its desired result. While the Chinese and other non-Malay groups have steadily increased their political strength, the economic status of the Malays has remained almost static. Economic power has proved more difficult to transfer than political power, and to redress the

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[19] Malaysian Bulletin, Malaysian Information Services, Wash., D. C., No. NB 33, (August 1966).

[20] Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," The Integration of Political Communities, op. cit., p. 144.

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balance, the Malaysian Government has recently diverted large sums to a re-vitalized rural development program designed to improve the economic status of the rural Malay kampong-resident. These promising plans will probably succeed at a level that is sufficient to keep the broad terms of the Sino-Malay bargain efficacious.

Karl W. Deutsch has suggested that the main stages of integration might be:

> "Open or latent resistance to political amalgamation into a common national state; minimal integration to the point of passive compliance with the orders of such an amalgamated government; deeper political integration to the point of active support for such a common state but with continuing ethnic or cultural group cohesion and diversity; and finally, the coincidence of political amalgamation and integration with the assimilation of all groups to a common language and culture."[21]

Only a utopian would suggest that Malaysian assimilation is closer than centuries away. Today Malaysia is posed between stage two and three in Deutsch's scheme. For the foreseeable future, Malaysia can at best hope for a high level of political integration with the continuation of linguistic and cultural diversity.

Facing the simultaneous impact of political crises of staggering proportions, Malaysia's next generation may well prove to be the most crucial period in her political history. During this period Malaysia's abilities to meet the exigencies of national existence will be harshly tested. During this

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[21] Karl W. Deutsch, "Some Problems in Nation-Building," Nation-Building, op. cit., p. 7.

period, the Alliance Government's efforts to renovate the polity's input processes will be imprinted in the political predispositions of a new generation of Malaysians.

To date, Malaysia's only slightly blemished record of political moderation, stability and pragmatism, together with her able and energetic leadership, give rise to cautious optimism for the future. Troubles abound and huge tasks remain, but Malaysia has no choice but to continue the painful transition through the poles of traditionalism and modernity, salvaging the relevant and scrapping the anachronistic.

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APPENDIX

LEGISLATOR'S BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE

(Please type or print clearly and fill in all of the blanks)

Parental Background

1. Parents' birthplace: Father (country)_____ (state)_____
   Mother (country)_____ (state)_____

2. Parents' education (highest level attained):
   Father _____
   Mother _____

3. Occupation of Father: _____

4. Religion or religions observed in parents' home: _____

5. Parents' ethnic background: Father _____
   Mother _____

Residential Background

6. Birthplace: (country)____ (state)____ (village or town)__

7. Place of rearing: (country)____ (state)____
   (village or town)__

8. Residence when you first entered politics: (state)_____
   (village or town)__

9. Current place of residence: (state)_____
   (village or town) _____

Age

10. Date of birth: (month) _____ (year) _____

11. Age upon first entering politics: _____

12. Age upon first holding a political or government position:

13. Age upon election to Parliament for the first time: _____

Educational Background

14. Institutions attended:

School's name	Location	Type: (govt., religious, private, etc.)	Language of instruction	Degree/s earned & date received
Primary				
Secondary				
University				
Graduate				
Other				

Career Background

15. Primary occupation: _____
16. Other (subsidiary) occupation: _____
17. What was the first government or political position you held? _____
18. In the period between the Malayan general elections of 1955 and 1959 were you:
    1) An _elected_ member of the Malayan Federal Legislative Council? Yes___ No___
    2) An _appointed_ member of the Malayan Federal Legislative Council? Yes___ No___
    3) A member of a state legislative assembly? Yes___ No___
    4) A member of a local government council? Yes___ No___

19. In the period between the Malayan general elections of 1959 and 1964 were you:
    1) A member of the House of Representatives? Yes___ No___
    2) A member of the Senate? Yes___ No___
    3) A member of a state legislative assembly? Yes___ No___
    4) A member of a local government council? Yes___ No___

20. Since the general elections of 1964 to the present, have you been:
    1) A member of a state legislative assembly? Yes___ No___
    2) A member of a local government council? Yes___ No___

21. In the spaces below, please list the major political and/or governmental positions you have held (or now hold) in dated chronological order:

    _____
    _____
    _____

22. List honours, titles, or awards that you have received: _

Voluntary Organization Memberships

23. Of what political organization(s) are you a member? _____
    _____

24. Of what business or professional organization(s) are you a member? _____
    _____

25. Of what religious organization(s) are you a member? _____

26. Of what philanthropic orgnization(s) are you a member? ___

27. Of what social and sports organization(s) are you a member?
    _____
    _____

Military Background

28. Branch and dates of service (if none, please indicate): __

29. Rank(s) held: _____

30. Awards and other distinctions: _____

Foreign Travel Experience

31. Please fill in the blanks:

Foreign countries visited	Length of visit (months & years)	Reason(s) for your visit: (pleasure, education, business, religious, etc.)

Marital Background

32. Current marital status: Married____ Single____

33. Number of children: _____

34. Wife's educational background (highest level attained): _____

Linguistic Background

35. Mother tongue: _____

36. The 1957 Malayan Census defines knowledge of a language as the ability "to read a notice and to write a letter." Using this definition, what languages do you know in addition to your mother tongue? _____

37. Are you the author of any articles, books, or other publications? Yes___ No___ (If 'yes', please list the main ones below indicating title, subject, date of publication, and the language in which each was written): _____

SOALAN2 LATAR BELAKANG

(Tolong taip atau tulis chap dengan terang; tolong isi semua
tempat kosong)

Latar Belakang Ibu-Bapa

1. Tempat lahir ibu-bapa: Bapa (negara)_____ (negeri)_____
   Ibu (negara) _____ (negeri)_____

2. Pelajaran ibu-bapa: (peringkat tertinggi yang di-chapai):
   Bapa: _____
   Ibu: _____

3. Kerja Bapa: _____

4. Ugama atau ugama2 yang di-'amalkan di-rumah ibu-bapa:____

5. Latar belakan bangsa ibu-bapa: Bapa _____
   Ibu _____

Latar Belakang Tempat Tinggal

6. Tempat lahir: (negara)_____(negeri)_____(kampong/bandar)

7. Tempat besar: (negara)____ (negeri)____ (kampong/bandar)__

8. Tempat tinggal waktu tuan pertama kali masok politik:
   (negeri) _____
   (kampong/bandar) _____

9. Tempat tinggal sekarang: (negeri)_____ (kampong/bandar)__

Umor

10. Tarikh lahir: (bulan)_____ (tahun) _____

11. Umor waktu pertama kali masok politik: _____

12. Umor waktu pertama kali memegang jawatan politik atau
    jawatan kerajaan: _____

13. Umor waktu pertama kali di-pileh ka-Parlimen: _____

Latar Belakang Pelajaran

14. Sekolah2 yang di-masokki:

Nama Tem-sekolah pat	Jenis: (ker-ajaan, ugama, suwa, dll.)	Bahasa Penghantar	Ijazah yang di-dapat dan tarikh menda-pat-nya
Rendah			
Menengah			
Universiti			
Siswazah			
Lain2			

Latar Belakang Kerjaya

15. Kerja utama: _____

16. Kerja2 (sambilan) lain: _____

17. Apa kerja kerajaan atau kerja politik yang pertama tuan pegang? _____

18. Dalam masa antara pilehan raya Tanah Melayu tahun 1955 ka- tahun 1959, ada-kah tuan:
    1) Ahli Majlis Mesyuarat Undangan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu yang di-pileh? Ya___ Tidak___
    2) Ahli Majlis Mesyuarat Undangan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu yang di-lantek? Ya___ Tidak___
    3) Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri? Ya___ Tidak___
    4) Ahli Majlis Kerajaan Tempatan? Ya___ Tidak___

19. Dalam masa antara pilehan raya Tanah Melayu tahun 1959 ka- tahun 1964, ada-kah tuan:
    1) Ahli Dewan Ra'ayat? Ya___ Tidak___
    2) Ahli Dewan Negara? Ya___ Tidak___
    3) Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri? Ya___ Tidak___
    4) Ahli Majlis Kerajaan Tempatan?Ya___ Tidak___

20. Semenjak pilehan raya 1964 hingga sekarang, ada-kah tuan:
    1) Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri? Ya___ Tidak___
    2) Ahli Majlis Kerajaan Tempatan? Ya___ Tidak___

21. Di-ruangan di-bawah, tolong daftarkan kerja2 politik dan/ atau kerja2 kerajaan yang besar yang tuan telah pegang (atau yang sekarang tuan pegang) mengikut susunan masa:

_____

_____

22. Daftarkan penghormatan, pangkat atau pingat yang tuan telah terima: _____

Ahli Pertubohan Sukarela

23. Apa pertubohan (pertubohan2) politik yang tuan menjadi ahli- nya? _____

24. Apa pertubohan (pertubohan2) perniagaan atau kerjaya yang uan menjadi ahli-nya? _____

25. Apa pertubohan (pertubohan2) ugama yang tuan menjadi ahli- nya? _____

26. Apa pertubohan (pertubohan2) kebajikan yang tuan menjadi ahli-nya? _____

27. Apa pertubohan (pertubohan2) masharakat atau sokan yang tuan menjadi ahli-nya? _____

Latar Belakang Tentera

28. Chawangan dan tarikh2 perkhidmatan (kalau tiada, tulis tiada): _____

Latar Belakang Tentera (sambongan)

29. Pangkat (pangkat2) yang di-pegang: _____

30. Pingat dan kepujian2 lain: _____

Pengalaman Lawatan Ka-Luar-Negeri

31. Tolong isi tempat2 yang kosong:

Negara luar yang di-lawat	Lama lawatan bulan & tahun	Sebab Lawatan: ajaran, perniagaan, ugama, dll.)	(makan-angin, pel-

Latar Belakang Perkahwinan

32. Keadaan sekarang: Beristeri_____ Bujang_____

33. Bilangan anak: _____

34. Latar belakang pelajaran isteri (peringkat tertinggi yang di-chapai): _____

Latar Belakang Bahasa

35. Bahasa ibunda: _____

36. Banchi Tanah Melayu 1957 menerangkan pengetahuan sa-saorang tentang bahasa sabagai kebolehan "membacha kenyataan serta menulis surat." Mengikut penerangan ini, apa bahasa yang tuan tahu sa-lain daripada bahasa ibunda tuan? _____

37. Ada-kah tuan pengarang makallah, buku atau penerbitan2 lain? Ya___ Tidak___ (Kalau ada, tolong daftarkan yang utama-nya di-bawah. Nyatakan tajok-nya, tarikh terbit-nya dan dalam bahasa apa di-tulis): _____

VITA

Felix Victor Gagliano, Jr. received his secondary education in his native city of New Orleans. His undergraduate study was undertaken at Louisiana State University, where he was awarded a B.A. degree in 1960. The following year he was awarded the M.A. degree in political science at the same institution and subsequently entered the Ph.D. program in political science at the University of Illinois.

Mr. Gagliano was the recipient of a Fulbright study grant to the Federation of Malaysia during 1964-1965; under these auspices he completed field research for his dissertation while based at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.

He received the Ph.D. in June of 1967 at the University of Illinois in the field of political science. Mr. Gagliano is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. He is twenty-nine years old, married, and the father of two sons.